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1.1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.2. BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
Section 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, as amended (“the Act”), 
obligates a Regional or High Court, to sentence an accused person who has been convicted of 
offences specified in the Act to life imprisonment.1 It further obligates the courts to impose 
certain minimum sentences to categories of offenders.2 The provisions of the Act were a 
temporary measure and were to be effective for only two years,3 but the period was later 
extended. 4 It was extended for a period of one year with effect from 1 May 2000 
(Government Gazette 21122 GN 23, 20 April 2000) and thereafter for two years with effect 
from 1 May 2001 (Government Gazette 7059 GN 29, 30 April 2001), for two years with 
effect from 1 May 2003 (Government Gazette 24804 GN 40, 30 April 2003), for two years 
with effect from 1 May 2005 (Government Gazette 27549 GN 21, 29 April 2005) and for two 
years with effect from 1 May 2007 (Government Gazette 29831 GN 10, 25 April 2007). The
Act covers a number of serious crimes, such as murder, robbery and rape. It further covers 
circumstances which trigger the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentences attached to 
the above-mentioned crimes. 5 The mandatory minimum sentences will attach unless the 
sentencing court is satisfied that there exist “substantial and compelling circumstances”, 
warranting a departure from the prescribed sentence and thus justifying the imposition of a 
lesser sentence.6
Various purposes for the Act have been advanced; this is despite the fact that its primary aim 
has been ascertained as deterrence.7 The provisions of the Act were introduced in an effort to 
reduce serious and violent crimes as severe sentences will often deter potential offenders 
1 s 51 (1) of the Act.
2 Ibid s 51 (2).
3 Ibid s 53 (2).
4 s 3 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 of 2007.
5 s 51 of the Act.
6 Ibid s 51 (3) (a).
7 S v Mofokeng 1999 (1) SACR 502 (W) at 526; S v Homareda 1999 (2) SACR 319 (W) at 325; S v 
Eadie 2001 (2) SACR 185 (C) at 187; S v Kgafela 2001 (2) SACR 207 (B) para 23.
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from committing crimes.8 This is also seen in S v Malgas,9 where the SCA stated that the 
legislature, through the provisions, aimed at ensuring that there was a severe, standardised 
and consistent response from the courts to the commission of serious crimes.10 It would thus 
seem that the key objective in introducing the minimum sentences was to provide a severe 
response against the commission of violent crimes. Though there is little doubt that 
deterrence was the primary aim for the enactment of the Act, it is said that the provisions of 
the Act have worsened the disparities and inconsistencies that are present in relation to the 
offences targeted by the law,11 and one submits that this could be as a result of the different 
interpretations given by the courts as to what constitutes “substantial and compelling 
circumstances”.
1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The purpose of the dissertation is to evaluate what factors could possibly constitute 
“substantial and compelling circumstances”, by critically discussing and analysing the 
manner in which our courts have defined the phrase. One will further take into account 
certain mitigating and aggravating factors in conjunction with the Zinn triad, in order to 
establish whether certain factors such as the prospects of rehabilitation can be viewed as 
“substantial and compelling” during the sentencing process. In S v Zinn12 and S v Malgas,13 it 
was stated that in the sentencing process, it is essential to consider the crime, the offender and 
the interests of society. This is because the sentence imposed has to be proportionate, taking 
these three considerations into account and where the sentence proves to be disproportionate 
or grossly disproportionate, a lesser sentence than that which has been imposed ought to be 
considered.14
In the Zinn case,15 it was implied that the interests of society require that the accused be 
incarcerated for a long time in order to protect society and to serve as a warning to future 
offenders, thus placing greater weight on the idea of deterring people in order to serve the 
8 M Tonry Sentencing Matters (1996) 159-161.
9 S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA).
10 Ibid para 25.
11 SS Terblanche, ‘Sentencing guidelines for South Africa: Lessons from elsewhere’, 2003 120 South 
African Law Journal, 881.
12 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A).
13 S v Malgas (n 9).
14 Ibid para 25.
15 S v Zinn (n 12).
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interests of society.16 Rehabilitation and deterrence thus become particularly important when 
considering the interests of society as they are focused on the reduction of crime in society 
and thus the protection of the society’s interests.  Rehabilitation is aimed at the improvement 
of the offender, with the aim of making them a law-abiding citizen, thus living a crime-free 
life.17 Deterrence on the other hand is aimed at inflicting fear in both an offender and a 
potential offender by preventing the former from re-offending and by ensuring that the latter
refrains from committing any crimes through a threat of the infliction of unpleasant 
punishment.18
Accordingly, it seems that the interests of society will be best served where offenders 
(including future offenders) are deterred from committing crimes and where there is a greater 
prospect of rehabilitating the offender in order to achieve a crime-free society. In light of this, 
a part of this dissertation will evaluate the argument that the prospects of achieving 
rehabilitation can be seen as a mitigating factor or a “substantial and compelling 
circumstance”, which once coupled with other considerations, warrants a departure from the 
prescribed sentences.
One will further look at certain developments in the law that have been recognised during the 
sentencing stage, specifically the concept of restorative justice as well as victim-impact 
statements.
1.4. KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As highlighted above, the purpose of the dissertation is to evaluate what factors could 
possibly constitute “substantial and compelling circumstances”, by critically discussing and 
analysing the manner in which our courts have defined the phrase. One thus explores the 
principles relevant to the subject and further takes into account certain mitigating and 
aggravating factors in conjunction with the Zinn triad. In addition, one looks at the prospects 
of rehabilitation as a possible “substantial and compelling circumstance”, which once coupled 
with other considerations, can warrant a departure from the prescribed sentences under s 51 
of the 1997 Act. Finally, one also looks at certain developments in the law that have been 
16 Ibid.
17 JM Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3rd ed (2005) 78-79.
18 Ibid 74-75.
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recognised during the sentencing stage, specifically the concept of restorative justice as well 
as victim-impact statements.
The dissertation seeks to answer the following questions:
a. Are the minimum sentencing provisions constitutional?
b. Do the minimum sentencing provisions strip the courts of its sentencing discretion?
c. How have the courts defined “substantial and compelling circumstances”?
d. What factors could possibly constitute “substantial and compelling circumstances”?
e. What factors are indicative of the prospects of rehabilitation and can the prospects of 
rehabilitation be recognised as a mitigating factor?
f. Has the recognition of victim impact statements as well as the concept of restorative 
justice assisted in the sentencing process?
1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FEASIBILITY 
This is a qualitative study. As such, it is based largely on a critical analysis of information 
gathered from legal materials in order to identify gaps and trends in the relevant field of 
interest. The information gathered is analysed and applied to achieve the desired outcome of 
the research. The aims and objectives of the research are achievable given the questions, 
arguments and debates arising from the chosen focus in both literature and case law. 
Literature is readily available from the university library; University of KwaZulu-Natal. The 
information is gathered from text books, articles, law journals, statutes and other publications. 
Another source is articles that are available on the internet. 
1.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
Although the research may give rise to difficult theoretical problems and may encompass a 
wide range of principles relating to sentencing, this dissertation focuses simply on the manner 
in which the courts have interpreted and applied the phrase “substantial and compelling 
circumstances”. This is done so as to determine what factors could possibly constitute such
circumstances. Although the dissertation touches on some of the principles relating to 




2. MINIMUM SENTENCES LEGISLATION
2.1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
2.1.1. SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
In the Makwanyane case,19 the Constitutional Court on the 6th of June 1995, decided against 
the death penalty. The court found that the death penalty was inconsistent with the provisions 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, then in force, and was 
later followed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (“the 
Constitution”). This was based on the fact that the penalty resulted in a violation of the right 
to life and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.20
Consequently, the Court in the circumstances ordered that the death penalty be “set aside in 
accordance with the law, and be substituted by appropriate and lawful punishment.”21 The 
Court dismissed the argument that the sentence to death was the most effective one and was 
adamant in its finding that life imprisonment as a sentence was equally effective.22
Two years after the above-mentioned judgment, Parliament passed legislation which to some 
extent satisfied the order of the Constitutional Court in the Makwanyane case. 23 The 
legislation provided for the setting aside of all death sentences and for the substitution of 
these by appropriate and lawful punishments. 24 This legislation was the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 105 of 1997, informally referred to as the “Minimum Sentences 
Legislation”.25 Under this legislation, the sentence of death, which usually attached to the 
crime of murder, was substituted by the sentence of imprisonment for life.26
19 S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).
20 Ibid para 344.
21 Ibid para 150.
22 Ibid para 128.
23 Ibid.
24 JD Mujuzi ‘The Changing Face of Life Imprisonment in South Africa’ (Research Paper 15), 2008 
Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative 17.
25 Ibid 26.
26 s 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; The Act (n 1).
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Section 51 of the Act, which was headed “Discretionary Minimum Sentences for Certain 
Serious Offences” after the passing of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 of 
2007 (“CLSAA”), obligates a Regional or a High Court, to sentence an accused person who 
has been convicted of an offence specified in the Act to life imprisonment. 27 It further 
obligates the courts to impose certain minimum sentences to categories of offenders.28 This is 
the case, unless the sentencing court is satisfied that there exist “substantial and compelling 
circumstances”, warranting a departure from the prescribed sentence and thus justifying the 
imposition of a lesser sentence.29
Section 51 (1) of the Act provides for a mandatory life sentence by stating that:
‘Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a High Court shall, if it 
has convicted a person of an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2, sentence the 
person to imprisonment for life.’
Section 51 (2) of the Act on the other hand provides for the minimum sentencing of 
categories of offenders who have been convicted of offences referred to in Parts II, III and IV 
of Schedule 2 by providing that:
‘Notwithstanding any other law, but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a Regional Court or a High 
Court shall sentence a person who has been convicted of an offence referred to in-
(a) Part II of Schedule 2, in the case of-
a. A first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 15 years;
b. A second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less than 20 years; 
and
c. A third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less 
than 25 years;
(b) Part III of Schedule 2, in the case of-
a. A first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 10 years;
b. A second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less than 15 years; 
and 
c. A third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less 
than 20 years; and 
(c) Part IV of Schedule 2, in the case of-
a. A first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 5 years;
27 s 51(1) of the Act.
28 Ibid s 51 (2).
29 Ibid s 51 (3) (a).
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b. A second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less than 7 years; 
and 
c. A third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less 
than 10 years.’
Lastly an escape clause appears under s 51 (3) (a) of the Act and provides that:
‘If any court referred to in subsections (1) or (2) is satisfied that substantial and compelling 
circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than the sentence 
prescribed in those subsections, it shall enter those circumstances on the record of the 
proceeding and must thereupon impose such lesser sentence.’
Before the introduction of the 1997 Act, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, appointed a project committee of the then South African Law Commission 
(“the SALC”) which was chaired by a judge of the High court. 30 This committee was 
appointed for purposes of investigating all issues and elements relating to sentencing, this 
included an enquiry into the desirability of introducing legislation governing the imposition 
of minimum and maximum sentences in South Africa.31 The appointed committee produced 
an Issue Paper No. 11 which was titled (Project 82) Sentencing: Mandatory minimum 
sentences in 1997.The Issue Paper outlined options for sentencing reform and recommended
that issues arising from the investigation of all sentencing aspects should be thoroughly 
debated before any legislation could be proposed.32
However, before any public comment on the Issue Paper could be made, the Act was already 
before Parliament and had included provisions which created a scheme of minimum 
sentences ranging from five-year sentences to life imprisonment. 33 This was the case 
regardless of the recommendations made by the SALC and consequently the Act was passed 
without due regard to the process of the SALC.34 In 1998 however, the Minister of Justice 
appointed a new project committee which was under the leadership of Professor Dirk Van 
Zyl Smit and this committee was to investigate and undertake empirical studies on the 
30 M O' Donovan & J Redpath ‘The Impact of Minimum Sentencing in South Africa’ (Report 2), 2006 






sentencing patterns before and after the introduction of the Act.35 This also included an 
investigation into the attitudes of the key role-players (judges) towards the Act.36 In the year 
2000, the work of this committee resulted in a report titled ‘Sentencing: A New Sentencing 
Framework’, which also included a proposed Sentencing Framework Bill.37 However, this 
Bill has never been put before Parliament.38
Before the abolishment of the death penalty however, mandatory minimum sentences were 
already in existence in South Africa.39 For instance, there were various prescribed mandatory 
sentences for drug-related offences, involving the dealing in, use or possession of potentially 
dangerous dependence-producing drugs which were prohibited.40 Further, in 1952, corporeal 
punishment was imposed as a mandatory penalty in certain circumstances.41 Again, in 1959 
where certain requirements were met, the imposition of imprisonment for the prevention of 
crime as well as imprisonment for corrective training was compulsory.42 For instance, for 
corrective training, a minimum of 2 years and a maximum of 4 years imprisonment was 
applicable and for the prevention of crime, a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of 8 years 
imprisonment was applicable.43 In 1971 however, a finding of the Viljoen Commission44 led 
to the subsequent abandonment of the prescribed sentences for corrective training and the 
prevention of crime. This was because the Commission had concluded that the mandatory 
nature of minimum sentences prevented individual circumstances from being taken into 
account in the different cases before the courts and thus resulted in unfair sentences being 
imposed and also, the prescripts interfered with the judicial sentencing discretion.45




38 M O' Donovan & J Redpath (n 30) 12.
39 Ibid 11.
40 See s 2 & s 3 of the Abuse of Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act 
41 of 1971.
41 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 11 (Project 82) ‘Sentencing: Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences’ (1997) 28 & 31.
42 Ibid.
43 JJ Neser ‘Mandatory Minimum Sentences in the South African context’ (2001) 3 Crime Research in 
South Africa (CRSA) 1.
44 G Viljoen Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Penal System of the Republic of South 
Africa. Pretoria: Government Printer (1976).
45 SS Terblanche Sentencing: Changes and effect since 1994. Paper presented at conference, A
Decade of Criminal Justice in South Africa, 7–8 February 2005. (2005).
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On 1 May 1998, the 1997 Act re-introduced minimum sentencing in South Africa.46 It seems 
the legislation was not only passed as a response to the order from the Makwanyane case,47
but it was also passed as a response to the public outcry regarding the escalation of crime in 
South Africa.48 Public dissatisfaction with the crime rate at the time and the lack of grave 
sentences for serious crimes was evidenced in newspaper articles.49
The legislature’s intention in adopting the 1997 Act was to reduce the epidemic of serious 
and violent crimes through the imposition of grave sentences in order to achieve general 
deterrence.50 This was endorsed in S v Malgas51 as the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) 
stated that “In short, the Legislature aimed at ensuring a severe, standardised and consistent 
response from the courts to the commission of serious crimes.”52 Another objective that is 
often advanced, although always secondary to the key objective of deterrence, relates to the 
eradication of the inconsistencies that are present in the sentencing process. This need for 
restoring consistency arises from the fact that judges have always had an almost unlimited 
discretion in the imposition of sentences, thus resulting in discrimination. This of course has 
led to “like cases not being treated alike as some offenders were treated differently on the 
grounds of race and social status in particular cases.”53 For example, there were accusations 
of racial bias,54 which originated from the fact that some white judges were found to be more 
lenient when imposing sentences on their racial group as compared to situations where they 
had to impose sentences on black accused persons.55 It has been said however that the 
46 J Deziel The Effectiveness of Mandatory Minimum Sentences: A Comparative Study of Canada and 
South Africa (Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2013) 43.
47 S v Makwanyane (n 19).
48 South African Law Commission (n 41).
49 "People are being murdered, raped, abused and hacked, either through political, recreational or 
gangster violence. Chaos reigns without control." (The Citizen 26 October 1995); "Tough jail 
sentences should be imposed on child abusers and this could be the only deterrent against child 
abuse. ... We have told Mr Omar that the sentences meted out for offenders were too lenient and that 
new laws with stiffer sentences had to be introduced." (Sowetan 10 November 1995); "We will never 
be in a position to bring the epidemic of serious economic crime and corruption in South Africa to an 
end if we do not bring in new structures to deal with it."(Pretoria News 26 October 1995); “A minimum 
sentence and tougher sentences could be introduced for child molesters, since existing sentences do 
not appear to be sufficient deterrent for the community." (Beeld 22 November 1995) in JJ Neser (n 43)
2.
50 General deterrence: Infliction of fear in an offender and a potential offender by preventing them 
from committing crime through a threat or an infliction of an unpleasant punishment. JM Burchell (n 
17) 74-75; SS Terblanche (n 11).
51 S v Malgas (n 9).
52 Ibid para 25.
53 South African Law Commission (n 35) 26.
54 D Van Zyl Smit, ‘Mandatory Sentences: A Conundrum for the new South Africa?’ (2000) 2
Punishment and Society 198 at 202-203.
55 Ibid.
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identification of this objective proves to be inaccurate as consistency in sentencing could not 
have been the key objective, particularly because the 1997 Act was initially intended to be for 
a temporary nature. Further, the 1997 Act is only triggered where specified aggravating 
circumstances are in existence and such circumstances may differ from case to case and thus 
warrant differing results.56 It is also important to note that the Constitution places great 
importance on the principle of proportionality and thus one submits that the sentence imposed 
ought to be proportional to the seriousness of the crime, regardless of what is specified in the 
provisions of the 1997 Act.
Certain cases have also expressed views on the intention behind the passing of the 1997 Act. 
For instance, in S v Mofokeng and Another,57 the court held that the main intention of the 
legislature was to deter perpetrators and potential perpetrators through the imposition of 
severe minimum sentences. 58 In S v Homareda, 59 the court endorsed deterrence and 
retribution as the intended purposes of the said legislation.60 The court was however doubtful 
as to whether these intended purposes can only be achieved through prescribed minimum 
sentences which have proved to result in failure in the past in respect of drugs and drug 
trafficking.61
In the case of Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development 
and Others62 Cameron J held that there can be no doubt that the intention and effect of the 
minimum sentencing regime introduced in May 1998 was to impose a harsher system of 
sentencing for the scheduled crimes.63 In S v Majalefa and Another,64 Leveson J expressed 
the view that “the purpose of the legislation was to avoid disparities in sentencing”.65 The 
court in S v Montgomery66 also emphasised that the intention of the legislation was “to avoid 
56 SS Terblanche 'Mandatory and minimum sentences: Considering s 51 of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 1997' 2003 Acta Juridica 195.
57 S v Mofokeng and Another 1999 (1) SACR 450 (C).
58 Ibid para 454 C.
59 S v Homareda 1999 (1) SACR 502 (W).
60 Ibid para 526 A.
61 Ibid.
62 Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2009 (2) 
SACR 477 (CC).
63 Ibid para 16.
64 S v Majalefa and Another: Unreported judgment of the Witwatersrand Local Division delivered on 
22 October 1998.
65 S v Blaauw 1999 (2) SACR 295 (W) para 303 A.
66 S v Montgomery 2000 (2) SACR 318 (N).
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situations where surprisingly disparate sentences are imposed by different courts for a 
particular offence”.67
Though the Act was to serve the above-mentioned purposes, the provisions of the Act were 
regarded as a temporary measure, to be effective for only two years and thereafter they were 
to be extended from time to time.68 Their operation was first extended for a period of one 
year with effect from 1 May 2000, they were further extended for a period of 2 years in the 
ensuing years and this was done in May 2001 to 2007.69 After they had been extended several 
times, s 51 was rendered permanent on 31 December 2007 by the CLSAA.70 The subsequent 
amendments to the Act included the granting of jurisdiction to the Regional Court to pass life 
imprisonment, an automatic right of appeal against life imprisonment in respect of a juvenile 
accused and identification of circumstances that do not constitute “substantial and compelling 
circumstances”.71
Section 1 of the 1997 Act also provides for the substitution of the sentence of death and 
evidently, South Africa following the abolishment of the sentence of death resorted to the 
imposition of life imprisonment as the maximum sentence. 
67 Ibid para 322 H.
68 s 53 (1) & (2) of the Act (n 1).
69 Government Gazette 7059 GN 29, 30 April 2001; Government Gazette 24804 GN 40, 30 April 
2003; Government Gazette 27549 GN 21, 29 April 2005; Government Gazette 29831 GN 10, 25 April 
2007.
70 s3 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act (n 3).
71 ES Nzimande Minimum Sentence Legislation in South Africa (Unpublished LLM Thesis, Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University, 2012) III.
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2.2. JUDICIAL DISCRETION UNDER THE LEGISLATION
2.2.1. SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
The judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in S v Toms; S v Bruce,72
though decided prior to South Africa becoming a constitutional democracy with an 
enforceable bill of rights, is seemingly an important reference when dealing with the 
sentencing discretion of judicial officers. In the case, Smalberger JA held:
‘The first principle is that the infliction of punishment is pre-eminently a matter for the 
discretion of the trial court (cf R v Mapumulo and Others AD 56 at 57). The fact that courts 
should, as far as possible, have an unfettered discretion in relation to sentence is a cherished 
principle which calls for constant recognition. Such discretion permits of balanced and fair 
sentencing, which is a hallmark of enlightened criminal justice. The second, and somewhat 
related principle, is that of the individualisation of punishment, which requires proper 
consideration of the individual circumstances of each accused person. This principle too is 
firmly entrenched in our law (S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA. 855 (A) at 861D; S v Scheepers 1977 (2) 
SA 154 (A) at 158F-G)’.73
Accordingly, it has been submitted that the sentence discretion is a vital element of our law of 
sentencing and that at the heart of that discretion is the principle that each case should be 
treated on its own facts or merits and it is precisely for this reason that the sentencing 
discretion lies with the trial court.74
In the S v Dodo case,75 with regards to the sentencing discretion of judicial officers under the 
Act, the High Court concluded that the provisions of the Act undermine the independence of 
the judiciary,76 and it also pointed out that the imposition of the most severe penalty falls 
within the exclusive discretion of the sentencing court and judicial power cannot be usurped 
by the legislature for sentencing purposes.77 The Constitutional Court however, disputed the 
fact that the imposition of a heavy penalty fell within the exclusive discretion of the 
72 S v Toms; S v Bruce 1990 2 SA 802 (A).
73 Ibid para 806H-I.
74 SS Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 1st ed (1999) 122.
75 S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC).
76 Ibid para 8.
77 De Lange v Smuts NO and Others 1998(7) BCLR 779(CC), 1998(3) SA 785 (CC) para 61.
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sentencing court and concluded that this did not correctly reflect the law.78 Thus, the question 
that arises when dealing with the minimum sentences legislation is of whether or not the 
discretion of a judicial officer imposing the sentence is fettered. 
In S v Toms; S v Bruce, 79 judges expressed their concerns with regards to mandatory 
minimum sentences. Smalberger JA held:
‘It reduces the court’s normal sentencing function to the level of a rubber stamp. It negates the 
ideal of individualisation. The morally just and the morally reprehensible are treated alike. 
Extenuating and aggravating factors both count for nothing. No consideration, no matter how 
valid or compelling, can affect the question of sentence. Harsh and inequitable results 
inevitably flow from such a situation. Consequently judicial policy is opposed to mandatory 
sentences as they are detrimental to the proper administration of justice and the image and 
standing of the courts’.80
Chief Justice Corbett in support also stated that:
‘the imposition of a mandatory minimum prison sentence has always been regarded as an 
undesirable intrusion by the Legislature upon the jurisdiction of the courts to determine the 
punishment to be meted out to persons convicted of statutory offences and as a kind of 
enactment that is calculated in certain instances to produce grave injustice’.81
One submits that this to some extent holds to be correct as one is of the opinion that a court 
faced with a case where the minimum sentencing provisions apply, will have no choice, but 
to impose the prescribed sentence, when an accused is convicted of an offence referred to 
under the different parts of Schedule 2. One further submits that this will happen regardless 
of what the court might regard as the appropriate sentence in the circumstances and 
accordingly, it would seem their discretion in the circumstances stands to be fettered. This is 
largely because the enactment of the legislation meant that it was no longer business as usual, 
when sentencing for the specified offences.82
78 S v Dodo (n 75) para 13.
79 S v Toms; S v Bruce (n 72).
80 Ibid 807A-C.
81 Ibid 817 C-D.
82 S v Malgas (n 9) para 7.
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In terms of the legislation, courts are granted discretion to deviate from the prescribed 
minimum sentences in so far as there are “substantial and compelling circumstances” which 
allow for the imposition of a lesser sentence.83 Owing to this, the minimum sentences cannot 
be perceived as an interference with the independence of the judicial officers.84 This is the 
case regardless of the fact that the provisions of the 1997 Act have been viewed as an attempt 
by the legislature to do so.85 Those judicial officers, who were opposed to the Act coming 
into operation, have continued to address their concerns that arise from the fact that the 
legislation interferes with their sentencing discretion.86 Even if their objection in principle is 
set aside by the Malgas case,87 there are difficulties associated with the interpretation and 
application of the Act. These difficulties arise largely from the fact that judges have 
difficulties applying the “substantial and compelling circumstances” test,88 which in turn is 
primarily because the relationship between the test and the general principles of sentencing 
has not been clearly defined.89
In S v Blaauw90 Judge Borchers found that the Act limits the sentencing discretion of judicial 
officers to the extent that courts no longer have the discretion they previously had to impose 
sentences.91 It was said that the Act affects the discretion of the courts “more rigorously” than
it would have, if the courts had to merely find that there were “circumstances” that justified a 
departure from the prescribed minimum sentences.92 The legislature has deliberately left out
those characteristics that would make circumstances that ought to be considered by the court
meet the criteria of being substantial and compelling.93 Accordingly, they did this in order to 
leave it to the court to decide in their final stage of analysis, whether the circumstances of a 
particular case before it presents a case that is substantial and compelling and that calls for a 
departure from the prescribed sentences. 94 In addition, the legislature has not specified
whether or not the circumstances should be “exceptional” to qualify as being substantial and 
compelling, if this was the case however, the discretion of the courts would be made even 
83 The Act (n 1) S51 (3) (a).
84 Sv Malgas (n 9) para 25.
85 JJ Neser (n 43) 1.
86 South African Law Commission (n 35) at xviii .
87 S v Malgas (n 9) para 25.
88 South African Law Commission (n 35) at xviii.
89 Ibid.
90 S v Blaauw (n 65).
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 S v Malgas(n 9) para 18.
94 Ibid.
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narrower by the requirement of “exceptional”.95 In the Mofokeng case,96 the court concluded 
that the words “substantial and compelling circumstances” leave the trial court with almost 
no discretion and in fact compel it to impose the minimum sentence.97 However, the said case 
is superseded by the Malgas case,98 which suggests that the said phrase does not deviate from 
the traditional factors ordinarily taken into account when imposing a sentence.
The court’s advantage centres on the fact that they try individual cases and they can thus 
make sentencing decisions based on the particular facts of each case as they possess 
information pertaining to a particular accused.99 It is this advantage that South African judges
have used as the basis of their argument, when arguing that they should be granted an 
unfettered discretion to impose sentences in cases presented to them,100 as the sentencing 
discretion can only be properly exercised on the basis of all the facts relevant to the matter.101
It seems however, that a free and unfettered discretion amounts to an exercise of absolute 
power that our democratic system cannot tolerate.102 It can be and has been argued that in 
South Africa the sentencing discretion of judicial officers is to be exercised within statutory 
defined bounds and is not to go entirely unstructured.103
Section 51 (3) (a) of the Act however, referring to “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” has been viewed as an escape clause, which reinstates the courts discretion.104
This is also reinforced in S v Malgas,105 where the court stated that “Section 51 has limited 
but not eliminated the courts’ discretion in imposing sentence in respect of offences referred 
to in Part 1 of Schedule 2 (or imprisonment for other specified periods for offences listed in 
other parts of Schedule 2)”.106
95 Ibid.
96 S v Mofokeng (n 7).
97 Ibid.
98 S v Malgas(n 9).
99 South African Law Commission (n 35) 25. 
100 Ibid.
101 South African Law Commission (n 35) 77.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid 26.
104 SS Terblanche (n 56).
105 S v Malgas(n 9).
106 Ibid para 25.
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In Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others,107
Judge Cameron also confirmed the interpretation adopted in the S v Malgas case,108 stating 
that under the minimum sentencing provisions, the discretion granted to judicial officers was 
not eliminated, but was substantially constrained.109 In S v Mahomotsa110 it was held that, the 
sentence to be imposed once “substantial and compelling circumstances” are found to exist, is 
within the sentencing discretion of the court, of course subject to the prescripts imposed by 
the Act.111 In Malgas,112 the court remarked as follows: 
‘What stands out quite clearly is that the courts are a good deal freer to depart from the 
prescribed sentences than has been supposed in some of the previously decided cases and that it 
is they who are to judge whether or not the circumstances of any particular case are such as to 
justify a departure. However, in doing so, they are to respect, and not merely pay lip service to, 
the legislature’s view that the prescribed periods of imprisonment are to be taken to be 
ordinarily appropriate when crimes of the specified kind are committed’.113
Where legislation lacks an “escape clause” or the possibility for judges to depart from the 
mandatory sentences, the legislature eliminates the court’s discretion to impose an 
appropriate sentence, based on the particular circumstances of each individual case and 
substitutes it with a predetermined sentence that ought to apply to all cases.114
2.2.2. FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE RELATING TO JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Arguments relating to judges being given absolute independence in imposing sentences were 
rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the Mistretta v United 
States case,115 which held that: 
‘although up to that time Congress had delegated an almost unfettered sentencing discretion to 
judges, the scope of judicial sentencing discretion remained within congressional control.
107 Centre for Child Law (n 62).
108 S v Malgas (n 9).
109 Centre for Child Law (n 62).
110 S v Mahomotsa 2002 (2) SACR 435 (SCA).
111 Ibid para 18.
112 S v Malgas (n 9).
113 Ibid para 25.
114 H.Dumont ‘Disarming Canadians, and Arming Them with Tolerance: Banning Firearms and 
Minimum Sentences to Control Violent Crime. An Essay on an Apparent Contradiction in Mandatory
Minimum Sentences: Law and Policy’ (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 339.
115 Mistretta v United States ( 1989) 488 U.S 361. 
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Congress therefore had the constitutional authority to take back this wide discretion within 
statutorily defined limits’.116
Under Australian law and in the leading case of Palling v Corfield,117 it was emphasised that 
the imposition of sentences is solely associated with the powers of the legislature and they 
need not grant any judicial discretion.118 In Germany on the other hand, the independence of 
the judiciary from the other branches of government is a well-established principle. It is said 
that “judicial power may be exercised only by judges.”119 Article 104(2) of the Basic Law in 
Germany further holds that “only a judge may decide on the admissibility or continuation of 
detention”,120 thus implying that the sentencing authority is attributed to the judicial function. 
In India and in the case of Bachan Singh v State of Punjab,121 all justices agreed that the 
enactment of legislation by the legislature, adjusting judicial sentencing discretion was a 
legitimate legislative function.122 Most of the jurisdictions that have prescribed mandatory 
penalties have permitted judicial officers to depart from the prescribed sentences by the 
inclusion of an “escape” clause, like the  one apparent in South Africa under s 51 (3)(a) of the
1997 Act. This permits courts to impose a lesser sentence than that which is prescribed where 
certain circumstances exist.
In England and Wales for instance, limited judicial discretion has been granted to courts
where they are of the opinion that particular circumstances, relating to either the specified
offences or to the offender, exist and they render the imposition of the mandatory sentence 
unjust, thus warranting a departure from the prescribed sentence.123 The judge, like in South 
Africa, is expected to provide written reasons for not imposing the prescribed sentence, but 
through this, judges are then given some flexibility in the imposition of mandatory 
sentences.124 An example is to be found under the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 (“JA”) where
it is stated that:
116 South African Law Commission (n 35)27.
117 Palling v Corfield (1970) 123 CLR 52.
118 Ibid paras 58-59; Leask v Commonwealth of Australia (1996) 187 CLR 579 para 15.
119 Article 92 and 97 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz, GG) of 
1949.
120 Ibid Article 104(2).
121 Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684.
122 Ibid paras 74-75.
123 Mandatory Sentences of imprisonment in Common Law jurisdictions: some representative models 
(Canada; England and Wales; Scotland; Ireland; Australia, New Zealand and South Africa), 
Department of Justice Canada (Research and Statistics Division), (2005)14 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/reprap/2005/rr05_10/rr05_10.pdf Last accessed on 20 April 2015.
124 Ibid.
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‘The court shall impose an appropriate custodial sentence for a term of at least the required 
minimum term (with or without a fine) unless the court is of the opinion that there are 
exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or to the offender which justify it not doing 
so’.125
This is reiterated in the Sentencing Act126 where it is stated that:
‘the mandatory sentences can only be avoided where the court is of the opinion that there are 
particular circumstances which – (a) relate to any of the offences or to the offender; and (b) 
would make it unjust to impose the sentence in all the circumstances’.127
In contrast to the above, judicial officers in Canada are not granted this limited discretion 
following a finding of guilt.128 There is no “escape clause” allowing for the imposition of a 
lesser sentence.129 The lack of an “escape clause” prevents the judiciary from departing from 
the minimum sentences, even if there are exceptional circumstances allowing for such a 
departure.130 This of course is likely to lead to injustices as minimum sentences will apply to 
every offender regardless of their individual circumstances. 131 A departure is however 
allowed where there is evidence that the imposition of the sentence will amount to cruel and 
unusual punishment for the offender in the circumstances.132 In USA on the other hand, the 
sentencing judge is given an amount of flexibility when exercising their discretion in relation 
to mandatory minimum sentences, for instance a federal district court is allowed to impose a 
term of imprisonment which is lower than the prescribed minimum penalty in situations 
where the defendant provides “substantial assistance” in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person.133
125 s 287 (2) of the JA.
126 The Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.
127 Ibid s 110; s 110(2); s 111.
128 J Deziel (n 46) 27.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 K.Roach ‘The Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences’ (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L. J. 371.
132 R v Smith 1987 1 S.C.R 1045 para 1072.
133Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure; s 3553 (e) of the Title 18 of the United States 
Code.
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2.3. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
2.3.1. SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
In S v Dodo,134 the constitutional validity of s 51 (1) of the 1997 Act was challenged as the 
High Court found aspects of the provision to be unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court 
however decided not to confirm the order of invalidity by the High Court.135 In the High 
Court the provision was challenged on the basis it violated the principle of the separation of 
powers136 and the right of an accused to a public trial before an ordinary court.137
The Constitutional Court held with regards to an accused’s right to a fair trial138 that such a 
right will only be unjustifiably limited, if the provision has some material effect on the 
courts’ independence, or if it deprives the courts of judicial function in such a manner that the 
courts can no longer be classified as ordinary courts.139 The Constitutional Court however,
held that though our Constitution recognises the doctrine of the separation of powers and a 
system of checks and balances140 in relation to the exercise of the functions and powers of the 
three different branches of government, there is no absolute separation of powers between the 
judicial function, on the one hand, the legislature and the executive on the other hand.141 It 
found that both the legislature and the executive as the branches of government have a real 
interest in the severity of the sentences142 and consequently courts do not have the sole 
authority in determining the nature and the severity of punishments imposed on convicted 
persons.143 It further found that though the legislature has an interest in the imposition of 
penal sentences; it cannot compel courts to impose a sentence which is contrary to the 
Constitution.144
134 S v Dodo (n 75).
135 M O' Donovan & J Redpath (n 30).
136 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) paras 106–113.
137 s 35 (3) (c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”).
138 S v Dodo (n 75).
139 Ibid para 44.
140 Checks and balances: “constitute an integral part of the separation of powers principle; they 
prevent one separate arm of the state from becoming too powerful in the exercise of the powers 
allocated to it. In modern constitutionalism a most important check on the legislature in this regard is 
an entrenched bill of rights enforceable through an independent judiciary. A bill of rights protects 
individual rights by limiting the power of the legislature.” S v Dodo (n 75) para 41.
141 S v Dodo (n 75) para 33.
142 Ibid Para 33.
143 Ibid Para 33.1.
144 Ibid para 33.5.
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Accordingly, the Constitutional Court noted that the only relevant enquiry was of whether the 
provisions of the Act compelled the High Court to pass a sentence that is inconsistent with 
the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.145 The court also 
pointed out that where a person is subjected to punishment that shows characteristics of being
cruel, inhuman or degrading; their right to dignity is also affected.146 It agreed with foreign 
law and pointed out that gross disproportionality and not just mere disproportionality
between the sentences prescribed by the Act and that one merited by the offence would lead 
to a limitation of the right to dignity.147
It held that proportionality is an important aspect of the enquiry relating to whether or not the 
right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment has been infringed, and 
that this was the case because of the fact that the time to be served has to be proportionate to 
the offence.148 The offence must be regarded as being inclusive of all factors relevant to the 
nature and seriousness of the criminal act itself, as well as all relevant personal and other 
circumstances relating to the offender which could have a bearing on the seriousness of the 
offence and the culpability of the offender.149 It was further stated that humans should not be 
treated as means to an end through the imposition of a sentence that bears no relationship to 
the seriousness of the offence or to what the committed offence merits, as this would result in
denying the offender their humanity.150
The court was however of the view that the “substantial and compelling circumstances”
exception provided by the 1997 Act, ensured that the courts did not impose a grossly 
disproportionate sentence that would limit the right to dignity 151 and consequently, the 
offender’s right under s 12(1) (e) of the Constitution. The court made a distinction between 
two tests. Firstly, it stated that the test in Malgas152 must be employed for purposes of 
determining whether or not s 51 (3) (a) can legitimately be invoked by a sentencing judge in 
order to pass a lesser sentence than that prescribed by section s 51. Secondly, the court noted 
that the test of gross disproportionality must be applied in order to determine whether or not 
a sentence prescribed by law is in violation of the offender’s right not to be subjected to cruel, 
145 S v Dodo (n 75) para 35.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid para 39.
148 Ibid para 37.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid para 38.
151 Ibid para 39 and 40.
152 S v Malgas (n 9).
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inhuman and degrading punishment as outlined in s 12 (1) (e) of the Constitution.153 The 
court then ruled that s 51 (1) of the Act is not inconsistent with the right of an offender not to 
be punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.154 It also ruled that the provision is not 
inconsistent with the principle of the separation of powers and the right of an accused to a 
public trial before an ordinary court.155
In S v Vilakazi,156 it was said that the sentencing approach laid down in Malgas157 makes it 
possible for the courts to avoid the possibility of imposing “incongruous and 
disproportionate” sentences and it is safe to say that, it is through this approach that the 
Constitutional Court in S v Dodo158 found the provisions of the Act to be constitutional.159
Accordingly, it was said in the case that it is clear that every court in each and every case, 
before imposing a prescribed sentence must assess whether or not the sentence is indeed 
proportionate to the particular offence and of course this assessment must arise after a 
consideration of all the circumstances of that particular case.160 It was said that the phrase 
“substantial and compelling circumstances” vests the sentencing judge with the discretion, in
fact an obligation to consider whether the circumstances in a particular case require that a 
different sentence be imposed.161 Other writers such as Van Zyl Smit have also argued that 
“an adequate departure mechanism is one way of ensuring that a mandatory minimum 
sentence requirement does not produce a constitutionally unacceptable degree of 
disproportionality between crime and the imposed punishment”.162
153 S v Dodo (n 75) para 40.
154 The Constitution (n 137) s 12 (1) (e).
155 S v Dodo (n 75) para 51.
156 S v Vilakazi 2009 (1) SACR 552 (SCA).
157 S v Malgas (n 9).
158 S v Dodo (n 75).
159 S v Vilakazi (n 158) para 14.
160 Ibid para 15.
161 Ibid.
162 D Van Zyl Smit “Current developments: Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Departures from them 
in Substantial and Compelling Circumstances:” (1999) 15 SAJHR 271.
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2.3.2. FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE RELATING TO THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS AND THE RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL, INHUMAN AND 
DEGRADING PUNINSHMENT
In Canada, the mandatory sentences have also faced constitutional challenges on the basis 
that it violates certain rights of the accused and the case of interest in this regard is that of R v 
Smith. 163 This was the first decision dealing with the constitutionality of mandatory 
penalties. 164 The Supreme Court in R v Smith 165 ruled that the imposition of 7 years’
imprisonment for the import of narcotics (without regard to the type and quantity of the 
substance) constituted a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the 
Charter”),166 which contained a provision that was against the imposition of cruel and unusual 
punishment.167 It was said that the court when deciding on whether or not to impose the 
prescribed sentence, must first consider whether the sentence violates the Charter and if so 
whether such violation could be justified under s 1 of the Charter as it guarantees the rights 
and freedoms set out in the Charter subject to justifiable limits prescribed by law.168
It was warned however, that courts should not “stigmatise every disproportionate or 
excessive sentence as unconstitutional, but only those that were grossly disproportionate and 
so excessive as to outrage standards of decency”,169 this of course mirrors the decision in the 
Dodo case.170 In a recent case however in Canada, the same court stated that the sentencing 
court does not have the right to ignore a sentence set out by parliament by imposing a 
sentence less than that one prescribed, as such sentences could only be ignored in the 
presence of exceptional circumstances and in the absence thereof, the sentence set out by 
parliament must be applied, 171 thus abandoning any argument for the doctrine of the 
separation of powers.
Under Australian law, it appears that no violation of the separation of powers doctrine occurs 
when mandatory minimum sentences are set by the legislature leaving little or no discretion 
to the sentencing judge.172 In Palling v Corfield,173 Barwick CJ stated that:
163 R v Smith (n 132).
164 J.Deziel (n 46) pg 14.
165 R v Smith (n 132).
166 The Constitution Act of 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act of 1982.
167 s 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
168 R v Smith (n 132).
169 Ibid 1072.
170 S v Dodo (n 75).
171 R v Nasogaluak (2010) 1 S.C.R. 206.
172 Palling v Corfield (n 117) paras 58-9.
173 Ibid.
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‘It is both unusual and in general, in my opinion undesirable that the court should not have a 
discretion in the imposition of sentences, for circumstances alter cases and it is a traditional 
function of a court of justice to endeavour to make the punishment appropriate to the 
circumstances as well as to the nature of the crime. But whether or not such discretion shall be 
given to the court in relation to a statutory offence is for the decision of the parliament. It 
cannot be denied that there are circumstances which may warrant the imposition on the court of 
a duty to impose specific punishment. If Parliament chooses to deny the court such discretion, 
and to impose such a duty, as I have mentioned the court must obey the statute in this respect 
assuming its validity in other respects. It is not, in my opinion, a breach of the Constitution, not 
to confide any discretion to the court as to the penalty to be imposed’.174
Thus, in countries where parliamentary supremacy applies, courts ought to apply the law 
enacted by parliament;175 this argument may also be applicable to s 269 of the JA, found in 
England and Wales.176 However the case is different in South Africa because constitutional 
supremacy applies and thus courts have to abide by the prescripts of the Constitution when 
deciding on an appropriate sentence. 
In the United States, the power of the legislatures to define crimes and their punishment is not 
considered to be in breach of the separation of powers principle and the courts will not 
interfere with the exercise of such power unless it has been exercised in a manner which 
breaches the Constitution.177 It is accepted that the doctrine of the separation of powers, 
imposes on the different branches “a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of 
interdependence as well as independence the absence of which would preclude the 
establishment of a nation capable of governing itself effectively.”178
In the case of Booker,179 the court ruled that the Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines (The 
Sentencing Commission created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984), which gave judges 
very little power in imposing a sentence either higher or lower than those established by the 
guidelines were said to be unconstitutional due to their mandatory characteristics180 and the 
174 Ibid para 52.
175 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173 para 37.
176 A Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice 5th ed (2010) 54.
177 Weems v United States (1910) 217 U.S. 349.
178 Mistretta v United States (n 115) per Blackmun J citing Buckley v Valeo (1976) 424 U.S. 1.
179 United States v Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220.
180 Ibid 221,226,260,265.
24
only way they could be maintained was if they were rendered merely advisory. 181 The 
Supreme Court stated that the guidelines should be rendered advisory because criminal 
sentencing must be conducted on a case-by-case basis.182 The decision restored the discretion 
of federal courts with regard to the imposition of sentences but it unfortunately did not affect 
the statutory mandatory sentences, though they amount to a similar system of sentencing.183
2.4. CONCLUSION
Mandatory minimum sentences place a bar on a judge’s ability to set a sentence lower than 
that prescribed by the applicable legislation; it does this without stripping the judiciary 
completely of it sentencing powers. In most jurisdictions that have been discussed above, 
including South Africa, an “escape clause” is usually present to give courts some limited 
discretion in the application of the prescribed legislation.  It seems it is only where the 
imposition of the sentence would constitute as grossly disproportionate, will the mandatory 
sentences be rendered unconstitutional and in violation of the right not to be subjected to 
cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. Where the doctrine of the separation of powers 
constitutes the basis for challenging the validity of such sentences, courts have indicated that 
the judiciary, legislature and the executive all have an interest in sentencing.
181 Ibid 258-59.
182 Ibid 233.
183 K Riley ‘Trial by Legislature: Why Statutory Mandatory Minimum Sentences Violate the Separation 
of Powers Doctrine’ (2010) 19 Public Interest Law Journal 285-310 at 294.
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CHAPTER 3
3. “SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES”
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter involves a discussion of the manner in which the courts have looked at the 
phrase “substantial and compelling circumstances” as an escape clause from the prescribed 
minimum sentences.  It will also be inclusive of a discussion of the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines as the phrase “substantial and compelling circumstances” has been borrowed from 
the State of Minnesota in the United States of America. The point of departure will be the 
Malgas184 case which provided a step-by-step approach to the interpretation of the phrase in 
South Africa. The writer also intends looking at case law that precedes and succeeds the 
above-mentioned case and the Act in general in order to determine how courts have generally 
approached the question of sentencing.
3.2. THE INTERPRETATION OF “SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPELLING     
CIRCUMSTANCES” IN SOUTH AFRICA
In terms of s 51(3) (a) of the 1997 Act, a court is granted a discretion to impose a lesser 
sentence than that one prescribed by the Act where “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” exist. The phrase “substantial and compelling circumstances” has given rise 
to much debate as there has been a wide range of interpretations. Three approaches have 
developed from the differing interpretations of the phrase, namely a narrow interpretation and 
a wide interpretation.185
The case of S v Mofokeng 186 presents a narrow interpretation, which leaves almost no 
discretion for courts.  Stegmann J held that:
‘The absence of previous convictions, the comparative youthfulness of the offenders, the 
unfortunate factors in their backgrounds, the probable effect upon them of the liquor which they 
had taken, the absence of dangerous weapons, and the fact that the complainant had not 
184 S v Malgas (n 9).
185 South African Law Commission (n 35) 11-13.
186 S v Mofokeng (n 7).
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suffered serious injury are all factors that a court sentencing a convicted rapist in the ordinary 
course, would weigh up as substantial factors relevant to the assessment of a just sentence, and 
as tending to mitigate the severity of the punishment to be imposed. However, in my judgment, 
these factors, ‘substantial’ though they are, are matters that Parliament must have had in mind 
as everyday circumstances that would be found present in many or most of the crimes referred 
to in Part I of Schedule 2 of Act 105 of 1997. Without emasculating the legislation, they cannot 
be thought of as ‘compelling’ the conclusion that a sentence lesser than that prescribed by 
Parliament should be substituted for the prescribed sentence. This is owing to the absence of 
any exceptional factor to explain the prisoners’ conduct (which evidently sprang from nothing 
other than their own wicked desire to slake their lust regardless of the cost to the victim), and 
the absence of any mitigating factors other than the everyday factors already enumerated. As I 
understand this legislation, substantial and compelling circumstances must be factors of an 
unusual and exceptional kind that Parliament cannot be supposed to have had in contemplation 
when prescribing standard penalties for certain crimes committed in circumstances described in 
Schedule 2’.187
In Stegmann J’s view, factors that would ordinarily be regarded as aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances for purposes of sentencing cannot be simply weighed up in order to determine 
if they amount to substantial and compelling grounds for a departure, unless they are of an 
“unusual and exceptional kind that Parliament cannot be said to have contemplated when it 
prescribed standard penalties for certain scheduled crimes”. 188 He said that to regard 
circumstances falling outside of the “unusual and exceptional” scope would mean that the 
court prefers its own judgment to that of Parliament and would compromise the integrity of 
the court.189
This approach was adopted in cases that followed. For instance, in the Natal Division in S v 
Madondo,190 Squires J, in a case involving rape, emphasised that the intention of Parliament 
was focused on ensuring that sentences imposed for the rape of young girls are more severe 
and that courts would not easily intervene by imposing a lesser sentence as compelling 
reasons for doing so would not be lightly found. He explained that “compelling reasons
referred to more than just a disparity between what the Court feels may be the appropriate 
sentence and the actual prescribed sentence.”191 He further stated that to consider such a 
187 Ibid 523i-524d. S v Segole 1999 (2) SACR 115 (W) and S v Zitha and others 1999 (2) SACR 404 
(W) both followed the approach adopted by Stegmann J.
188 Ibid 524d.
189 Ibid 523b.
190 S v Madondo Unreported judgment of the NPD, case CC22/99, delivered on 30 March 1999.
191 Ibid.
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difference alone as constituting compelling reasons would equate to the undermining of the 
legislature’s intention.192 He also explained that “compelling was a strong word that meant 
“almost irresistible”, constituting at least a strongly sensed obligation”.193 He went on to say 
that factors such as the age of the girl and whether she was physically harmed or not, would 
usually not come into play for the purpose of sentencing under the Act. This decision, which 
is substantially similar to that one adopted in S v Mofokeng,194 has been followed in other 
decisions in the same Division.195
The unreported judgment of Leveson J in S v Majalefa and Another196 laid down a wider 
approach, by highlighting that regardless of the provisions of the Act, at the outset of the 
enquiry relating to whether or not a departure from the prescribed sentence is warranted,
there is a consideration of all aggravating and mitigating factors in the traditional sense.197
The judge in the case was of the opinion that the words “substantial and compelling” served 
as a confirmation for the consideration of traditional factors, while distinguishing factors of 
material significance from all the other factors which still had to be taken into account during 
the sentencing process. Thus, according to this view, the Act should not be regarded as 
introducing a major change in the approach to sentencing.198
Jones J gave support to the above-mentioned approach in the case of S v Cimani199 in the 
Eastern Cape Division and attempted a definition for “substantial and compelling 
circumstances”. He held that: 
‘In every case, however, the nature of the circumstances must convince a reasonable mind that a 
lesser sentence is a proper sentence and that it is justified when regard is had to
a. the aggravating and mitigating features attendant upon the commission of what is already 
classified by the lawgiver as among the most serious of offences, and 
b. the interests of society weighed against the interests of the offence.’200
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 S v Mofokeng (n 7).
195 S v Ngubane Unreported judgment of the NPD, per Squires J, case CC31/99, delivered on 30 
March 1999; S v Shinga unreported judgment of the D&CLD, per Nicholson J, case CC176/99, 
delivered on 26 October 1999 and S v Khuzwayo, unreported judgment of the D&CLD, per Combrink 
J, case CC103/99, delivered on 30 August 1999.
196 S v Majalefa and Another (n 64), quoted extensively in S v Blaauw (n 65) 305i - 306i.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 S v Cimani Unreported judgment of the ECPD, case CC11/99, delivered on 28 April 1999.
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A third approach which falls in between the two above-mentioned approaches has also been 
developed. This approach was followed in S v Blaauw201 where Borchers J held that the 
discretion that courts previously had when imposing sentences was narrowed by the 
introduction of the Act, particularly because of the high standard set as a qualifier for 
circumstances that need to be considered for a departure from the provisions of the Act. The 
judge further stated that in order to determine if a departure was allowed, the court need not 
look for exceptional circumstances but has to look at the cumulative effect of all the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case. If, in the light of these, the prescribed 
sentence would be “startlingly inappropriate” it could depart from them, but otherwise it was 
bound to impose them.202 This approach has been followed in decisions of the Witwatersrand 
Local Division.203
The Malgas 204 case has however, paved the way to the interpretation of the phrase 
“substantial and compelling circumstances” for our South African courts by detailing a step-
by-step procedure. The above-mentioned case is particularly important because it was the 
first time the SCA expressed itself on the interpretation of the said circumstances. Further, the 
Malgas judgement has been largely accepted by subsequent judgements and has thus 
rendered any notions previously developed regarding the subject irrelevant. Lastly, the case 
has been endorsed by the Constitutional Court in the Dodo205 case. It is thus important to 
discuss the case in detail.
201 S v Blaauw (n 65).
202 Ibid 311a-h.
203 S v Dithotze 1999 (2) SACR 315 (W); S v Homareda (n 7). 
204 S v Malgas (n 9).
205 S v Dodo (n 75).
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3.2.1. THE MALGAS CASE
a. FACTS
A 22-year-old woman was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against her sentence was granted by the court a 
quo.206 The appellant had been residing with the deceased’s family for about a month and at 
the instigation of his wife, shot the deceased in the head while he was asleep. The precise 
nature of their relationship was unclear. This is particularly because she had testified that on 
the night before the shooting, she was struck by the deceased, as he believed that she had 
been sexually involved with another man.207 The deceased’s wife, on the other hand, had 
allegedly been unfaithful to him with various other men and as a result their relationship was 
stormy, resulting in many quarrels. On the night before the shooting, his wife had even 
indicated that she intended to kill him.208
On the day of the shooting, a quarrel between the deceased and his wife took place.209 Later, 
the deceased’s wife (Carol) woke up the appellant and told her to proceed to shoot her 
husband. She handed her a loaded and cocked firearm and some equipment that she was to 
use in order to avoid discharging any evidence.210 The appellant then knelt alongside the 
deceased and pointed the firearm at his head. After being persuaded by the deceased’s wife to 
shoot, she shot the deceased to death.211 Later, she and the deceased’s wife attempted to pass 
off what had occurred as an act of suicide. Sometime thereafter however, she confessed to a 
friend as well as a member of the South African Police who was also her friend that she had 
shot the deceased and that led to her arrest and trial.212
b. DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO
The trial judge (as per Liebenberg J) made reference to the very serious nature of the crime. 
He did this by pointing out to the element of premeditation present and the defencelessness of 
206 Ibid para 26.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid para 27.
210 Ibid para 28.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid para 29.
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the deceased as he was asleep when he was shot.213 He considered that the motive for the 
killing was greed as there appeared to be some life insurance policies from which the 
appellant stood to gain. He further made reference to the occurrence of violent crimes in 
South Africa and how the community had an interest in receiving a severe response from 
courts.214 As against these considerations he took into account that the appellant had no 
previous convictions and was merely dominated by the deceased’s wife.  Though he accepted 
that the deceased’s wife had been the instigator, who had influenced the appellant to shoot 
her husband, he did not consider this to be a weighty factor when measured against the 
appellant’s act.215 The learned judge however, considered the fact that the appellant’s remorse 
had induced her voluntary admission of her guilt to her friends and pointed out that this could 
possibly be the strongest point in the appellant’s favour but then tended to minimise its 
importance by observing that subsequent remorse was not something exceptional.216
Having balanced all these considerations he concluded that they did not amount to 
“substantial and compelling circumstances” within the meaning of the legislation and passed 
the sentence of life imprisonment.217 Liebenberg J did not find “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” which warranted a departure from the prescribed sentence as he was of the 
view that in order to avoid the imposition of the prescribed minimum sentence, the 
circumstances would have to be exceptional.218 He reached that conclusion with regret and 
said that if it had not been for the fact that a sentence of life imprisonment was prescribed by 
the relevant statute, he would not have considered sentencing appellant to imprisonment for 
life.219 He referred to the lack of unanimity as to the correct interpretation of the legislation 
and regarded himself as bound by the approach indicated by Stegmann J in S v Mofokeng,220
where it was held that:
‘for substantial and compelling circumstances to be found, the facts of the particular case 
must present some circumstance that is so exceptional in nature, and that so obviously 
exposes the injustice of the statutorily prescribed sentence in the particular case, to the extent 
213 Ibid para 31.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid para 32.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
218 Ibid para 33.
219 Ibid para 30.
220 S v Mofokeng (n 7).
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that it could be described as compelling the conclusion that the imposition of a lesser sentence 
than that prescribed by Parliament is justified’.221
c. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
On appeal, the court, after considering the purpose of the legislature when it enacted the 
minimum sentences legislation, interpreted the words “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” in s 51 (3) (a) of the 1997 Act by providing a detailed step-by-step procedure 
to be followed in the application of the provision to the actual sentencing situation. In 
paragraph 25 of the judgement it was stated that: 
a. ‘Section 51 has limited but not eliminated the court’s discretion in imposing sentence 
in respect of offences referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 2 (or imprisonment for other 
specified periods for offences listed in other parts of Schedule 2).
b. Courts are required to approach the imposition of sentence conscious that the 
legislature has ordained life imprisonment (or the particular prescribed period of 
imprisonment) as the sentence that should ordinarily and in the absence of weighty 
justification be imposed for the listed crimes in the specified circumstances.
c. Unless there are, and can be seen to be, truly convincing reasons for a different 
response, the crimes in question are therefore required to elicit a severe standardised 
and consistent response from the courts.
d. The specified sentences are not to be departed from lightly and for flimsy reasons. 
Speculative hypotheses favourable to the offender, undue sympathy, aversion to 
imprisoning first offenders, personal doubts as to the efficacy of the policy underlying 
the legislation, and marginal differences in personal circumstances or degrees of 
participation between co-offenders are to be excluded.
e. The legislature has however deliberately left it to the courts to decide whether the 
circumstances of any particular case call for a departure from the prescribed sentence. 
While the emphasis has shifted to the objective gravity of the type of crime and the 
need for effective sanctions against it, this does not mean that all other considerations 
are to be ignored.
221 Ibid; S v Malgas (n 9) para 30.
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f. All factors (other than those set out in (d) above) traditionally taken into account in 
sentencing (whether or not they diminish moral guilt) thus continue to play a role; 
none is excluded at the outset from consideration in the sentencing process.
g. The ultimate impact of all the circumstances relevant to sentencing must be measured 
against the composite yardstick (“substantial and compelling”) and must be such as to 
cumulatively justify a departure from the standardized response that the legislature 
has ordained.
h. In applying the statutory provisions, it is inappropriately constricting to use the 
concepts developed in dealing with appeals against sentences as the sole criterion.
i. If the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the particular case is 
satisfied that they render the prescribed sentence unjust in that it would be 
disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the needs of society, so that an 
injustice would be done by imposing that sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser 
sentence.
j. In so doing, account must be taken of the fact that crime of that particular kind has 
been singled out for severe punishment and the sentence to be imposed in lieu of the 
prescribed sentences should be assessed paying due regard to the benchmark which 
the legislature has provided’.
Further, it was noted that the legislature refrained from using the word “or” in favour of the 
word “and” thus creating a composite description of the circumstances that ought to warrant a 
departure from the prescribed sentences. The circumstances considered must thus be both, 
compelling and substantial as the words are to be examined conjointly.222 Courts are not 
prohibited from using past sentencing patterns when deciding whether or not a prescribed 
sentence in the particular circumstances of a case should be regarded as unjust.223 It was 
stated however; that the courts need to appreciate the fact that a mere discrepancy between 
the two compared sentences will not be the sole criterion justifying a departure, something 
more will be needed.224 Though that something more cannot be expressed in precise and 
accurate language, it is clear that the circumstances of a particular case must render the 
222 Ibid para 19.
223 Ibid para 21.
224 Ibid.
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imposition of the prescribed sentence unjust or disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and 
the legitimate needs of society, because only then will the circumstances of a case be 
characterised as substantial and compelling to the extent that they justify the imposition of a 
lesser sentence.225 It was said that the injustice contemplated need not amount to a “shocking 
injustice” before a departure is justified, the occurrence of a mere injustice is sufficient.226
The judge (Marais JA) in the circumstances said that he found erroneous any previous 
decisions that suggested that traditional factors such as age or previous convictions or the 
lack thereof were to be eliminated in their entirety from the outset of the enquiry or at the
subsequent stage.227 He went on to say that:
‘equally erroneous, so it seems to me, are dicta which suggest that for circumstances to qualify 
as substantial and compelling they must be “exceptional” in the sense of seldom encountered or 
rare. The frequency or infrequency of the existence of a set of circumstances is logically 
irrelevant to the question of whether or not they are substantial and compelling’.228
It was also said that though it was not clear to what extent the trial judge was influenced by 
the proposition that the circumstances would have to be classifiable as “exceptional” before 
they are considered substantial and compelling, the power of the appeal court to reconsider 
the matter afresh arose as a result of his misdirection in adopting the proposition in his 
evaluation of the circumstances.229
In considering whether or not the circumstances of the case constituted “substantial and 
compelling circumstances”, warranting a departure from the prescribed sentences, Marais JA 
held that:
‘the circumstances in which the crime was committed are undoubtedly such as to render it 
necessary to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life unless substantial and compelling 
circumstances justify a lesser sentence. The shooting was premeditated and planned. The fact 
that the planning and premeditation occurred not long before the deed was accomplished cannot 
alter that. It was also carried out in the execution of a common purpose to kill the deceased. 
Giving all due weight to the enormity of the crime and the public interest in an appropriately 
225 Ibid para 22.
226 Ibid para 24.
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severe punishment being imposed for it, I consider that the personal circumstances of the 
accused (her relative youth, her clean record and her vulnerability to the deceased’s wife’s 
influence by reason of her status as a resident in the latter’s home at the latter’s pleasure) and 
the fact that she was dragooned into the commission of the offence by a domineering 
personality are strongly mitigating factors. As a fact she gained nothing from the commission 
of the crime. Her remorse cannot be doubted and her spontaneous confession which brought to 
light the commission of a crime which would otherwise have gone undetected is deserving of 
recognition in a tangible sense. She is young enough to make rehabilitation of her a real 
prospect even after a long period of imprisonment. These circumstances, cumulatively 
regarded, satisfy me that a sentence of life imprisonment would be unjust. They qualify 
therefore as substantial and compelling circumstances within the meaning of the provision. 
None the less, it remains a particularly heinous crime of the kind which the legislature has 
singled out for severe punishment and the sentence to be imposed in lieu of life imprisonment 
should be assessed paying due regard to the bench mark which the legislature has provided. In 
my judgment, imprisonment for twenty-five (25) years is appropriate’.230
Consequently, the appeal against the sentence of life imprisonment succeeded.  The sentence 
was set aside and substituted by one of 25 years’ imprisonment.231
3.2.2. THE ENDORSEMENT, CRITICISM AND MODIFICATION OF THE 
MALGAS JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Malgas232 case has been endorsed in a number of cases.233 For instance, 
in a judgment delivered by Ackermann J in the case of Dodo, 234 it was stated that:
‘This interpretation, as an overarching guideline, is one that this Court endorses as a practical 
method to be employed by all judicial officers faced with the application of section 51. It will 
no doubt be refined and particularised on a case by case basis, as the need arises. It steers an 
appropriate path, which the legislature doubtless intended, respecting the legislature’s decision 
to ensure that consistently heavier sentences are imposed in relation to the serious crimes 
230 Ibid para 34.
231 Ibid para 35.
232 S v Malgas (n 9).
233 Centre for Child Law (n 62); S v Vilakazi (n 158); S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA); S v 
Mahomotsa (n 110); Director of Public Prosecutions, KwaZulu- Natal v Ngcobo and Others 2009 (2) 
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covered by section 51 and at the same time promoting the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill
of Rights’.235
Further, it was said that the construction that the court placed on the concept of “substantial 
and compelling circumstances” was undoubtedly correct.236
In Matyityi,237 Ponnan JA stated that the Malgas238 case is the starting point when dealing 
with cases that fall within the purview of the 1997 Act.239 He went on to quote Navsa JA who 
stated that “it is not only a good starting point but the principles stated therein are enduring 
and uncomplicated.”240 In Ntsheno,241 Willis J in support of the Malgas242 case stated that 
“everyday” (traditional) factors continue to play a role when deciding whether or not to 
depart from the minimum sentences.243 In the Vilakazi case,244 Nugent JA in support of the 
decision of Malgas245 stated that sentences that perpetrate an injustice will only be avoided by 
approaching sentencing under the 1997 Act, in the manner that was laid down by the latter
case.246
Though the decision of the above-mentioned case has provided a detailed step-by-step 
procedure to the interpretation of the phrase “substantial and compelling circumstances”; a 
procedure which has been widely endorsed, it is still however, subject to some criticism. For 
instance, Terblanche has pointed out that even in a situation where reasonable people 
(judicial officers) are concerned, the concept of justice still differs from one person to another 
and thus tends to differ from one case to another. Consequently, he argues that a disparity in 
sentencing will arise where the discretion to deviate from the prescribed sentence is linked to 
an individual’s recognition of “an easily foreseeable injustice”.247 In S v Kgafela248 Friedman 
JP remarked that the terms “substantial and compelling circumstances” had not been textually 
235 Ibid para 11.
236 Ibid para 40.
237 S v Matyityi (n 233).
238 S v Malgas (n 9).
239 S v Matyityi (n 233) para 11.
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interpreted or defined in Malgas249 and the court had failed to state what was meant by the 
phrase. He granted leave to appeal and suggested that the SCA should revisit Malgas250 in 
order to give more definition or formulation to the phrase “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” and to reverse the order of the enquiry.251
The SCA in Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions 252 though in support of the 
Malgas253 judgment modified the judgment by providing further direction in relation to what 
circumstances could constitute as substantial in the sentencing of sex offenders, particularly 
where the victims are children. It was stated in the case that the youthfulness of the victim in 
rape cases is not the only criterion necessitating the imposition of a life sentence. This is 
because the objective gravity of the crime plays an important role, as does the present and 
future impact of the crime on the victim.254 In the case the offender, a 34-year-old, had 
participated in non-consensual sexual intercourse with a minor. Consequently, life 
imprisonment was considered to be the maximum and the most appropriate sentence that 
could be legally imposed on him.255 Though no evidence was led concerning the after-effects 
of the crime on the victim,256 the court held that the failure to lead evidence relating to the 
impact of the crime on the victim, led to a risk for the accused as no fair decision relating to 
the imposition of a life sentence can be taken in the case. It was said that “substantial and 
compelling circumstances are, on inadequate evidence, held to be absent. At the same time 
the community is entitled to expect that an offender will not escape life imprisonment which 
has been prescribed for a very specific reason simply because such circumstances are, 
unwarrantedly, held to be present.”257
In the Vilakazi case,258 the court clarified an aspect of the Malgas259 decision and said that the 
case does not say that prescribed sentences should be imposed as the norm and be departed 
from only as an exception. It was held that the case said that:
249 S v Malgas (n 9).
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251 S v Kgafela 2001 (n 7) at 210 (g)-213F para 13.
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‘a court must approach the matter involving the application of the Act, conscious of the fact 
that the legislature has ordained the prescribed sentence as the sentence that should be 
ordinarily and in the absence of weighty justification be imposed for the listed crimes in the 
specified circumstances’.260
It was further held that any circumstances rendering the prescribed sentence disproportionate 
to the offence committed will constitute “weighty justification”, warranting the imposition of 
a lesser sentence.261
3.2.3. CASES DECIDED BEFORE AND AFTER THE MALGAS CASE
The writer will now turn to look at cases decided before and after the Malgas case262
including those decided after the CLSAA. 263 Though one will discuss cases that have 
involved the application of the 1997 Act, the focus will mostly be on rape cases owing to the 
fact that the legislature has already provided some guidance in cases of rape, by specifying 
what would not constitute “substantial and compelling circumstances” in such cases. For 
instance, s 51 (3) (aA) of the 1997 Act, as amended provides that: 
‘When imposing a sentence in respect of the offence of rape, the following shall not constitute 
substantial and compelling circumstances justifying the imposition of a lesser sentence:
a. The complainant’s previous sexual history;
b. An apparent lack of physical injury to the complainant;
c. An accused person’s cultural or religious beliefs about rape; or
d. Any relationship between the accused person and the complainant prior to the offence being 
committed.’
260 S v Vilakazi (n 158) para 16.
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3.2.3.1. CASES DECIDED BEFORE THE MALGAS CASE
(i) S v Boer264
A 14-year-old virgin, with a rather muscular physique, was raped by three males in a deserted 
area. The first offender was 21 years of age at the time and had no previous convictions. He 
had completed grade 9 and was employed at a retail shop. The second offender was a year 
younger, had only done grade 8 at school and was also an employee of the same retail shop.
The third accused was considered to be a minor as they had not reached majority age. At the 
time of the offence, they were busy with grade 9 and had a clean criminal record. The 
prescribed sentence of life imprisonment was imposed on both the first and second offenders, 
while the third accused received a lesser term of imprisonment (15 years’ imprisonment). The 
court followed the narrow approach as laid down by the Mofokeng case.265
It was found that the seriousness of the offence outweighed the relevant mitigating factors, 
which in the case could not be regarded as sufficiently substantial and compelling. 
Aggravating factors included the fact that three males had brutally forced themselves on the 
female complainant. They had not only assaulted her, but they also humiliated her by 
exposing her private body parts to the public. On the arrival of other people on the scene, 
they still continued to assault her and refused to release her from their captivity. She was still 
a virgin at the time of the rape and the offence was thus considered to be scandalous and 
repulsive. It was noted that the purposes of punishment demanded greater recognition and 
reference was made to the dictum of Mahomed CJ in S v Chapman266 where he said that:
‘courts are under a duty to send a clear message to the accused, to other potential rapists and the 
community: We are determined to protect the equality, dignity and freedom of all women, and 
we shall show no mercy to those who seek to invade those rights’.267
With regards to the third offender, the court found that despite his youth, what counted as an 
aggravating factor was that, on the night of the incident, the third accused had behaved like 
264S v Boer 2000 (2) SACR 114 (NC). 
265 S v Mofokeng (n 7).
266 S v Chapman 1997 (2) SACR 3 (SCA).
267 Ibid 5b.
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an adult and had shown a great deal of maturity. The court however, failed to place any
importance on the impact of the offence on the victim and consequently, did not consider it to 
be an important factor in the determination of the eventual sentence.268
(ii) S v Dithotze269
The accused in this case was convicted of raping a 12-year-old girl, who happened to be the 
daughter of his girlfriend’s sister. On the day of the incident, they had been visiting the sister 
and ended up drinking. When the alcohol ran out, the accused was accompanied by the 
complainant in order to obtain more. On their journey, the accused had non-consensual 
sexual intercourse with the minor. The accused raped the victim once and as a result she did 
not sustain any major harm and it became apparent from the medical examination that she 
had been a victim of rape prior to the incident. 
The crime was described as one of a very disgusting nature. It was noted that although 
particularly serious, it did “not lie in the ionosphere of criminal depravity”270 when compared
to similar cases that proved to be particularly serious. The court went on to compare the case 
to that of “a nine-year-old girl who had been injured so severely by the act of rape that the 
flesh between her vagina and her rectum had been torn. She would, in all probability, never 
be able to have a satisfactory sex life in adulthood and would experience difficulties with 
child birth”. The court like in similar cases, failed to put any focus on the psychological harm 
caused to the victim as they solely focused on the physical harm or lack thereof caused by the 
incident. 
The court did however note that the cumulative effect of certain factors weighed heavily and 
were in favour of the accused. It considered for instance, that the accused was relatively 
young as he was 22 years old; that this was his first offence; that he did not wield or threaten 
to use a firearm or other dangerous weapon to force compliance and other than the 
commission of the crime of rape, he did not subject the victim to any violence; that he was 
intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime; that he did not forcefully enter the 
268 S v Boer (n 264).
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victim’s home and finally, that he received his “just deserts” when the victim’s aunt (his 
girlfriend) retaliated against his act.
In conclusion, the court accepted the fact that various interpretations may be borne from the 
question relating to what could amount to “substantial and compelling circumstances” as the 
subject was a particularly complex one. The mitigating factors above amounted to “some 
circumstances that loom large” and were sufficiently substantial and compelling enough to 
warrant a departure from the prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment.271 The court 
in imposing a sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment held that the imposition of the prescribed 
sentence in the circumstances would be “disturbingly inappropriate”.272
(iii) S v Gqamana273
Though this case was decided prior to the SCA judgment in Malgas,274 the court in this case 
resorted to a comparable approach. After the Homareda judgment, 275 the court concluded 
that the final decision in this regard depended on the merits of each particular case and such a 
decision was to be reflective of the cumulative effect of all aggravating and mitigating
factors. As per the then applicable law, the accused was convicted in the Regional Court, but
was referred to the High Court for sentencing as a result of his engagement in non-consensual 
sexual intercourse with a minor. In the case, the accused and the victim were not familiar 
with each other and on the night of the incident, the accused had forcefully persuaded the 
victim to accompany him a certain living quarter. On arrival, the accused had non-consensual 
sexual intercourse with the victim twice within a 30-minute period. He further kept her under 
his custody until she was eventually able to escape.
The court wished to hear evidence from the victim, her mother and the probation officer who 
had prepared reports on both the victim and the perpetrator. The court had to decide in the 
circumstances whether the sentence of life imprisonment was warranted. In doing so, they 
considered the following mitigating factors: 
271 “The court conceded that it was hardly surprising that judgments differed regarding the meaning of 
“substantial and compelling circumstances”, as issues of great moral and intellectual complexity were 
involved”(S v Dithotze (n 241) 316d).
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a. the fact that the accused was relatively young ( 20 years old ); 
b. the fact that he had no criminal  record; 
c. the fact that the complainant had not sustained severe physical injury, except for a 
torn hymen (though contrary to s 51 (3) (Aa) (ii) of the 1997Act, this judgement 
preceded the 1997 Act, as amended);
d. the fact that the victim’s mental instability was not of a grave and permanent nature; 
e. the fact that the accused did not utilise a firearm or any dangerous weapon when they 
committed the crime; 
f. the fact that, after an assessment of the victim’s appearance and maturity, the court 
found that it was probable that the accused had mistaken the complainant for a 16 
year-old; and
g. the fact that the victim’s maturity was of a person older than her true age.
The question before the court was whether after a consideration of the above factors, their 
cumulative effect outweighed the aggravating circumstances to the extent that the imposition 
of a sentence of life imprisonment was warranted. Thring J in the case concluded that to 
impose the prescribed life sentence would be “grossly disproportionate, startlingly 
inappropriate and offensive to the court’s sense of justice”. Though a sentence of 10 years 
was said to be the appropriate sentence in the circumstances, such sentence was reduced to 8 
years as regard was had to the time already spent in prison.276
(iv) S v Jansen277
The accused in the case was 26 years old and after an admission of guilt for the rape of a
nine-year-old girl, he was convicted. In his plea explanation, he maintained that the sexual 
intercourse was consensual. The court refused to hear evidence led by the prosecution 
regarding the force exerted by the accused in the commission of the crime and held that 
subsequent evidence could not be used to extend or alter the actual plea.278 The court went on 
to criticise the introduction of the minimum sentence legislation and stated that it was panic-
induced and essentially came about as result of desperation. The court further held that the 
said legislation could not be justified, particularly because the South African sentencing 
276 S v Gqamana (n 273).
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278 Ibid 371e, this was said to be the case, with the exception that the mere filling in of the plea 
remains permitted.
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regime is more flexible than the that of the State of Minnesota in the United States of 
America where the term “substantial and compelling circumstances” has been borrowed from 
and further, that the lack of information available regarding the subject makes it difficult to 
apply the said minimum sentencing legislation in our South African system.279
The court further raised concerns about borrowing legislation from other countries, it stated 
that this was an unfortunate practise which was often done without due consideration of the 
particular circumstances of that country that led to the implementation of the said 
legislation. 280 The Minnesota guidelines provide a particularly desert-based approach 281
which includes the application of a grid system282 to the issue of sentencing. Contrary to 
Minnesota, South Africa has no existing grid system and the rigid application of s 51 of the 
1997 Act (as in the case of Mofokeng283) proves to be unfeasible in the South African 
context,284 particularly because of the phrase “substantial and compelling circumstances”, 
which makes provision for a departure.
Despite an admittance by the court that an argument based on the fact that there was 
consensual sexual intercourse with a nine-year-old was objectionable, it still held that the 
medical report indicating that less severe harm was caused to the complainant made this case 
a less serious one when compared to other similar cases of rape.285 Consequently, this results 
in the existence of “substantial and compelling circumstances”, justifying a deviation from 
279S v Jansen (n 277) 373f. 
280 Ibid 374 j.
281 “This approach ensures that perpetrators are not treated as more (or less) blameworthy than is 
warranted by the nature of their crime. This means that punishment in the first instance must be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the offence so that offenders can get their just deserts”. (South 
African Law Commission (n 35) 15 and 36).
282 “This typically works according to a grid not unlike a crossword puzzle. Along the one axis (often 
the down blocks) provision is made for the severity of crime, with the least severe crimes usually at 
the top and the most severe at the bottom. Along the other axis (often the across blocks) provision is 
made for the criminal history of the offender, usually increasing in severity from left to right. The 
sentencing court establishes the severity of the crime and the extent of the offender’s criminal history. 
This is no simple matter. Once the severity of the crime and the extent of the offender’s criminal 
history have been established, the sentencing judge will follow the row “across” and the column 
“down” to the block where they intersect. In this cell at least one figure (sometimes up to three figures) 
is found; this is the suggested duration of imprisonment in months (the presumptive sentence). The 
court then has the discretion to move about within the limits provided in that cell and, in exceptional 
circumstances, to depart from these limits completely.” (SS Terblanche A guide to Sentencing in 
South Africa 2nd ed (2007) 134).
283 S v Mofokeng (n 7).
284 S v Jansen (n 277) 376i.
285Ibid 378g. “The doctor reported that only one finger had been admitted into the vagina and that no 
sign of rape had been found during the medical examination which took place two days after the 
incident”. 
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the prescribed sentence. Further, the court noted that this was the accused’s first offence and 
accordingly went on to consider the possibility of him being re-integrated in society.
The court acknowledged the seriousness of the crime before it and regarded it as an 
“appalling and perverse abuse of male power”. It stated that the occurrence of child rapes had 
a negative impact on the environment in which children were expected to grow in as such a 
crime limited a child’s freedom and instilled fear in them. 286 The court also took 
acknowledgement of the mental impact of the crime on the victim as well the society’s view 
in regard to the appropriate sentence:
‘It is sadly to be expected that the young complainant will now suffer the added psychological 
trauma which resulted in a marked change in attitude and of school performance. The 
community is entitled to demand that those who perform such perverse acts of terror be 
adequately punished and that the punishment reflects the societal censure’.287
After a consideration of the year that the accused had served in prison while awaiting 
trial, the sentence eventually imposed was 18 years. By virtue of the sentence imposed, 
the accused was to continue being detained until such time the victim reaches 
adulthood.288
Despite the fact that little information regarding the circumstances leading to the crime, the 
relation that existed between the accused and complainant and the place in which the offence 
was committed, the mental impact of the crime on the victim remained recognised. The court 
however, accorded great weight to the presence of physical injuries caused by the incident as 
the absence of such injuries influenced its decision. This results in the conclusion that judges 
view the crime of rape as one which ordinarily results in the infliction of physical harm.
Further, this indicates a lack of insight by the court regarding the grooming process and the 
fact that a child will ordinarily be incognisant of the consequences of sexual involvement 
with adults, even where they are alleged to have consented.289
286 Ibid 378j. 
287 Ibid 378h-i.
288 Ibid 379d. 
289 A Van der Merwe Aspects of the Sentencing Process in Child Sexual Abuse Cases (Unpublished 
Phd Thesis, Rhodes University, 2005) 75.
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3.2.3.2. CASES DECIDED AFTER THE MALGAS CASE
(i) S v Fatyi290
This case fell within the scope of Schedule 2, Part III offences. The accused had initially been 
charged with raping a six-year-old girl, but was instead found guilty of indecent assault. The 
accused provided after-care transport for school children. On the day of the incident, he had 
fetched the victim at her school and had transported her to an excluded area, where he 
indecently assaulted her. Following this, he transported her to the after-care centre where her 
grandmother was to fetch her later that afternoon.291 Injuries to the complainant’s genitalia 
included bruising of the labia minora (two inner folds of the external parts of the female’s sex 
organ), the vestibule (the passage leading to the vagina) and vaginal area, as well as tearing of 
the hymen and fourchette, with mild bleeding. It was presumed in the circumstances that the 
perpetrator had utilised his fingers and not his penis in order to penetrate the victim. In its 
decision, the court found as mitigating factors, the fact that the accused was elderly as he was 
51 years old, that he had not been previously convicted of any offences and that he suffered 
from asthma attacks and required regular medical attention. Further, that he was self-
employed as he owned taxis and that he was a family man who supported not only his wife 
and children, but his extended family as well.
The court also looked at the following factors as having an aggravating effect: 
a. The age of the offender; 
b. The force used in the assault which resulted in moderate to severe genital injuries; 
c. The assault did not only result in physical injuries, but also in psychological 
trauma; and 
d. The accused abused his position of trust: “his conduct was appalling for own 
sexual gratification the accused took advantage of a little girl entrusted to his 
care.”292
290 S v Fatyi 2001 (1) SACR 485 (SCA). 
291 Ibid.
292 Ibid at 23.
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With due regard to the above factors as well as the principles laid out in S v Malgas,293 the 
court concluded that were no “substantial and compelling circumstances” in existence which 
justified the imposition of a lesser sentence and consequently confirmed the sentence of 10 
years imprisonment which was passed in terms of s 51 (2) (b) of the 1997 Act. 294 In its 
judgment, the court raised a valuable point and concluded that “bodily harm” was inclusive 
of all kinds of physical injury, even the most trivial.
(ii) S v Mahomotsa295
The accused in this case was found guilty of two incidents of rape, which took place in a 
space of two months. He had committed the crimes against two minors of the same age. He 
had approached both victims while they were walking on the street and had used deadly force 
against them in order to lure them into his room. Thereafter he engaged in non-consensual 
sexual intercourse with both victims more than once. Though the victims’ age was never 
proven, the case nevertheless fell within the purview of S51 of the Act as the accused had 
repeatedly raped the victims.  
The sentencing court imposed a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment (six years for count one 
and 10 years for count two to run concurrently). On appeal, the sentence for both counts was 
increased and the maximum time the accused was to serve in prison was 12 years. It was
found that the court a quo failed to consider the gravity of the crime in the passing of its 
sentence. The appeal court in reconsidering the matter looked at these factors as having an 
aggravating effect:
a. the accused had previously committed a similar crime and also had a previous 
conviction for another crime; 
b. the accused was a serial rapist who objectified young girls for his own sexual desires; 
c. the accused had repeatedly raped the young girls;
d. The accused failed to release the first victim from his custody even after her father’s 
attempts to free her.
293 S v Malgas (n 9).
294 S v Fatyi (n 290).
295 S v Mahomotsa (n 110).
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The court went on to look at the following factors as having a mitigating effect: 
a. the accused’s relatively young age, as he was 23 years old at the time; 
b. both victims had already started engaging in sexual intercourse (though contrary to 
S51 (3)(aA) (i) of the Act, the judgement preceded the 1997 Act, as amended) ; and 
c. the accused had been incarcerated for a period of eight months. 
The trial judge was said to have been erroneous in his decision and his misdirection resulted 
in the appeal court hearing the matter afresh. The court found that it was unlikely to have an 
absence of physical and psychological harm in a case of rape. Furthermore, it held that a 
man’s manhood could never be viewed as a justification for a lesser sentence, if he chooses to 
gratify himself by having non-consensual sexual intercourse with women. The victims’ 
sexual history was considered to be irrelevant in the circumstances. Though the accused had 
initially made an incorrect submission with regards to his age, such submission did not 
negatively affect him as the court did not view this as an aggravating factor, particularly 
because the accused had withdrew his submission before sentencing (he stated that he was a
17-year-old and not a 23-year-old). A lesser sentence than life imprisonment was imposed 
for both counts of rape as it was said that the imposition of life imprisonment would be 
disproportionate in the circumstances, particularly because the crime was considered to be 
less heinous when compared to other rapes.296
(iii) Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions 297
The perpetrator in this case was a 34-year-old male. He had raped his 13-year-old neighbour. 
Despite the age of the victim being an aggravating factor, the court felt that other factors such 
as the seriousness of the crime as well as the immediate and future effects of the crime on the 
victim were equally important and necessitated the imposition of a life sentence.298 The court 
went on to place great weight on the consequences of the crime on the victim by stating that 
“evidence relating to the extent to which the complainant had been affected by the rape, and 
would be affected in future, was relevant and indeed important”. The matter was reverted to
296 S v Mahomotsa (n 110).
297 Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions (n 252).
298 Ibid 205b.
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the sentencing court (High Court) by the SCA so as to gather the relevant information 
pertaining to the impact of the rape on the victim before punishment could be imposed.299
The victim, who had reached majority age at the time, testified yet again in the High Court; 5 
years after the happening of the incident. Though she stated that the rape had affected her 
relationship with her partner, she admitted that with time, she was able to overcome the 
impact of the incident. When asked by the state what she would convey to her perpetrator if 
an opportunity arose, in tears, she replied by saying: “wat jy gedoen het was nie reg nie” 
(“What you did was not right”). Even though she had initially been reluctant about facing the 
accused again, her testimony provided further relief for her.300 As a mitigating factor, the 
court considered the fact that she appeared to have since healed from the emotional trauma 
associated with the crime. At the commission of the crime, the victim was under the guidance 
of her uncle for educational reasons, but because of the incident, she was unable to complete 
her studies and accordingly, this was viewed by the court as having an aggravating effect.301
The High Court concluded that life imprisonment was not an appropriate sentence in the 
circumstances and accordingly imposed a sentence of 21 years’ imprisonment.302
The SCA before referring the matter back to the High Court, ascertained that the prosecutor’s 
failure to lead evidence pertaining to the after-effects of the crime on the victim, including the 
failure to call witnesses to give evidence to that effect could potentially lead to unfavourable 
consequences for the accused as there could be no fair assessment made regarding the 
imposition of a life sentence.303
(iv) S v Blaauw304
The perpetrator in this case was an 18-year-old male, who was found guilty of premeditatedly 
raping a 5-year-old girl while under the influence of alcohol. As a consequence of his actions, 
the child suffered severe genital harm and it also appeared from the evidence presented by a 
social worker that the child was likely to suffer additional harm in the future. The accused 
299 Ibid.
300 Ibid.
301 Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions (n 252).
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid.
304 S v Blaauw (n 65).
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had been previously convicted of two offences and had been consequently committed to a 
reformatory, which he later escaped from. The court held that such committal to the 
reformatory might have negatively affected the accused, particularly because of his 
unfavourable background.  The court viewed the offence as being repulsive and was adamant 
that the interests of society in the circumstances demanded a severe sentence. Following the 
approach laid out in Malgas,305 the cumulative effect of the factors looked at by the court 
compelled it to consider the imposition of a lesser sentence. These factors included the young 
age of the accused, both at the commission of the offence and at sentencing, the accused’s 
unfavourable background and the fact that he had consumed alcohol at the time of the 
incident. 306
Van Heerden J considered the imposition of the prescribed mandatory sentence to be a harsh 
measure because of the accused’s age. The court held that the cumulative effect of the 
mitigating factors warranted a lesser sentence and as a result imposed a sentence of 25 years 
imprisonment. The court further recommended that the accused be committed to a 
rehabilitation programme.307
(v) S v Abrahams308
This case dealt with an appeal of a seven-year sentence imposed on a father who was found 
guilty of raping his daughter of 14 years of age. It was established that the approach taken by 
the sentencing court in reaching an appropriate sentence amounted to a misdirection and 
warranted an interference by the Supreme Court of Appeal. Despite the fact that the sentence
initially imposed was increased on appeal, the court after a consideration of material factors 
held that the imposition of the maximum sentence of life imprisonment was still not 
warranted in the circumstances. The approach taken by the presiding judge in dealing with 
the issue of whether “substantial and compelling circumstances” were present in the 
circumstances was acceptable as material factors ordinarily taken into account in the 
sentencing process were regarded. These factors did not only pertain to the accused’s 
305 S v Malgas (n 9).
306 S v Blaauw (n 65).
307 Ibid.
308 S v Abrahams 2002 (1) SACR 116 (SCA). 
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personal background, but also the nature of the crime and the circumstances under which it 
was committed. 
The court looked at the following factors as having an aggravating effect: 
a. the accused’s sexual attraction for his daughter and his attitude towards women ; 
b. that the accused had abused his position as a father and had used such a position to 
force compliance from his daughter;
c. that the victim had suffered severely as a result of the rape; and
d. that incestuous rape was considered as a heinous crime. 
The court also took into account the following mitigating factors:  
a. the accused had not been previously convicted of any offence;
b. apart from the act of rape itself, the victim had not sustained physical injuries;  
c. two years prior to the commission of the offence, the victim’s brother had committed 
suicide and this negatively affected the accused’s judgment; and 
d. his actions did not amount to the worst kind of rape. 
The court further referred to S v Swartz and Another309 and held that not all crimes of rape 
resulted in the same punishment.310
It was also held that once “substantial and compelling circumstances” were found to be in 
existence, the imposition of a sentence which is in accordance with those applied before the 
operation of the legislation amounted to an error. It was further held that the existence of 
“substantial and compelling circumstances” did not defray from the fact that the legislation 
created a minimum standard that played an important consideration when the sentencing of 
scheduled crimes was in issue 311 and further, past cases could no longer be the deciding 
factor when determining the lengthiness of a sentence and as such, reliance on S v B312 by the 
court a quo for such was a misdirection.313
309 S v Swartz and Another 1999 (2) SACR 380 (C).
310 Ibid 386b-c. 
311 S v Malgas (n 9).
312 S v B 1996 (2) SACR 543 (C). 
313 S v Swartz and Another (n 309) 126b.
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(vi) S v Njikelana314
The accused, who was 24 years old at the time of the incident, was found guilty of raping a
16-year-old girl on two consecutive occasions. The girl was not only his neighbour, but was 
also his friend. After the court considered the cumulative effect of some mitigating factors, it
found “substantial and compelling circumstances” to be in existence and the imposition of a 
lesser sentence to be warranted in the circumstances. At the time of the incident, both the 
victim and the accused were intoxicated and the rape appeared to have taken place on 
impulse. 315 As mitigating factors, the court found that the accused had no previous 
convictions and was fairly young. It further found that he had no formal education and was 
unsophisticated. Further, the victim had not sustained any permanent physical injuries and 
only had a scar on her forehead which was barely visible. The court also considered the fact 
that the accused had served a period of 35 months in prison while awaiting sentencing.
The aggravating factors included the fact that the accused had used force in order to obtain 
compliance from the victim and had further applied force in the commission of the crime and 
this was evidenced by the physical injuries caused to the victim, although not permanent and 
severe. Although another perpetrator engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with the 
victim on the day, the accused remained the lead perpetrator and had thus abused his position 
as a friend. Despite the fact that the crime of rape was considered to be prevalent, the court 
held that life imprisonment was unwarranted in the circumstances and considered 
precedent316 which leaned towards a sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment as an appropriate 
one. The court however reduced such a sentence as a result of the time already served by 
accused in prison while he was awaiting sentencing and trial. Consequently, the sentence 
eventually imposed was 14 years’ imprisonment.317
314 S v Njikelana 2003 (2) SACR 166 (C). 
315 Ibid.
316 S v Jansen (n 277); S v Swartz and Another (n 309); S v Dithotze (n 241).
317 S v Njikelana (n 314).
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(vii) S v G318
An unemployed 32-year old male was found guilty of raping a 10-year-old girl, who 
happened to be his girlfriend’s daughter. Though he was not her biological father, he was 
ultimately regarded as such, particularly because they all resided in one household as a 
family. On receiving the case for sentencing, the High Court considered the impact of the 
crime on the victim and found the following factors to be aggravating:
a. though it appeared as if the victim had overcome the incident, she and her immediate 
family suffered from severe emotional trauma;
b. the crime negatively affected the victim’s grooming process, and ultimately robbed
her of a life with her mother as she had to move and live in an impoverished area with 
her grandmother; 
c. the victim was relatively young and was not sexually mature or active at the time of 
the offence and this resulted in the crime being categorised as a heinous one. 
d. the accused abused his position of trust; and
e. the accused displayed no remorse. 
The court also found the following factors to be mitigating: 
a. the accused had no previous convictions;
b. the accused had not exerted excessive force to obtain compliance and as a result, the 
rape did not yield serious bodily harm. The court did however note that little force 
was needed to force compliance of a 10-year-old; and
c. the accused had served two years in prison while awaiting sentencing.
The court then went on to compare the circumstances of this case with those of Abrahams,319
Mahomotsa320 and Rammoko,321 in order to make a suitable decision. As a result, the court 
found that though this was a serious case, it did not fall within the category of the worst cases 
of rape previously brought before the court. A sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment was then 
318 S v G 2004 (2) SACR 296 (W). 
319 S v Abrahams (n 308).
320 S v Mahomotsa (n 110).
321 Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions (n 252).
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deemed to be appropriate, particularly because an imposition of the prescribed mandatory 
sentence of life imprisonment would be disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime.322
The cases decided before and after the Malgas case,323 considered traditional factors (as laid 
out by the latter case) in concluding whether or not “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” existed, thus allowing a deviation from the sentence prescribed by the 1997 
Act, as amended. The cases decided before the above-mentioned case appear to have placed
greater weight on the presence of physical injuries or absence thereof (contrary to S51 (3) 
(aA) (ii) of the Act). The courts were consistent in considering the age of the accused as well 
as the victim and the accused’s criminal history. With the exception of cases that followed 
Mafokeng324 or a similar narrow interpretation, the cases decided prior to the Malgas325
decision appear to have taken similar factors into account and came to conclusions that would 
probably not have differed even if decided after Malgas..326 Cases decided after the Malgas
case,327 did not only consider the physical injuries caused to the victim, but also considered 
the victim’s psychological trauma or the after-effects of the rape. The cases also considered 
the time already served by the accused in prison and viewed it as a mitigating factor. The 
cases decided after the leading case also categorised rape and repeatedly implied that life 
imprisonment is only justified in extreme cases of rape (S v Abrahams328; S v Mahomotsa329; 
Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions330).
322 S v G (n 318).
323 S v Malgas (n 9).
324 S v Mafokeng (n 7).
325 Ibid.
326 S v Malgas (n 9).
327 Ibid.
328 S v Abrahams (n 308).
329 S v Mahomotsa (n 110).
330 Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions (n 252).
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3.2.3.3. CASES DECIDED AFTER THE CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) 
AMENDMENT ACT
(i) S v Matyityi331
The respondent was a 27-year-old ringleader of a gang of three. He was a repeat offender and 
had committed the crimes of rape, murder and robbery. He was convicted of one count of 
rape, one count of murder, and two counts of robbery. The respondent chose not to testify, 
nor was any evidence led in mitigation on his behalf, although some submissions regarding 
his personal circumstances were made.332 He had expressed a willingness to tender a plea of 
guilty to all of the charges and thereafter he was duly sentenced in the Eastern Cape High 
Court. He was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment on each of the murder and rape charges 
and in respect of each of the two counts of robbery, the respondent was sentenced to 13 years' 
imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. He was thus sentenced to an 
effective term of 25 years' imprisonment as he could only serve a total of 25 years at most.333
The state appealed against the sentences which were imposed in respect of the rape and 
murder (but not robbery) convictions, as they were regarded as being too lenient.334
The crimes took place on two separate occasions in a space of five days. In the first occasion, 
the respondent was a member of a gang of three who attacked and robbed the complainant 
(“Mr AC”). The complainant had been sitting in his car at the beach when his car window 
was smashed, and he was hit in the face. His cell phone, cash and ATM card were then
stolen. The respondent had placed a hood over the complainant’s face, and drove him in the 
back seat of his car to an isolated place, where he was bound up and tied to a tree.335 His 
attackers demanded his ATM pin number, and in an attempt to buy himself some time to 
escape, he deliberately gave an incorrect one. The attackers left him in search of an ATM, but 
returned when they discovered that the pin was incorrect. After he had tendered them with a 
correct pin, they left again and fortunately for him, this time he was able to free himself from 
331 S v Matyityi (n 233).
332 Ibid para 12.
333 Ibid para 7.
334 Ibid para 8.
335 Ibid para 1.
54
the tree and escaped from the area on foot.336 His car was later recovered, but the CD player 
had been stolen.337
Five days after the above-mentioned incident, the respondent and his gang hit again. This 
time they attacked a couple (male and female) which was parked in an isolated spot at the 
same beach. The male complainant (“Mr MF”) was attacked and was placed in the boot of 
the car despite the fact that he bleeding badly. The female complainant (“Ms KD”) was 
driven in the same car to a secluded area and was raped by all three of the attackers. Mr MF, 
who was unconscious at the time, was then removed from the boot and placed on the back 
seat of the car. The attackers then drove the vehicle back in the direction from which it had 
come, and after obtaining an affirmative response from Ms KD relating to her familiarity 
with her whereabouts, they alighted from the motor vehicle. MS KD then drove the vehicle to 
the hospital, but Mr MF was pronounced dead on arrival.338 The respondent and the other 
gang members were later arrested as a result of a tip-off.339
The court a quo acknowledged the fact that the nature of the offences brought the case within 
the ambit of s 51 of 1997 Act, which prescribed minimum sentences, namely life 
imprisonment for each of the counts of rape and murder.340 This was because the murder took 
place in the course of a robbery accompanied by aggravating circumstances, and also because
the complainant was raped by not only the respondent, but also by his accomplices (S51, read 
with Part 1 Schedule 2 of the Act and S1 of the CPA). Matiwana AJ in identifying the issue 
stated that “the question, therefore, that I am faced with, is whether there are any compelling 
circumstances in this case, which, if present, would justify a departure from the prescribed 
sentences laid down by the legislature”.341 He answered the question as follows:
‘As I have stated, in my mind, the court should not impose the prescribed minimum sentence in 
this case, in view of the accused's age, and in the light of the remorse displayed by him during 
the trial here’.342
The court a quo thus did not impose the prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment 
for any of the counts. The reason behind this was the respondent’s age as he was said to have 
336 Ibid para 2.
337 Ibid para 3.
338 Ibid paras 3-5.
339 Ibid para 6.




been 27 years old at the time, and because he had pleaded guilty and thus had expressed 
remorse during the trial.343
Therefore, the central question in the court of appeal was of whether or not the trial court was 
correct in concluding that “substantial and compelling circumstances” existed. The appeal 
court went on to say that the starting point was the Malgas case,344 meaning that the court had 
to approach the question conscious of the fact that the minimum sentence had been ordained 
as the sentence which ordinarily should be imposed unless there exist the above-mentioned 
circumstances.345 The court then noted that the respondent was also married at the time of the 
commission of the offences. It also noted that he had three children, the oldest of whom was 
10 years and the youngest one month and that his highest level of education was Standard 7 
(Grade 9),346 though the trial judge had only considered as mitigating factors, the fact that the 
respondent had displayed remorse and that he was 27 years.347
In relation to remorse, it was said to have been manifested in his guilty plea and his apology 
to the victims. The court in this regard said that a guilty plea amounts to a neutral factor and 
cannot be accorded any weight in the mitigating sense.348 The court further pointed out to the 
difference between remorse and regret by stating that: 
‘Many accused persons might well regret their conduct but that does not without more translate 
to genuine remorse. Remorse is a gnawing pain of conscience for the plight of another. Thus 
genuine contrition can only come from an appreciation and acknowledgement of the extent of 
one’s error. Whether the offender is sincerely remorseful and not simply feeling sorry for 
himself or herself at having been caught is a factual question. It is to the surrounding actions of 
the accused rather than what he says in court that one should rather look’.349
The court went on to say that in order for the remorse to be regarded as a mitigating factor, it 
has to be sincere and the accused must be able to convince the court of its genuineness. The 
court further noted that before a court can be convinced of the genuineness of the remorse, it 
needs to have a proper appreciation of what motivated the respondent to commit the crime,
343 Ibid.
344 S v Malgas (n 9).
345 S v Matyityi (n 233) para 11.
346 Ibid.
347 Ibid para 12.
348 Ibid para 13.
349 Ibid.
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what has since provoked his change of heart and whether he does indeed have a true 
appreciation of the consequences of those actions.350 The court then concluded that such 
information was never placed before the court and it remained peculiarly within the 
respondent's knowledge. Accordingly the court held that it cannot be said that the respondent 
was remorseful, particularly because the incidents were five days apart, thus giving the 
respondent enough time to reflect after the first incident and also because he had played a 
prominent part in the commission of the crimes as he was the ringleader and this reflected an 
awareness for what he was participating in.351
Regarding his age, the court stated that a court will generally not punish an immature young 
person as harshly as it would punish an adult. It stated that the age of an offender will count 
as a mitigating factor, only where there is proof of immaturity, unless the viciousness of their 
conduct rules out immaturity. It was said that though a person under the age of 18 years is 
regarded prima facie immature, a person of 20 years or more must provide evidence of their 
immaturity that reduces his blameworthiness to such an extent that it can operate as a 
mitigating factor.352 The court then concluded that:
‘At the age of 27 the respondent could hardly be described as a callow youth. At best for him 
his chronological age was a neutral factor. Nothing in it served, without more, to reduce his 
moral blameworthiness. He chose not to go into the box and we have been told nothing about 
his level of immaturity or any other influence that may have been brought to bear on him to 
have caused him to act in the manner in which he did’.353
In addition, the trial judge was found to have misdirected himself as they had found no 
aggravating factors to be present. Firstly, it held that the respondent’s previous conviction 
was irrelevant to the case before it or to the charges he had been found guilty of, and
secondly, the learned judge also held that the rape victim had sustained no injuries.354 On this 
misdirection, the appeal court found that the trial judge was correct to the extent he was 
referring to the “absence of permanent physical injuries”, but also held that “to limit the 
enquiry to permanent physical injuries amounts to a fundamental misconstruction of the act 
of rape itself and its profound psychological, emotional and symbolic significance for the 
350 Ibid.
351 Ibid.
352 Ibid para 14.
353 Ibid.
354 Ibid para 10.
57
victim.”355 For instance, at the time of the trial; one year after the incident, the victim (Ms 
KD) was still receiving counselling as the trauma she suffered was severe.356
The SCA emphasised the importance of a victim-centred approach to sentencing. It held that 
by accommodating the victim during the sentencing stage, the court would be well informed 
about the impact and future impact of the crime on the victim, and thus better able to achieve 
proportionality rather than harshness. The court further said that the involvement of the 
victim is important as courts do not possess the necessary experience that allows them to 
draw conclusions about the effects and consequences of rape for a rape victim.357 In its 
support, the court quoted Muller and Van der Merwe,358 who said:
‘It is extremely difficult for any individual, even a highly trained person such as a magistrate or 
a judge, to comprehend fully the range of emotions and suffering a particular victim of sexual 
violence may have experienced. Each individual brings with himself or herself a different 
background, a different support system and, therefore, a different manner of coping with the 
trauma flowing from the abuse’.359
The SCA also commented on the need for courts to comply with prescribed sentencing 
legislation, it noted that sentencing courts are often willing to:
‘deviate from the minimum sentences prescribed by the legislature for the flimsiest of reasons, 
such as speculative hypotheses favourable to the offender, maudlin sympathy, aversion to 
imprisoning first offenders, personal doubts as to the efficacy of the policy implicit in the 
amending legislation and like considerations’.360
The SCA found this to have been the case in the court a quo as the accused’s age and
purported remorse were incorrectly regarded as “substantial and compelling circumstances”
justifying a deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence. Consequently, the court set 
aside the sentences imposed by the court of first instance and imposed life imprisonment for 
the counts of murder and rape.361
355 Ibid.
356 Ibid para 20.
357 Ibid para 16.
358 K Müller and A Van der Merwe ”Recognising the Victim in the Sentencing Phase: The Use of 
Victim Impact Statements in Court” (2006) 22 SAJHR 647.
359 Ibid 253-254.
360 S v Matyityi (n 233) para 23.
361 Ibid para 24.
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(ii) S v Vilakazi362
The complainant in this case was a girl under the age of 16 years; who lived in poor 
circumstances and had no formal schooling. On the day of the incident, she had been visiting 
at a nearby mine and was walking home alone in the late afternoon. The appellant drove by in 
what appeared to be a tanker-truck. He stopped to give her a lift and after travelling for a 
while changed routes and turned into a nearby plantation, where he apparently stopped.363
According to the complainant both she and the appellant then jumped off from the truck and 
sat in the plantation for a while. After some time the appellant proceeded to the truck and
returned with a condom which he put on. The appellant then caught the complainant, covered 
her mouth and had sexual intercourse with her against her will.  Once done, he departed in his 
truck and was said to return.364 At that time, the complainant continued to wait in the 
plantation for the appellant to return in order to get a lift home. When the appellant did not 
return, she decided to get a lift from another vehicle.365 The appellant pleaded guilty and 
acknowledged that he had had sexual intercourse with the complainant, but said his act did 
not amount to rape because he had utilised a condom and also because he had obtained the 
complainant’s consent.366
According to the Act, on account of the girl being under the age of 16 years, life 
imprisonment was the maximum sentence to be imposed unless “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” exist and justify a lesser sentence.367 The High Court found that no such 
circumstances existed and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment on the count of rape, 
leading to this appeal against the sentence.368
The SCA in this case as a starting point held that it is only by approaching sentencing under 
the Act in the manner that was laid down by this court in Malgas,369 that disproportionate 
sentences can be avoided.370 It was further stated that the terms in which the approach was 
framed meant that a court in every case, before it imposes a prescribed sentence, should 
362 S v Vilakazi (n 158).
363 Ibid para 33.
364 Ibid para 34.
365 Ibid para 35.
366 Ibid para 43.
367 Ibid para 6.
368 Ibid paras 6-7.
369 S v Malgas (n 9).
370 S v Vilakazi (n 158) para 14.
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assess, upon a consideration of all the material circumstances of the particular case, whether 
the prescribed sentence is indeed proportionate to the particular offence as  any circumstances 
that would render the prescribed sentence disproportionate to the offence would constitute the 
required “weighty justification” for the imposition of a lesser sentence of which the court is 
bound to impose.371 The court went on to say that that the 1997 Act is triggered once any of 
the aggravating features specified under it are present and life imprisonment is then 
applicable regardless of the degree in which the feature is present and irrespective of whether 
the convicted person is a first or repeat offender.372
In the case, the SCA also held that the imposition of life imprisonment was not reserved for 
extreme cases of rape only and stated that, “there comes a stage at which the maximum 
sentence is proportionate to an offence and the fact that the same sentence will be attracted by 
an even greater horror means only that the law can offer nothing more”.373 It is however 
unclear as to why courts will often approach sentencing in cases of rape in this manner.
Turning to the circumstances of the case, the SCA held that the trial court misdirected itself 
by not evaluating the circumstances in which the offence was committed. The court went on 
to say that the matter was approached on the basis that the prescribed sentence ought to be 
imposed unless the personal circumstances of the appellant proved to be exceptional. It 
further said that such approach was not permissible as the court was required to apply its 
mind to whether sentence to be imposed was proportional to the offence committed and 
accordingly the court had failed in that regard.374 Owing to this misdirection, the SCA found 
that it had to evaluate the proportionality of the sentence, in accordance with the approach 
that was laid down in the case of Malgas.375
The court after considering the circumstances of the case, considered the following mitigating 
factors as a justification for a lesser sentence:
a. There was no extraneous violence and no physical injury was caused other than 
physical injury inherent in the offence;
b. There was also no threat of extraneous violence of any kind;
371 Ibid paras 15-16.
372 Ibid para 13.
373 Ibid para 54.
374 Ibid para 30.
375 Ibid para 31.
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c. The appellant at least minimized the risk of pregnancy and the transmission of disease 
by using a condom;
d. That after the event the complainant felt herself able to await the appellant’s return 
and to be in his company once more while he drove her home and became 
exasperated when he did not return; and
e. When she was examined by the district surgeon a little later he observed no signs of 
distress, though the court on this held that “it must be accepted that no woman, and 
least of all a child, would be left unscathed by sexual assault, and that in this case the 
complainant must indeed have been traumatized”.376
f. The appellant was arrested on the day the offence was committed and has been 
incarcerated ever since and it would be unjust if the period of imprisonment while 
awaiting trial is not then brought to account in any sentence that is imposed.377
The court further considered the personal circumstances of the appellant and stated that in 
such a case, they are largely immaterial in the question relating to the period of imprisonment 
to be imposed and they merely amount to the “flimsy” grounds of departure contemplated in 
the Malgas case.378 The court however noted that they assist in other respects, for instance, 
where the material question to be answered is of whether or not the accused can be expected 
to offend again. In the case, the court then considered the appellant’s personal circumstances 
to reach a conclusion in this regard. It noted that the appellant had reached the age of 30 years 
without any serious clashes with the law and that his stable employment and “apparently”
stable family circumstances are not indicative of an inherently “lawless character”.379
Looking at the age of the complainant as an aggravating factor the court held: 
‘the complainant’s age fits in the range between infancy and 16 I do not think that her age by 
itself justifies what would otherwise have been a sentence of 10 years imprisonment being 
raised to the maximum sentence permitted by law. A substantial sentence of 15 years’ 
imprisonment seems to me to be sufficient to bring home to the appellant the gravity of his 
offence and to exact sufficient retribution for his crime. To make him pay for it with the 
remainder of his life would seem to me to be grossly disproportionate’.380
376 Ibid paras 55-57.
377 Ibid para 60.
378 S v Vilakazi (n 158) para 58.
379 Ibid.
380 Ibid para 59.
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Consequently, the appeal against the sentence of life imprisonment succeeded and was 
substituted by 15 years imprisonment, from which the two years that the appellant had spent 
in jail while awaiting trial was to be deducted.381
(iii) DDP v Thusi382
In this case, three respondents were convicted and sentenced on various counts. The appeal 
however relates to the counts of murder in respect of all the respondents and the count of rape 
(involving the infliction of grievous bodily harm) in respect of the second accused.383 The 
counts on which they were convicted on were born from separate incidents. Regarding the 
count of rape, the respondents had unlawfully broken into the complainant’s (“McKnight”) 
home in her absence. She however returned home while the respondents were still on the 
premises in the company of her elderly helper. The men then attacked and assaulted the two 
women and the second respondent in the midst of this, solely proceeded to rape McKnight,
who was then 84 years in one of the bedrooms and as a result she sustained severe physical 
injuries and profound trauma.384 Regarding the count of murder, the same trio, seven days 
after this, unlawfully broke into the house of the deceased (“Andrade”), who was then 64 
years old, in his absence. When he returned, they attacked and assaulted him, tied his hands 
behind his back, pushed a sock into his mouth and strangled him with an electric cord and as 
a result he died of suffocation by strangulation.385 Owing to the circumstances under which 
these offences were committed, the minimum sentence for each of them was and is still life 
imprisonment unless “substantial and compelling circumstances” allowing for the imposition 
of a lesser sentence exist.386 The trial judge found that such circumstances existed and thus on 
the murder count, sentenced all three respondents to 15 years’ imprisonment and on the count 
of rape; sentenced the second to 18 years’ imprisonment.387
The trial court as mitigating factors had considered the following:
a. the relative ages of the respondents and their good prospects of rehabilitation;
381 Ibid para 61.
382 DPP v Thusi 2012 (1) SACR 423 (SCA).
383 Ibid para 2.
384 Ibid para 4
385 Ibid para 5.
386 Ibid paras 7-8.
387 Ibid para 2.
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b. regarding the first responded, the fact that he had co-operated and assisted the police 
in their investigation, thus displaying remorse; and 
c. regarding the count of murder, regarded the fact that the state only proved oblique 
intent to kill (dolus eventualis).388
The question before the SCA was thus of whether the trial court misdirected itself in its 
finding that “substantial and compelling circumstances” existed in respect of the murder and 
rape charge. The court mentioned the case of Malgas389 as a starting point and then noted that 
though the trial court had regarded the “relative youthfulness” of the respondents as a factor 
counting in their favour, none of them proved to be immature as their conduct demonstrated 
brutality that was inconsistent with immaturity and further, there was no evidence suggesting 
that they had subjected each other to undue pressure in the commission of the offences.390
The court went on to dismiss the proving of dolus eventualis for the count of murder as a 
mitigating factor. It stated that the fact that the respondents were armed and made no attempts 
to flee the scene after the return of the home-owners indicated an intention on their part to 
confront resistance which was foreseeable with force. 
The court further said that if their intention was only to steal, the rape, murder and assault of 
elderly people who were defenceless was unnecessary.391 This means that they planned the 
housebreakings to an extent that included the understanding that anyone who offered 
resistance will be killed.392 The court did however mention that though this is a relevant 
factor, it is not a compelling one in the circumstances especially because of their brutality in 
the commission of the murder.393 Regarding the respondents’ good prospects of rehabilitation 
evidenced in their personal circumstances and age, the court held that when it is weighed 
against the objective gravity of the offences that they committed, the prevalence of such 
offences in South Africa and the expectations of the society that such crimes will be severely 
punished, the factor does not weigh in favour of them.394
388 Ibid para 9.
389 S v Malgas (n 9).
390 DPP v Thusi (n 382) para 11 and para 17.
391 Ibid.
392 Ibid.
393 Ibid para 22.
394 Ibid para 19.
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The court concluded by saying: 
‘As appears from what has been said above, in imposing sentence on both the murder and the 
rape charges, the trial court over-emphasised the personal interests of the respondents over the 
seriousness and prevalence of the offences, the interests of society and the harm suffered by the 
complainant and by the family of the deceased. In my view there were no substantial and 
compelling circumstances present in the case of either offence that warranted a departure from 
the prescribed statutory norm. To my mind, even having regard to the time spent in custody by 
the respondents pending finalisation of the trial, the prescribed minimum sentences are, in the 
totality of the circumstances encountered here, the only fair and just sentences’.395
Consequently, the court set aside the sentences imposed by the trial court and substituted 
them with life imprisonment, which was to run concurrently with any other sentences 
imposed on the respondents.396
(iv) S v Bailey397
The appellant was convicted of raping his 12-year-old daughter in the Regional Court. He 
had pleaded guilty to the charge of rape as he admitted to having unlawful sexual intercourse 
with the complainant, despite knowing the fact that she was below the age of sixteen years at 
the time of the incident. In fact she was 12 years at the time of the incident.398
The court found that no “substantial and compelling circumstances” and sentenced the 
appellant to life imprisonment. The appellant appealed to the High Court, which dismissed 
the appeal and subsequently to the SCA.399 The appellant’s attack against the imposition of 
life imprisonment was based on the fact that the previous court erred in not finding that the 
sentence imposed was unreasonable and inconsistent with the sentences imposed for similar 
offences by the court and that the facts and circumstances advanced by the appellant as 
evidence amounted to “substantial and compelling circumstances” which justified a sentence 
less than life imprisonment.400 The issue in this appeal was thus whether or not the previous 
395 Ibid paras 23-24.
396 Ibid.
397 S v Bailey 2013 (2) SACR 533 (SCA).
398 Ibid para 2.
399 Ibid para 1.
400 Ibid para 3.
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court erred in not finding that the facts put forward by the appellant amounted to “substantial 
and compelling circumstances” justifying a sentence other than life imprisonment.401
In the case, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that three considerations should be 
considered as “substantial and compelling circumstances”, justifying the imposition of a 
lesser sentence. 402 Firstly, it was said that the appellant had displayed remorse, which 
emanated from his guilty plea and that he had further expressed such remorse to the probation 
officer; secondly, that there were prospects of the appellant being rehabilitated as he had 
shown an appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct and an insight which made him 
open to rehabilitation and consequently, life imprisonment will deny him the opportunity for 
rehabilitation. Thirdly, that he was using drugs at the time of the commission of the
offence.403
Regarding the inconsistency of the sentence when looking at similar cases, the court held that 
a court that follows past precedent without proper consideration of the peculiar facts of that 
particular case will be acting improperly and would be abdicating its duties and discretion to 
consider an appropriate sentence. The court went on to say that where a court imposes a 
sentence which is within the confines of a previously decided similar case, the sentence will 
be appealable on the basis that the court has either failed to exercise its discretion properly or 
at all. 404 The court further quoted Marais JA in Malgas, 405 who commented on the 
comparative approach and said: 
‘It would be foolish of course, to refuse to acknowledge that there is an abiding reality which 
cannot be wished away, namely, an understandable tendency for a court to use, even if only as a 
starting point, past sentencing patterns as a provisional standard for comparison when deciding 
whether a prescribed sentence should be regarded as unjust. To attempt to deny a court the right 
to have any regard whatsoever to past sentencing patterns when deciding whether a prescribed 
sentence is in the circumstances of a particular case manifestly unjust is tantamount to 
expecting someone who has not been allowed to see the colour blue to appreciate and gauge the 
extent to which the colour dark blue differs from it. As long as it is appreciated that the mere 
401 Ibid para 4.
402 Ibid para 5.
403 Ibid para 5.
404 Ibid para 16.
405 S v Malgas (n 9).
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existence of some discrepancy between them cannot be the sole criteria and something more 
than that is needed to justify departure, no great harm will be done’.406
The court then concluded that similar cases should only be used as guidelines and cannot be 
elevated to binding precedent, particularly because in rape cases, it is hard to imagine a 
situation where two different complainants in two different cases would have the same 
physical, emotional and behavioural problems after the rape. Owing to the fact that these are 
important factors to be considered when determining an appropriate sentence, a sentence 
imposed will be different not only because of the variation in the problems encountered after 
the rape, but also in personal circumstances of the accused, the nature and gravity of the 
offence and all other factors relevant to sentencing.407 The court further stated that the after-
effects of the rape on the complainant in this case were devastating and far reaching, making 
this case heinous and different from the similar decided cases in which life imprisonment was 
not imposed.408
With regards to the existence of “substantial and compelling circumstances”, the court noted 
that a consideration of the appellant’s personal circumstances was necessary.409 The court 
then looked at the fact that the appellant was 38 years old at the time of the commission of 
the offence and 40 years old during sentencing. He was married to the complainant’s mother 
and had 3 children including the complainant. He was employed before his arrest and was 
responsible for the maintenance of his children. He had a drug habit which was caused by the 
death of his father. He pleaded guilty and expressed remorse for his actions. Lastly he had 
previous convictions for theft, fraud, attempted rape and other offences.410 On the other hand 
as aggravating factors, the court considered the fact that the complainant was 12 years old at 
the time of the rape; that the appellant was her biological father, resulting in the rape being 
incestuous and being found to be morally repugnant by many if not all reasonable persons. 
The court also considered the fact that before the rape the appellant had performed improper 
sexual practices on the complainant on two occasions. The court also considered the 
emotional and psychological suffering of the complainant.411
406 Ibid para 21.
407 S v Bailey (n 397) para 18.
408 Ibid para 13.
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The court then concluded that the above-mentioned circumstances were seriously aggravating 
and deserved appropriate weight in the consideration of an appropriate sentence. 
Consequently, the court held that no “substantial and compelling circumstances” existed and 
accordingly dismissed the appeal.412 In addition, the court stated that the phrase “substantial 
and compelling circumstances” is so elastic that it includes the ordinary mitigating
circumstances and a value judgment on the part of the sentencing court.413
(v) S v Nkomo414
The appellant was convicted in the Regional Court of rape and kidnapping. The complainant 
testified that she was at the bar drinking a cold drink, given to her by the appellant, which he 
had laced with alcohol. The appellant forced her into a hotel room that he had hired, forced 
her to undress and raped her.415 The appellant locked her in the room and went back to the 
bar for more drinks, hence the kidnapping conviction. She attempted to escape from the room 
by jumping out of a window, fell some ten metres to the ground and injured her leg.416
Unfortunately, where she fell was where the appellant had been sitting and drinking. He 
forced her back into the hotel room and raped her four more times during the course of the 
night, thus resulting in the rape falling within s 51 (1) of the 1997 Act. He also forced her to 
perform oral sex on him and slapped her, pushed her and kicked her. He prevented her from 
leaving the room again by taking her clothes away.417
When the complainant managed to escape the following morning, she went straight away to 
the police station.418 The appellant was arrested and charged. The Regional Court sentenced 
him to a three year sentence on the kidnapping charge and referred him to the High Court for 
sentence on the charge of rape. The High Court did not find any “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment. The appellant appealed to 
the SCA against the sentence.419
412 Ibid paras 24-25.
413 Ibid para 21.
414 S v Nkomo 2007 (2) SACR 198 (SCA).
415 Ibid para 5.
416 Ibid para 6.
417 Ibid para 7.
418 Ibid para 8.
419 Ibid paras 1-2.
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The sentence was however imposed in 1999 before the leading case in Malgas420 determined 
the approach to be adopted in finding whether “substantial and compelling circumstances”
exist.421 The High Court thus relied heavily on earlier authority which suggested that ordinary 
mitigating factors did not in themselves warrant the imposition of a sentence less severe than 
that prescribed by the Act.422 The SCA was said to be free to impose a sentence that it 
considered appropriate as the High Court had erred by not considering the mitigating factors 
adduced by the appellant.423
The court as aggravating factors then looked at the fact that the appellant had not only raped 
the complainant once, but had raped her five times during the course of the night; that he held 
her captive in a room while he demeaned and hurt her, forcing himself on her repeatedly 
throughout the night, even after she had seriously hurt herself when she jumped out of the 
window, and was in pain. It also considered that he showed no remorse, throughout the 
proceedings and claimed that the complainant had lied about being raped and about the 
events that had taken place in the bar, despite the fact that he was prepared to pay her in order 
to persuade her to withdraw the charge of rape.424 The appellant was also in a comparatively 
better position than the complainant as he had some education and a permanent job and 
should have known better, but instead had behaved like a “sexual thug”.425
The court noted as mitigating factors in favour of the appellant, the fact that the appellant was 
relatively young at the time of the rapes (he was 29 years old); that he was employed and that 
there was a chance of rehabilitation.426 It also considered the fact that the appellant did not 
use any weapon although he assaulted the complainant and that he did not seriously injure the 
complainant, though he “callously and cruelly” disregarded the injury caused when she tried 
to escape from the hotel room.427 Lastly, it considered the fact that the appellant was a first 
offender.428
420 S v Malgas (n 9).
421 S v Nkomo (n 414) para 2.
422 Ibid para 3.
423 Ibid para 4.
424 Ibid para 13.
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In concluding that the sentence of life imprisonment was unjust in the circumstances, the 
court quoted the Mahomotsa case,429 which dealt with multiple rapes. In the case Mpati JA 
was quoted saying: 
‘Even in cases falling within the categories delineated in the Act there are bound to be 
differences in the degree of their seriousness. There should be no misunderstanding about this: 
they will all be serious but some will be more serious than others and, subject to the caveat that 
follows, it is only right that the differences in seriousness should receive recognition when it 
comes to the meting out of punishment. As this Court observed in Abrahams,430 some rapes are 
worse than others and the life sentence ordained by the Legislature should be reserved for cases 
devoid of substantial factors compelling the conclusion that such a sentence is inappropriate 
and unjust. Of course, one must guard against the notion that because still more serious cases 
than the one under consideration are imaginable, it must follow inexorably that something 
should be kept in reserve for such cases and therefore that the sentence imposed in the case at 
hand should be correspondingly lighter than the severer sentences that such hypothetical cases 
would merit. There is always an upper limit in all sentencing jurisdictions, be it death, life or 
some lengthy term of imprisonment, and there will always be cases which, although differing in 
their respective degrees of seriousness, nonetheless all call for the maximum penalty imposable. 
The fact that the crimes under consideration are not all equally horrendous may not matter if the 
least horrendous of them is horrendous enough to justify the imposition of the maximum 
penalty.’431
The court imposed 16 years of imprisonment, partly because this case did not fall within the 
worst category of rapes and also because of the mitigating factors that weighed in favour of 
the appellant.
(vi) S v Kwanape432
The complainant, a 12-year-old girl (“K”), was playing in the street with her friends when the 
appellant, who was well-known to her, emerged. Having asked them what they were doing,
the appellant grabbed the complainant and dragged her to a nearby bush. One of K’s friends 
tried to intervene and asked the appellant as to what they were doing and the appellant instead 
429 S v Mahomotsa (n 110).
430 S v Abrahams (n 308).
431 S v Mahomotsa (n 110) paras 14, 17, 18 and 19.
432 S v Kwanape 2014 (1) SACR 405 (SCA).
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threw stones at the two friends causing them to flee.433 When K tried to scream, the appellant
averted the noise by closing her mouth with his hand. He further pushed her to the ground, 
undressed her, and after undressing himself, raped her three times albeit at different spots. 
During the rape, K said that she was feeling pain. The appellant subsequently took her to his 
home where she is said to have slept with the appellant’s sister. The next day, whilst 
returning home, K met her father on the road. She then reported the incident to him and upon 
reaching home she also reported the incident to her mother. She was then taken to hospital 
where she was examined by a doctor, who described the complainant’s vaginal examination 
as having been painful. The doctor also recorded that the complainant sustained, inter alia, 
scratch marks on her knees and elbows and a small tear in her private part.434
Due to the fact that she was under the age of 16 years, this case fell within S51 (1) of the Act. 
The High Court in the circumstances found that were no “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” warranting the imposition of a lesser sentence and consequently imposed life 
imprisonment. The appellant then got leave to appeal to the SCA.435 The issue before the 
SCA was therefore whether or not the High Court was correct in finding that there were no 
“substantial and compelling circumstances”.436
The appellant submitted that the High Court failed to consider factors that would have 
weighed in his favour. These factors were that the appellant was:437
a. A first offender;
b. 24 years of age when the rape was perpetrated;
c. Gainfully employed and earning R500 fortnightly;
d. had attended school up to grade 5;
e. HIV positive (even though one would consider this to be an aggravating factor as the 
appellant raped a minor knowingly);
f. A primary care-giver;
g. Running a tuck-shop from which he generated R400 per month; and
h. Capable of being rehabilitated
433 Ibid para 10.
434 Ibid para 11.
435 Ibid para 2.
436 Ibid para 9.
437 Ibid para 12.
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The court quoted the leading case of Malgas438 as a starting point, and stated that when 
dealing with a case falling under the scope of S 51(1), courts have to be mindful of the 
objectives of the Act.439 The court then went on to quote the Matyityi case,440 which said that
“the crime pandemic that engulfs our country has not abated. Thus courts are duty-bound to 
implement the sentences prescribed in terms of the Act and that ill-defined concepts such as 
relative youthfulness or other equally vague and ill-founded hypotheses that appear to fit the 
particular sentencing officer’s personal notion of fairness ought to be avoided.”441
The court stated that the mitigating factors advanced by the appellant must be weighed 
against the aggravating circumstances of the case, which were:442
a. The fact that the appellant had steadfastly maintained his innocence even in the face 
of overwhelming evidence against him;
b. He brazenly abducted the complainant in the presence of her friends to satisfy his
sexual desires without using a condom;
c. He subjected the complainant to the agony, pain and indignity of rape;
d. The age of the complainant when she was raped, coupled with her immaturity and 
anatomical under-development render this rape a dreadful one;
e. The complainant was effectively held hostage the whole night thus exacerbating her 
anguish;
f. The complainant was forced to drop out from school, compelling her mother to give 
up employment to offer her emotional support; and
g. The complainant has been driven to becoming a recluse to avoid being ridiculed by 
her peers, thus exacerbating the consequential emotional and psychological trauma 
she suffered.
In dismissing the appeal and after considering the aggravating circumstances, Petse JA held
that:
‘For all the foregoing reasons I am not persuaded that the court below erred in its conclusion 
that substantial and compelling circumstances were absent. To come to a contrary decision in 
438 S v Malgas (n 9).
439 S v Kwanape (n 432).
440 S v Matyityi (n 233).
441 Ibid 53c-g.
442 Ibid para 17.
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this case would constitute a failure to heed the caution in Malgas443 that the specified sentences 
are not to be departed from lightly or for flimsy reasons and that speculative hypotheses 
favourable to the offender, undue sympathy, aversion to imprisoning first offenders are to be 
excluded. Although the High Court did not say so in terms, it is evident from the tenor of its 
judgment that before it imposed the prescribed sentence, it had assessed, upon a consideration 
of all the circumstances of this case, whether the prescribed sentence was indeed proportionate 
to the offence charged’.444
Accordingly, it was said that this case was horrendous enough to justify the imposition of the 
maximum penalty.445
(vii) DPP v Gcwala446
The deceased (“Thandi”) was a deputy mayor, whose municipality had awarded a number of 
tenders to a Ms Lukhele. She however, subsequently cancelled these tenders for some reason. 
Ms Lukhele then arranged for her to be murdered. She enlisted the help of a number of 
people, including one called Madoda to execute her plan. Madoda agreed to execute Ms 
Lukhele’s mandate for a fee of R60 000 and he in turn obtained the assistance of the three 
respondents.447
On the day of the murder, the deceased died on the scene in the presence of her family, after 
several shots were fired at her. This happened on arrival at her home, while she was 
approaching her front door. Ms Lukhele was then charged with the murder together with the 
respondents; however, she pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 20 years’ 
imprisonment. She agreed to give evidence at the respondents’ trial and testified that she had 
conspired to murder the deceased and implicated other people in her testimony. She also 
testified as to the financial arrangements that she had made with Madoda.448
Madoda on the other hand gave evidence in court on the basis that if he answered questions 
frankly and honestly he may be discharged from prosecution (though he was not discharged 
443 S v Malgas (n 9).
444 S v Kwanape (n 432) para 25.
445 Ibid para 20.
446 DPP v Gcwala 2014 (2) SACR 337 (SCA).
447 Ibid para 2.
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because he failed to answer questions frankly and honestly).449 Madoda testified to the fact
that he had approached the three respondents to assist in him with the killing of the deceased 
and to the fact that all three respondents were in attendance for the meeting held at Madoda’s 
house. All acknowledged the fact they were mandated to kill the deceased for a fee. After 
executing the mandate, they informed Madoda that the mandate was accomplished and 
accordingly, they were paid a fee.450
The evidence that the three respondents were responsible for the killing of the deceased was 
corroborated by a number of other witnesses. Though it was not clear which respondent 
actually shot the deceased, evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that all three 
respondents had acted in execution of a common purpose to murder the deceased.451 They 
were convicted on a charge of murder and sentenced to an effective sentence of 12 years’ 
imprisonment by the High Court.452 The state in the circumstances was thus appealing against 
the sentence of the High Court.453
In determining the sentence, the trial court took a number of factors into account. Those 
factors included: 
a. the fact that the murder was planned; 
b. that the respondents willingly agreed to kill a woman who was a dedicated member of 
the community; 
c. that they spent time travelling a distance to plan the commission of the offence; 
d. that they received a fee once the mandate to kill the deceased was carried out; 
e. that the murder was politically motivated; 
f. that they showed no remorse; and
g. that communities “have been riddled with these offences of killing officers holding
decisive positions in government especially those who refuse to subscribe to
corruption”.454
449 Ibid para 2.
450 Ibid para 4.
451 Ibid para 4.
452 Ibid para 1.
453 Ibid.
454 Ibid para 6.
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The High Court however, decided that the following circumstances justified the imposition of 
a sentence less than the prescribed period of life imprisonment for the murder of the 
deceased:455
a. all three accused had been in custody for 4 years awaiting trial;
b. there was no evidence before the court as to who shot the deceased;
c. accused 1 and 3 were first offenders; and
d. all three were capable of being rehabilitated.
The trial judge also explained that he had taken the 4 years spent in custody by the 
respondents while awaiting trial into account, and had, doubled that number, resulting in the 
deduction of 8 years from the sentence he would otherwise have imposed. 456 This 
consideration follows from a finding of S v Brophy,457 where the court held that as a rule of 
thumb, time spent in custody while awaiting trial equates to double the time one actually 
spends in prison.458 The SCA in the light of this had to address the following questions:459
a. How should the period spent in custody be dealt with in cases where a life sentence is 
appropriate, and in this case?
b. How must a court deal with and give credit to the accused for the time spent in 
custody before conviction and sentence?
In respect of this, the SCA quoted S v Radebe,460 where the court held that there should be no 
rule of thumb in respect of the calculation of the weight to be given to the time spent in 
custody while awaiting trial.461 Lewis JA said that:
‘In my view there should be no rule of thumb in respect of the calculation of the weight to be 
given to the period spent by an accused awaiting trial. A mechanical formula to determine the 
extent, to which the proposed sentence should be reduced, by reason of the period of detention 
prior to conviction, is unhelpful. The circumstances of an individual accused must be assessed 
in each case in determining the extent to which the sentence proposed should be reduced. A 
better approach, in my view, is that the period in detention pre-sentencing is but one of the 
455 Ibid para 8.
456 Ibid para 10.
457 S v Brophy & another 2007 (2) SACR 56 (W).
458 DPP v Gcwala (n 446) para 10.
459Ibid para 14.
460S v Radebe & another 2013 (2) SACR 165 (SCA).
461 DPP v Gcwala (n 446) para 16.
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factors that should be taken into account in determining whether the effective period of 
imprisonment to be imposed is justified: whether it is proportionate to the crime committed.
Such an approach would take into account the conditions affecting the accused in detention and 
the reason for a prolonged period of detention. And accordingly, in determining, whether 
substantial and compelling circumstances warrant a lesser sentence than that prescribed, the test 
is not whether on its own that period of detention constitutes a substantial or compelling 
circumstance, but whether the effective sentence proposed is proportionate to the crime or 
crimes committed: whether the sentence in all the circumstances, including the period spent in 
detention prior to conviction and sentencing, is a just one’.462
Accordingly, the SCA held that the sentencing court in its assessment of the particular 
circumstances of a case, should consider whether the prescribed sentence is proportionate to 
the offence committed; taking into account traditional factors as well as the period spent in 
custody while awaiting trial.463 Thus, the trial court in this matter, should have determined 
whether, after a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, including the period spent 
in custody awaiting trial, a sentence less than that one prescribed was justified.464 This means 
that the 4 years spent in custody by each of the respondents while awaiting trial should have 
been taken into account as a factor warranting a lesser sentence, but the doubling of such a 
period cannot be justified. 465 Thus, the deduction of 8 years of imprisonment from the 
number of years that the trial court considered appropriate amounted to a misdirection on the 
part of the court, warranting interference by the SCA.466
The SCA then held that the trial court failed to consider all the factors necessary in 
determining an appropriate sentence, resulting in the imposition of sentences far too lenient in 
the circumstances. The above-mentioned aggravating circumstances indicate that the 
sentences imposed were inappropriate.467 After noting that the time spent in custody while 
awaiting trial should only be regarded as a factor, and should not be decisive of the 
appropriate sentence, the court held that though life imprisonment was inappropriate in the 
circumstances, a lengthy term of imprisonment, much longer than that one prescribed was 
warranted. The court further stated that people who kill people for financial gain ought to be 
462 S v Radebe (n 460) paras 13-14.
463 DPP v Gcwala (n 446) para 18.
464 Ibid para 19.
465 Ibid.
466 Ibid.
467 Ibid para 27.
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severely punished and consequently, imposed a sentence of 20 years of imprisonment in 
respect of each of the respondents.468
The cases after the decision of Malgas469 and after the 1997 Act, as amended, like the 
previously discussed cases, consider traditional factors in concluding whether or not 
“substantial and compelling circumstances” in a particular case exist. In rape cases, though 
the courts consider the victim’s psychological trauma or the impact of the rape on the victim, 
they still place great weight on the presence of physical injuries or absence thereof, despite 
the fact that this is contrary to s 51 (3) (aA) (ii) of the Act. Traditional factors such as the age 
of the accused as well as the victim, including the accused’s criminal history continue to be
an important consideration.
The approach laid down by the leading case of Malgas470 is used as a point of departure and 
is often quoted by the different judicial officers. The courts also often consider the time 
already served by the accused in custody while awaiting trial and view this as a mitigating 
factor and not as the sole criterion for deciding whether “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” exist. The judicial officers continue to categorise rape and repeatedly imply
that life imprisonment is only justifiable in extreme cases of rape (S v Nkomo; 471 S v 
Bailey472). However, the SCA in Vilakazi473 has clarified this misconception by holding that 
the imposition of life imprisonment is not reserved for extreme cases of rape.474 Courts are 
now also considering the accused’s good prospects of rehabilitation as a mitigating factor in 
the enquiry relating to “substantial and compelling circumstances” (S v Nkomo; 475 S v 
Bailey;476 DPP v Thusi477). Though remorse has also been viewed as a mitigating factor, it is
said that it can only be regarded as such, where there is evidence of it being genuine.478
Judicial officers throughout the above-mentioned cases appear to have a tendency of looking 
at the personal circumstances of the accused when determining whether there are mitigating 
468 Ibid para 28.
469 S v Malgas (n 9).
470 Ibid.
471 S v Nkomo (n 414).
472 S v Bailey (n 397).
473 S v Vilakazi (n 158).
474 Ibid para 30.
475 S v Nkomo (n 414).
476 S v Bailey (n 397).
477 DPP v Thusi (n 382).
478 S v Matyityi (n 233) para 13.
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factors. Regarding this, it was stated in the Vilakazi case,479 that such circumstances are 
immaterial in the question relating to the period of imprisonment to be imposed, though they 
are able to assist the court in deciding whether or not the accused is likely to re-offend.480 The 
court stated that what had to be evaluated in such an enquiry were the circumstances in which 
the offence was committed.481
The above-mentioned cases have not textually defined what amounts to “substantial and 
compelling circumstances”, but have rather set out an approach that is to be followed when 
faced with an enquiry relating to such circumstances. This is also the case under Minnesota 
Guidelines, but contrary to South Africa, in Minnesota, the presence of “substantial and 
compelling circumstances” may result in both a lesser and harsher sentence, in that some 
aggravating circumstances may be substantial and compelling enough to warrant a sentence 
higher than the prescribed one (upward departure). 482 The Minnesota Guidelines (“the 
Guidelines”) do not only contain a list of factors that may not be considered in the decision as 
to whether a departure is justified, but equally, a list of factors indicating when “substantial 
and compelling circumstances” will be said to exist is provided, though it is not a closed list.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines will be discussed below.
3.3. MINNESOTA GUIDELINES
3.3.1. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota sentencing guidelines are aimed at establishing a rational and consistent 
sentencing standard that eradicates any sentencing disparities. Unlike South Africa however, 
they ensure that the punishment imposed on convicted persons is not only proportional to the 
severity of the offence, but also to the offender’s criminal history, notwithstanding the fact 
that South Africa also considers previous convictions in the sentencing process. Persons 
convicted of similar crimes under similar circumstances receive similar punishment and those 
convicted under substantially different circumstances receive different punishments.483
479 S v Vilakazi (n 158).
480 Ibid para 58.
481 Ibid para 30.
482 D Van Zyl Smit (n 162) 272
483 Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines & Commentary (1 August 2013) 1. http://mn.gov/sentencing-
guidelines. accessed 17/06/2015.
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According to the Guidelines, sentencing should be impartial in the sense that the race, gender, 
social, or economic status of convicted persons is to be considered irrelevant. Under the 
Guidelines, the severity of punishment increases with an increase in the severity of the 
offence and the convicted person’s criminal record. Though imprisonment is not the only 
punishment available to the court, it is the most severe punishment that could be imposed on 
a criminal and it is usually limited to cases where the offenders are convicted of serious 
offences and have a long criminal record. Although the Guidelines are only advisory and not 
mandatory, the sentences established under them are deemed appropriate for the crimes they 
cover. A departure from the established sentences is possible when “substantial and 
compelling circumstances” can be identified and articulated.484
3.3.2. SENTENCES ESTABLISHED UNDER THE GUIDELINES
The Guidelines establish presumptive sentences, which are those sentences presumed to be 
appropriate for all similar cases, where the offenders have the same criminal history and have 
committed crimes of the same severity.485 The sentences imposed on criminals are presented 
through a grid system, similar to a crossword puzzle,486 and they are found in a cell where the 
offender’s criminal record and the severity of the offence they have committed intersect.487
Regarding offence severity, the level of severity is determined by the crime for which the
offender has been convicted of and if the offender has been convicted of more than one 
offence, the most severe offence for which he has been convicted of will determine the level 
of severity.488 Serious offences either than sex offences are arranged vertically on the grid 
into eleven levels and they range from high to low; level eleven being the most severe and 
level one being the least severe, though they are all presumed equally serious. Sex offences 
are arranged in a similar way on a separate sex offender grid.489
Regarding the offender’s criminal history, it is represented horizontally on the grid and is 
made up of the offender’s prior offences; custody status at the time of the offence; prior 
484 Ibid 1-2.
485 Ibid 4.





misdemeanours and gross misdemeanours (misdemeanours being less serious crimes); and 
prior juvenile adjudications. 490 This means that the offender’s criminal history is not only 
made up of his past convictions, but it also comprises of offences for which the offender has 
not been convicted of as well as their clashes with the law in general.
The grid displays shaded and unshaded cells. If a case results in a sentence that falls in the
cells outside of the shaded areas, it means the sentence is to be carried out. If it has a sentence 
falling in the cells within the shaded areas; the sentence should be stayed unless the offence 
for which the offender is convicted of carries a mandatory minimum imprisonment 
sentence.491 On each unshaded cell on the grid, there is a fixed imprisonment term that a court
is to impose as well as a discretionary sentence range within which a court may choose from
in an instance where it does not impose the fixed term. This is not the same for shaded areas 
of the grid as they do not display such discretionary ranges.492
If the duration for an imprisonment sentence is found within the unshaded areas, the court is 
empowered to impose a sentence that is 15 per cent lower and 20 per cent higher than the 
fixed duration displayed on the grid and it is able to do this without the sentence being 
deemed a departure from the fixed term. If the court imposes a sentence lower than the fixed 
term, such sentence must not be less than one year and one day, and if it imposes a sentence 
higher than the fixed term, the sentence imposed must not be more than the statutory 
maximum.493 It is important to note that premeditated murder (1st degree murder) has not 
been included in the Guidelines as it carries a mandatory life sentence.494
3.3.3. DEPARTURES FROM THE GUIDELINES
The sentence ranges provided in the grids (including the sex offences grid) are presumed to 
be appropriate for the crimes to which they apply and thus, the court is expected to pronounce 
a sentence within the specified range unless there exist identifiable “substantial and 







applicable grid. 495 Where such circumstances exist, the court may depart from the 
presumptive sentence and impose a sentence that it deems to be more appropriate. A sentence 
for a conviction that is outside the appropriate range on the grid is a departure from the 
Guidelines and is thus not controlled by the Guidelines, but rather, is an exercise of judicial 
discretion constrained by either statute or case law.496
Like in South Africa, the court is expected to disclose in writing or on the record the 
particular “substantial and compelling circumstances” that make the departure more 
appropriate than the prescribed sentences.497 However, unlike South Africa, the Guidelines 
have set out departure factors which the courts are to consider when departing from the 
presumptive sentences. In addition, those factors that are not to be considered in the enquiry 
concerning the presence of “substantial and compelling circumstances” have also been set out
in the same manner South Africa has set out factors that do not amount to “substantial and 
compelling circumstances” in a case of rape. The factors that can be considered are however 
only advisory unless otherwise established by case law.498
According to the Guidelines, the following factors should not be used as reasons for 




c. Employment factors, which include occupation or the impact of the sentence on their 
profession or occupation; their employment history; their employment at the time of 
the commission of the offence; and their employment at the time of sentencing. 
d. Social factors, which include their educational attainment; their living arrangements at 
the time of the commission of the offence or sentencing; their length of residence
(how long they have resided in one area); and their marital status. 







The Guidelines in addition to this have set out factors that have to be considered in the 
enquiry relating to whether or not “substantial and compelling circumstances exist”. The 
factors have been divided into mitigating factors, for when the court departs and imposes a 
lesser sentence (downward departure) and aggravating factors, for when the court departs and 
imposes a higher sentence (upward departure). This is however not a closed list as new 
factors may be established through case law. Accordingly, the mitigating factors will be 
found where;500
a. The victim was an aggressor in the incident. 
b. The offender played a minor or passive role in the crime or participated under 
circumstances of coercion or duress. 
c. The offender, because of some physical or mental impairment, lacked substantial 
capacity for judgment when the offence was committed. This factor however does not 
include the voluntary use of intoxicants such as drugs or alcohol. 
d. The offender’s presumptive sentence is an imprisonment term, but not a mandatory 
minimum sentence, and either of the following exist: 
i. The offence the offender is convicted of falls at Severity Level 1 or 2 and the offender 
received all of his or her prior convictions at two separate court appearances; or 
ii. The current offence for which the offender is convicted of is at Severity Level 3 or 4 
and the offender received all of his or her prior convictions at one court appearance. 
e. Other substantial grounds exist that tend to excuse or mitigate the offender’s 
culpability, although not amounting to a defence. 
f. The court is ordering an alternative placement as the offender has a serious and 
persistent mental illness. 
On the other hand, aggravating factors will be found where;501
a. The victim was particularly vulnerable due to age, infirmity, or reduced physical or 
mental capacity, and the offender knew or should have known of this vulnerability. 
b. The victim was treated with particular cruelty for which the individual offender 
should be held responsible. 
c. The offender is convicted for a sexual offence, or an offence in which the victim was 
otherwise injured, and in the circumstances, the offender has a prior conviction for a 




d. The offender committed the crime against another person and was paid a fee for its 
commission. 
e. The offender is being sentenced as a “dangerous offender”.
f. The offender is being sentenced as a “career offender”.
g. The offender committed the crime as part of a group of three or more offenders who 
all actively participated in the crime. (Common purpose).
h. The offender intentionally selected the victim because of the victim’s actual or 
perceived race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, age, or national origin. 
i. The offence was committed in the presence of a child. 
j. The offence was committed in a location in which the victim had an expectation of 
safety and privacy. 
Van Zyl Smit has expressed the view that a noteworthy feature of the above circumstances is 
that they all focus on features which relate to the gravity of the offence itself, and the
blameworthiness of the offender in respect of that offence; mimicking what was once known 
as “extenuating circumstances” in South Africa when courts were confronted with mandatory 
sentences for murder in the past.502 He submits that in this regard, South African courts 
proved adept at developing criteria for identifying mitigating circumstances by including all 
those circumstances that diminished the moral blameworthiness of the offender’s conduct. He 
further submits that though the application of this test was controversial, it greatly widened 
the discretion of the courts whilst still structuring the decision-making process. He further 
stated that the current legislation demands a similar judicial initiative in determining what 
circumstances are relevant to deciding whether “substantial and compelling circumstances”
exist. He submits that if this is done “rigorously and systematically” it could go a long way 
towards balancing the clear legislative desire to encourage the courts to impose heavier 
sentences on the grounds of deterrence or incapacitation, with the avoidance of sentences that 
are grossly disproportionate to the specific crimes committed.503 The concept of “extenuating 
circumstances” will be discussed below.
502 D Van Zyl Smit (n 162) 272.
503 Ibid 275-276.
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3.4. EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
3.4.1. INTRODUCTION
Section 277 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (“CPA”)504 read as follows:
‘Where a woman is convicted of the murder of her newly-born child or where a person under 
the age of eighteen years is convicted of murder or where the court, on convicting a person of 
murder, is of the opinion that there are ‘extenuating circumstances’, the court may impose any 
sentence other than the death sentence.’
Like in the case with “substantial and compelling circumstances”, the legislature did not 
provide a definition of “extenuating circumstances”. This means that there was no guidance 
as to what factors should be taken into account in an enquiry relating to extenuating 
circumstances and further there was no guidance as to whether the factors taken into account 
should relate to the accused’s state of mind or their degree of participation in the commission 
of the crime.505 Owing to this, the concept was susceptible to various interpretations, like in 
the case with “substantial and compelling circumstances”, and the approach adopted in its 
interpretation was established through case law.506
3.4.2. INTERPRETATION OF EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES
The first expressed interpretation of “extenuating circumstances” was provided in the 1935 
decision of R v Mfoni,507 where it was held that “only such circumstances as are connected 
with or have a relation to the conduct of the accused in the commission of the crime should 
have any weight at all” (should be considered).508 A couple of years later, the case of R v 
Biyana509 defined extenuating circumstances as any “fact associated with the crime which 
serves in the minds of reasonable men to diminish, morally albeit not legally, the degree of 
504 Criminal Procedure Act (n 26).
505 R J Mbuli Extenuating Circumstances in Murder (Unpublished LLM thesis, University of Zululand, 
(1989)) 10.
506 G Devenish “The application of the death penalty in South Africa: Its historical and jurisprudential 
evolution and background and its relationship with constitutional and political reform” (1992) 5 South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 1-31 at 8.
507 R v Mfoni 1935 OPD 191.
508 Ibid.
509 R v Biyana 1938 EDL 310.
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the prisoner’s guilt”.510 In support of the above, the case of R v Fundakubi511 held that “No 
factor not too remote or too faintly or indirectly related to the commission of the crime, 
which bears on the accused’s moral blameworthiness in committing it, can be ruled out from 
consideration”.512
The interpretation of extenuating circumstances as set out in S v Letsolo513 was however the 
supported one. Though it did not textually define the concept, it set out the nature of factors 
that were to be taken into account during the enquiry into the existence of extenuating
circumstances. The interpretation as laid out by the above-mentioned case did not put a limit 
on the type or nature of factors that were to be considered in the enquiry and accordingly, it 
was accepted as being correct by numerous cases that followed it.514 The onus to prove the 
existence of extenuating circumstances rested on the accused, however, like in the case with 
“substantial and compelling circumstances”, the accused was not expected to lead evidence 
during the trial or the sentencing stage, as the court was able to draw inferences from the 
evidence led by the state and the accused during the trial.515
The Letsolo case,516 introduced a 3-step approach that was to be followed in the enquiry as to 
whether extenuating circumstances existed in a particular case.517 The first step dealt with an 
enquiry into whether or not there were facts, factors or circumstances which could have 
influenced the state of mind of the accused.518 This was a factual question as the courts were
merely required to scrutinise the evidence as a whole and then conclude whether such factors 
existed. Where the accused was a youthful offender, or where there was evidence that the 
accused was intoxicated, provoked, acting in self-defence or acting under compulsion or 
duress, the court was likely to find that such factors existed and had a bearing on the 
accused’s state of mind. It was not possible however, to put a limit to the nature of factors or 
circumstances that could affect the accused’s state of mind as different cases could present 
different circumstances. If a court did not find any fact, factor or circumstances which could 
have influenced the mental ability or the state of mind of the accused during the commission 
510 Ibid.
511 R v Fundakubi 1948 (3) SA 810 (AD).
512 Ibid.
513 S v Letsolo 1970 (3) SA 476 (A).
514 R J Mbuli (n 505) 15.
515 R v Lembete 1947 (2) SA 603 (A).




of the murder, the court could not be said to have found extenuating circumstances. 
Consequently, the imposition of the mandatory death sentence followed as the court did not 
have the discretion to impose any other sentence.519
The second step dealt with an enquiry relating to whether or not the facts, factors or 
circumstances which were present during the commission of the murder, considered 
cumulatively did in fact influence the accused’s conduct.520 This was once again a factual 
question and the court was to be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the said facts, 
factors or circumstances did influence the accused. If they did not influence the accused, the 
court will not proceed to the next step but will conclude that it did not find extenuating 
circumstances.521
The third stage of the enquiry relating to the existence of extenuating circumstances involved 
a value judgment by the court. The court was required to judge whether in its opinion, the 
influence on the mental ability or state of mind of the accused was of such a nature that the
accused’s conduct could be regarded as less morally reprehensible. It was during this third 
step of the enquiry that the question of moral blameworthiness came into play.522 Thus,
according to Letsolo,523 before imposing the sentence of death, the court was required to ask 
three questions, namely; whether there were relevant mitigating facts, such as immaturity, 
drunkenness or provocation; whether such facts, considered cumulatively, had an influence 
on the accused’s conduct and lastly whether the facts were sufficient enough to reduce the 
moral blameworthiness of the accused. 524 The above court further pointed out that the 
discretion of the court in such an enquiry was expected to be exercised in a judicial manner, 
taking into account all relevant facts, which were inclusive of the personal circumstances of 
the accused, particularly their criminal record.525
A number of factors continued to emerge through case law. For instance, the criminal law 
requirement of intention for the crime of murder that presents itself in the form of dolus 
519 R J Mbuli (n 505) 18.
520 S v Letsolo (n 513).
521 R J Mbuli (n 505) 18.
522 S v Letsolo (n 513).
523 Ibid.
524 SS Terblanche ‘Sentencing Murder and the Ideal of Equality’ (2011) XLIV CILSA 97.
525 Ibid.
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eventualis was accepted as an extenuating circumstance.526 The reason for this was because 
this form of intention amounts to an indirect one, which is based, not on the desire to kill, but 
on an intention which amounts to exposing the deceased to harm and then being reckless as to 
whether death ensues or not.527
In 1990, the concept of extenuating circumstances was abolished by passing of the Criminal 
Procedure Amendment Act of 1990 (“the Amendment Act”), as it substituted a discretionary 
death sentence in all cases.528 The legislation was applicable to all pending appeals and
required that the death sentence be imposed only after a full consideration of both mitigating 
and aggravating factors. It also provided for the review of cases where the appeals were 
exhausted and the death sentence was confirmed.529 In S v Nkwanyana,530 the Appellate 
Division found that mitigating factors included a broader range of factors than those required 
in the consideration of extenuating circumstances as the concept included more than just
those factors connected to the commission of the crime. The Court also concluded by stating
that the prosecution had the burden of showing aggravating factors and the absence of 
mitigating factors thereof beyond a reasonable doubt.531
3.4.3. FACTORS CONSIDERED AFTER THE 1990 AMENDMENT ACT
Du Toit et al states that although the imposition of the death penalty continued even after the 
1990 Amendment Act, courts were no longer required to establish whether or not there were
extenuating circumstances but rather whether there were mitigating or aggravating factors.532
Offenders who would have ordinarily attracted the death penalty in the absence of 
extenuating circumstances could be sentenced to lesser sentences such as life imprisonment 
526 S v Mazibuko 1988 3 SA 190 (A) 199–200; S v Sethoga 1990 1 SA 270 (A); S v Rapitsi 1987 (4) 
SA 351 (A) 358–359; MM Loubser & MA Rabie ‘Defining dolus eventualis: a voluntative
element?’(1988) 3 SACJ 415-436 at 432.
527 S v Ngubane 1985 3 SA 677 (A) 685: “The distinguishing feature of dolus eventualis is the 
volitional component: the agent (the perpetrator) “consents” to the consequence foreseen as a 
possibility, he “reconciles himself” to it, he “takes it into the bargain”.… Our cases often speak of the 
agent being “reckless” of that consequence, but in this context it means consenting, reconciling or 
taking into the bargain … and not the “recklessness” of the Anglo-American systems nor an 
aggravated degree of negligence.”
528 A Novak ‘Capital Sentencing Discretion in Southern Africa: A Human Rights Perspective on the 
Doctrine of Extenuating Circumstances in Death Penalty Cases’ (2014) 1 AHRLJ 24-42.
529 Ibid.
530 S v Nkwanyana 1990 (4) SA 735 (AD).
531 Ibid.
532 E Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (1993) 277.
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because the “term mitigating factor, had a wider interpretation than an extenuating 
circumstance and included factors that were not related to the crime, such as the accused’s 
behaviour after the commission of the crime or the accused’s clean criminal record.”533 In 
other words, after the 1990 Amendment Act and prior to the abolishment of the death 
penalty, the sentence of death for murder became discretionary and could only be imposed 
when it was “the only appropriate sentence”.534 Joubert argued that “life imprisonment was 
considered to be a valuable alternative to the death sentence and was imposed in cases of 
extreme seriousness, but this was the case when the death penalty was not considered to be 
the only appropriate sentence.”535
Life imprisonment was imposed instead of the death penalty in those “cases of extreme 
seriousness”, where the courts thought that it would serve the same purpose as the death 
penalty and permanently remove the accused from society;536 where the offender was young
and immature;537 where they had no previous criminal record and had committed the murder 
while intoxicated;538 and where there was a “reasonable prospect” of their rehabilitation.539
Courts also imposed life imprisonment where the offender was unlikely to re-offend because 
the circumstances that led to him committing the murder were unlikely to re-occur;540 where 
the offender had no previous record for “serious” convictions and where it was a case of rape 
in which none of his victims suffered severe or prolonged psychological effects.541 Courts 
also considered the fact that the interests of justice demanded the imposition of a life sentence 
instead of the death penalty, where the prisoner’s detention would enable the prison 
533 Ibid.
534 Ibid.
535 JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 8th ed (2007) 290-291.
536 Ibid.
537 S v Cotton 1992(1) SACR 531 (A).
538 Ibid.
539 Ibid.
540 S v Cele 1991(1) SACR 627(A) where the appellant, a 40-year-old man, had paid two young men 
to murder his former employee who had caused trouble for his business which led him to lose his 
customers.
541 S v D 1991(2) SACR 543 (A), where the accused was found guilty of various crimes, including six 
counts of rape (in which some of his victims contracted sexually transmitted diseases), one count of 
attempted rape and one count of indecent assault. See also S v P 1991 (1) SA 517 (A) where the 
court set aside the death penalty that had been imposed on the appellant and substituted it with life 
imprisonment on, amongst other grounds, that the women the appellant had raped were not virgins, 
they had not experienced serious psychological problems as a result of rapes, and that the appellant 
could be rehabilitated during his long term of imprisonment. In S v W 1993 (2) SACR 74 (A) the Court 
substituted the appellant’s death sentence into life imprisonment on amongst other grounds that the 
victim of his rape had suffered no serious physical injuries.
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authorities to treat him for his mental condition;542 and where the murder had not been 
accompanied by cruel and humiliating acts.543
The circumstances under which the crime of murder was committed and the accused’s level 
of participation in the crime were also important factors in determining whether the accused 
should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. Consequently, where the circumstances 
proved to be less cruel and where the accused had not directly participated in the murder, 
they would be sentenced to life imprisonment.544 Also, the court would sentence an elderly 
accused to life imprisonment regardless of the fact that they were found guilty of murder with 
no extenuating circumstances and this was because it found that society did not expect an old 
person to be sentenced to death.545 The fact that a dangerous offender may be released on 
parole if sentenced to life imprisonment was said not to be sufficient reason to justify the 
imposition of the death penalty.546 In cases of rape, on the other hand, an accused was more 
likely to be sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death if the victim appeared to not have
sustained serious physical or psychological injuries as a result of the rape.547 It is important to 
note that in most cases where the accused was sentenced to life imprisonment instead of 
death, the youthfulness of the accused was highlighted.
The above-mentioned cases indicate that the cumulative effect of the factors considered was 
important and a sole factor, for example, the youthfulness of the offender was normally not 
sufficient for the court to depart from the imposition of the death penalty. Courts had to 
consider other factors such as the prospect of rehabilitation; whether the accused had 
previous criminal convictions; and the nature of the crime.548 This is the same as in a case 
where “substantial and compelling circumstances” have to exist for the court to impose a 
sentence lesser than life imprisonment.549
In 1995, the Constitutional Court in the Makwanyane case,550 declared the death penalty
unconstitutional and ordered, amongst other things, that all death sentences be “set aside in 
542 S v Lawrence 1991(2) SACR 57 (A).
543 S v Mdau 1991 (1) SA 169 (A).
544 S v Mthembu 1991 (2) SACR 144 (A).
545 S v Munyai and others 1993 (1) SACR 252 (A).
546 S v Oosthuizen 1991 (2) SACR 298 (A).
547 JD Mujuzi (n 24) 15.
548 Ibid 14.
549 S v Malgas (n 9).
550 S v Makwanyane (n 19).
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accordance with the law, and substituted by appropriate and lawful punishments”. 551
Accordingly, the Minister of Justice was obliged to refer cases of those prisoners who had 
been sentenced to death and had in respect of that sentence exhausted all the recognised legal 
procedures pertaining to appeal or review, to the court in which the sentence of death was 
imposed. The court was then required to consider the case for purposes of converting the 
sentence to a lesser one, but before converting the sentence and based on the evidence and 
arguments provided in the case, the court was to “advise the President, with full reasons of 
the need to set aside the sentence of death, of the appropriate sentence to be substituted in its 
place and if, applicable, of the date to which the sentence shall be antedated”. 552 The 
President was then required to set aside the sentence of death and substitute it with the 
punishment advised by the court.553 In converting the sentences, the court looked at numerous 
factors and these factors are discussed below.
3.4.4. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN CONVERTING THE DEATH PENALTY
When the courts were converting the death sentence, they reviewed the facts of the case, that 
is, the nature of the offence committed by the accused, the personal circumstances of the 
accused, for instance, whether he was capable of rehabilitation or not.  This also included a
consideration of any aggravating and mitigating factors, and when the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors, the death penalty was converted to life imprisonment.554 In 
cases where the courts imposed a lesser sentence than life imprisonment however, the courts 
concluded that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors. For instance, in the 
case of S v Musingadi and others, 555 the court held that the death sentence had to be 
converted to 16 years imprisonment, because the appellant was relatively young (31 years 
old); he was a first offender; he had a wife and a child whom he supported; his level of
education was low (Standard 5); and he had not played a leading role in the murder and 
robbery.556 In S v Nogqala557 however, the court held that though the accused was also 
551 Ibid para 150.
552 The Act (n 1) s 1 and s 1 (3) (b).
553 Ibid s 1(4).
554 S v Khaba 1999 JOL 5758 (A); S v Kruger and another 1999 JOL 5341 (A); S v Mafumo and
another 1999 JOL 5342 (A); S v Mashego 1999 JOL 5525 (A); S v Motshwedi 1999 JOL 5511 (A); S v
Ndgungweni and another 2001 JOL 7324 (A); S v Ngcobo 1999 JOL 5731(A); S v Rasmeni 1999 JOL 
5510 (A); S v Shabalala and another 2000 JOL 7270 (A); S v Smith 1999 JOL 5730 (A).
555 S v Musingadi and others 2004 (4) SA 274 (SCA).
556 Ibid para 52.
557 S v Nogqala 1999 JOL 5527(A).
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relatively young (30 years old); was a first offender; came from an impoverished background;
and had good prospects of rehabilitation, his death sentence still had to be converted to life 
imprisonment because of the cruel nature of the murder he had committed. The court held 
that the murder of an elderly man in the most brutal of circumstances amounted to a “heinous 
murder” and retribution and deterrence as the objectives of punishment outweighed the good 
prospects of rehabilitation.558
In some cases the court put greater weight on the character of the accused. For instance, in S v 
Boy and another,559 the sentence of death was converted to life imprisonment because the 
court was of the opinion that the appellants were irretrievably beyond any possibility of 
rehabilitation.560 In another case, the court justified the imposition of life imprisonment on 
the ground that the appellant’s removal from society should be permanent and that life 
imprisonment was the only fitting sentence.561 The courts also continued to take into account 
the accused’s previous convictions.562
3.5. CONCLUSION 
The inference one draws from the above jurisprudence is that where a court is faced with an 
issue of whether or not certain circumstances exist in order to justify a lesser sentence, it 
weighs the mitigating factors against the aggravating factors or vice versa. In a case where 
the former outweighs the latter, it is very likely that the court will impose a lesser sentence. It 
is also important to note that in an attempt to establish whether “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” exist, courts look at the personal circumstances of the accused and the 
circumstances under which the crime was committed. In cases of rape, courts have often 
considered the impact the rape had on the victim. If the effect was less serious or if the rape 
did not fall into the worst category of rape, some courts have opted for a lesser sentence than 
that one of life imprisonment.
558 Ibid.
559 S v Boy and another 1999 JOL 5392(A).
560 Ibid.
561 S v December 1999 JOL 5508(A).
562 S v Mokoena 1999 JOL 5396(A).
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CHAPTER 4
4. TRADITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
SENTENCING PROCESS
4.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the writer will discuss the traditional factors usually taken into account in the 
imposition of an appropriate sentence or in the making of a decision relating to whether or 
not a departure from the prescribed sentences is warranted. In doing so, the writer also 
intends to look at the basic considerations (the crime, the offender and the interests of 
society) in imposing a sentence as laid out in the cases of Zinn563 and Malgas. 564 The writer 
will further look at restorative justice and victim impact statements as new developments 
considered in the sentencing enquiry. 
4.2. TRADITIONAL FACTORS (AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING 
FACTORS)
4.2.1. BASIC ELEMENTS IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE
In the case of Zinn,565 Justice Rumpff stated that “what has to be considered in sentencing is 
the triad consisting of the crime, the offender and the interests of society.”566 This was largely 
endorsed in the case of Malgas,567 where it was said that when deciding whether or not to 
depart from the prescribed sentences, the sentencing court on consideration of the 
circumstances of the particular case, must be satisfied that the prescribed sentence is unjust in 
that it is disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the needs of society, thus resulting in 
an injustice which can only be averted by the imposition of a lesser sentence.568 Thus in 
imposing a sentence, the judicial officer has to consider the gravity or seriousness of the 
offence, the personal circumstances of the offender as well as the interests of society, 
563 S v Zinn (n 12).
564 S v Malgas (n 9).
565 S v Zinn (n 12).
566 Ibid 540G-H.
567 S v Malgas (n 9).
568 Ibid para 25.
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specifically the protection of the community.  In recent years and in rape cases however, a 
more victim-centred approach has emerged in sentencing, placing additional focus not only 
on the crime, the offender and the interests of society, but also on the impact of the crime on 
the victim.569 This means that the physical as well as the psychological effects of the incident 
on the victim have also become a vital consideration in the imposition of an appropriate 
sentence.570 Sentencing involves an evaluation of the above-mentioned considerations and a 
process of weighing up each against the other, without over-emphasising one at the expense 
of the other.571
It is submitted that the above suggests that the factors traditionally taken into account when 
sentencing should be divided into four categories, particularly factors relating to the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime; factors relating to the personal 
circumstances of the offender; factors having a bearing on society’s interests and factors 
pertaining to the harmful effects of the crime on the victim.572 These factors may have an 
aggravating or mitigating effect.573 Aggravating and mitigating factors influence the extent to 
which the offender should be blamed and punished for their unlawful conduct. 574 A 
mitigating factor reduces the severity of the sentence while an aggravating factor increases 
the severity of the sentence.575 It has been acknowledged however that though many factors 
may be listed as aggravating or mitigating, some only have a neutral effect and do not really 
influence the sentencing process.576 Factors which either aggravate or mitigate the sentence 
can be divided into those relating to the crime, the offender and the interests of society.
569 A Van der Merwe (n 289) 15 & 20.
570 Ibid.
571 CGH Hlatshwayo Sentencing of Youth Offenders For Housebreaking with Intent to Steal: Practises 
and Attitudes of Magistrates and Prosecutors (Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Cape Town, 
2002) 16.
572 Ibid 303-304.
573 J Jacobson & M Hough ‘Mitigation: The role of personal factors in sentencing’ Prison Reform Trust 
(2007) 9.
574 A Van der Merwe (n 289) 301.
575 Ibid.
576 S v Matyityi (n 233); J Jacobson & M Hough (n 573) pg 10; S v E 1992 (2) SACR 625 (A).
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4.2.2. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS RELATING TO THE 
OFFENCE
The crime is an important element of sentencing and has a great influence on the nature and 
extent of the sentence imposed.577 When dealing with the crime, the main focus is on the 
seriousness of the offence committed by the offender, as the sentence imposed thereof must 
reflect the seriousness of the crime.578 In considering the seriousness of any offence, the court 
must consider the offender’s culpability in committing the offence and the effects caused or 
foreseeably caused by the offence (harm).579 This is owing to the fact that the seriousness of 
the offence is reflected through the extent to which the offender could be held accountable for 
the harm arising out of the criminal act. 580 Harm is construed as contributing to the 
seriousness of the offence as well as a finding of a higher degree of culpability on the 
offender’s part.581 When considering the crime component, courts are to consider in each 
individual case, the offender’s particular crime and its seriousness and are precluded from 
making a generalised assessment of the severity of a specific crime.582 Further, according to 
Holmes JA in the case of Rabie,583 the courts are to guard against allowing the heinousness of 
the crime to cloud their judgment as a balancing of all relevant factors is essential.584
a. AGGRAVATING FACTORS
Almost every crime has its own inherent set of factors which aggravate it and result in the 
imposition of a more severe sentence. Though this is not a closed list, these factors include:
a. The degree and extent of violence used.585
b. The type of weapon used.586
c. The brutality and cruelty of the attack on the victim.587
577 Terblanche (n 282) 148.
578 Ibid 149.
579 J Jacobson & M Hough (n 573) 5.
580 Terblanche (n 282) 150.
581 A Van der Merwe (n 289) 387.
582 S v De Kock 1992 (2) SACR 171 (T) 192i.
583 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A).
584 Ibid 863 A-B.
585 S v B 1994 (2) SACR 237 (E) 251h-i.
586 Ibid.
587 S v Qamata 1997 (1) SACR 479 (E) 481h.
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d. The nature and character of the victim; whether they were unarmed or rendered 
helpless.588
e. The presence of a direct intention to commit the crime.589
f. The fact that the crime was pre-meditated or planned.590
g. In a case of rape, where the victim was raped by more than one person acting in the 
furtherance of a common purpose.591
h. In a case of rape, where the victim was raped more than once, whether by the accused, 
a co-perpetrator or an accomplice.592
i. The presence of physical injuries which cause permanent damage.593
j. In a case of murder, the crime will fall within the purview of S51 of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 105 of 1997 and consequently carry a heavy sentence of life 
imprisonment, where the death of the victim was caused by the accused while 
committing or attempting to commit either rape or robbery with aggravating 
circumstances.594
k. Where the offence was committed in the furtherance of a common purpose.595
l. In a case of rape, where the rape involved the infliction of grievous bodily harm.596
m. In a case of rape, where the offender rapes, knowing that they have HIV/AIDS.597
b. MITIGATING FACTORS
Similar to the above, a wide variety of factors may mitigate the crime and result in the 
imposition of a lesser sentence. Though this is not a closed list, these factors include:
a. The fact that the crime was incomplete and only amounted to an attempt.598
b. The fact that the offender played a limited role in the commission of the crime.599
588 S v Mnguni 1994 (1) SACR 579 (A) 583e.
589 DPP v Thusi (n 382).
590 S v Makwanyane (n 19) 161c-e.
591 Part I of Schedule II of the Act.
592 Ibid.
593 S v Matyityi (n 233).




598 Terblanche (n 282) 193.
599 S v Sinama 1998 (1) SACR 255 (SCA) 259c-d.
94
c. The fact that the crime was committed as a result of inducement or the offender was 
acting under duress when they committed the crime.600
d. In a case of rape, the fact that the rape does not fall within the worst category of 
rape.601
e. The fact that the physical injuries, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the 
offence was minimal.602
f. The fact that there was an absence of cruelty and violence.603
g. The fact that there was no use of a dangerous weapon or threats.604
h. The fact that the crime was committed not with direct intent, but with dolus 
eventualis.605
i. The fact that the crime was not planned or organised.606
j. The fact that the offender attempted to prevent, remedy or limit the harmful 
consequences of the crime.607
4.2.3. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS RELATING TO THE 
OFFENDER
The second leg of the triad, which relates to the offender, considers their personal 
circumstances, in line with what is known as the concept of individualisation. This is because 
the sentence imposed needs to fit the offender. 608 Many factors are involved when the 
offender is considered, including age, marital status, the presence of dependants, level of 
education, employment and health. This leg of the sentencing enquiry focuses on the 
character of the offender.609 The character of the offender is however difficult to ascertain
and consequently, the personal circumstances of the offender, like those circumstances 
relating to the crime assist in determining the offender’s blameworthiness as they serve to 
either lessen or increase the blame that can be attributed to the offender.610 The offender’s 
600 Ibid.
601 S v Nkomo (n 414).
602 S v G (n 318).
603 S v Dithotze (n 306).
604 Ibid.
605 DPP v Thusi (n 382).
606J Jacobson & M Hough (n 573) 75. 
607 Ibid 77.




blameworthiness is thus used as a measure for determining the appropriate sentence and the 
more blameworthy or accountable the offender, the more severe their sentence may be.611
Regarding the influence of the offender’s personal circumstances on the sentence, Rumpff CJ 
in the case of Du Toit612 stated that:
‘when considering the other legs of the triad, particularly the nature of the crime and the 
interests of society, the accused is somewhat in the background, but when considering factors 
pertaining to the accused, a full investigation of his whole person with all its facets should be 
undertaken. His age, gender, background, mental state, motive and other relevant factors have 
to be investigated, despite the seriousness of the crime. This is because the offender should not 
be regarded with vengeance, but with humanity, which requires the investigation of mitigating 
factors in order to give rise to an appropriate sentence’.613
Rumpff CJ in the case of Holder614 went on to say that though society may expect heavy 
sentences to be imposed for serious crimes, it also expects courts to make a thorough
assessment of the mitigating circumstances applicable and the offender’s particular 
position.615 Judicial officers have often looked at the personal circumstances of the accused 
when determining whether there exist mitigating factors, however, in the case of Vilakazi616 it 
was held that such circumstances are immaterial in the question relating to the period of 
imprisonment to be imposed and they only assist the court as far as the question of whether or 
not the accused is likely to re-offend is concerned.617
(a) AGGRAVATING FACTORS
The cumulative effect of these factors relating to the offender result in an increased sentence. 
Though this is not a closed list, factors falling under this category include:
a. The fact that the accused is a career offender.618
b. The fact that they have previous convictions.619
611 Ibid.
612 S v Du Toit 1979 (3) SA 846 (A).
613 Ibid 857 H- 858B.
614 S v Holder 1979 (2) SA 70 (A).
615 Ibid 81B.
616 S v Vilakazi (n 158).
617 Ibid para 58.
618 S v Mhlakaza 1997 (1) SACR 575 (SCA) 518a.
619 S v Scheepers 2006 (1) SACR 72 (SCA) para 11.
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c. The fact that they abused their physical strength.620
d. The fact that they abused their position of trust (for instance, they were a teacher or 
policeman).621
e. The fact that they lacked remorse.622
f. The fact that they were motivated by greed or some other morally unacceptable 
motive.623
g. The fact that the accused had knowledge of their HIV/AIDS status or some other life 
threatening disease that could be possibly transmitted to the victim.624
h. The fact that the accused exploited their position of power to the full, especially in 
cases of rape.625
i. The fact that they are awaiting trial for a similar offence.626
j. The fact that they were the leader of a gang and were aware of what they were 
doing.627
k. The fact that they have committed numerous crimes in a short space of time.628
l. The fact that they had formal education and a permanent job and thus should have 
known better.629
(b) MITIGATING FACTORS
The cumulative effects of these factors relating to the offender substantially reduce the 
effect of the sentence. Though this is not a closed list, factors falling under this category 
include:
a. The fact that the offender acted under substantially reduced criminal capacity 
because of provocation, mental instability, intoxication or some other reason.630
b. The fact that they are a first offender.631
620 S v Jackson 1998 (1) SACR 470 (SCA) 478b.
621 S v Abrahams (n 308) 123d.
622S v Matyityi (n 233) paras 12-13; DPP v Gcwala (n 446) para 6.
623 DPP v Gcwala (n 446) para 6.
624 S v Blaauw (n 65) 260g.
625 S v Abrahams (n 308) 122g.
626 S v Mahomotsa (n 110) 444d.
627 S v Matyityi (n 233) para 13.
628 Ibid paras 2-3.
629 S v Nkomo (n 414) para 21.
630 Terblanche (n 282) 194; S v Ferreira 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA) at para 46; S v Smith 1990 (1) 
SACR 130 (A) 136b-c.
631 S v Nkomo (n 414) para 22.
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c. The fact that they are relatively young.632
d. The fact that they are of an advanced age or are elderly.633
e. The fact that they have a fatal or serious illness.634
f. The fact that the accused has dependants.635
g. The fact that they are employed.636
h. The fact that they have no formal education.637
i. The fact that they have an unfavourable background.638
j. The fact that they have no previous convictions and they are of middle or older 
age.639
k. The fact that they are remorseful.640
l. The fact that they acted on the spur of the moment.641
m. The fact that the offender spent some time in custody while awaiting the finalisation 
of the trial.642
n. The fact that they had good prospects of rehabilitation.643
4.2.4. FACTORS RELATING TO THE INTERESTS OF SOCIETY
This third leg of the triad relates to serving the interests of society or community.644 Case law 
has indicated that the interests of society refer to the reaction that the members of society 
have in relation to the commission of particular crimes as well as their subsequent 
expectations for a more severe sentence for such crimes.645 It further indicates that they are 
best served through the prevention of crime by way of deterring the accused or potential 
offenders and by the reform and removal of such accused from society.646
632 Ibid para 13.
633 S v Fatyi (n 290); S v Zinn (n 12) 541B; S v Heller 1971 (2) SA 29 (A) 55CD.
634 S v Zinn (n 12) 542E-F; S v Magida 2005 (2) SACR 591 (SCA) paras 9-10.
635 S v Bailey (n 397) Para 23; S v Matyityi (n 233) para 11; S v Fatyi (n 290).
636 S v Vilakazi (n 158) para 58; S v Bailey (n 397) para 23.
637 S v Njikelana (n 314); S v Matyityi (n 233) para 12; S v Musingadi and others (n 595) para 52.
638 S v Abrahams (n 308) 126j; S v Blaauw (n 65) 262a-j. 
639 S v Malgas (n 9) para 32; S v Fatyi (n 290); S v Gqamana (n 273) 35g.
640 S v Matyityi (n 233) paras 9 and 13; S v Malgas (n 9) para 32.
641 S v Mofokeng 1992 (2) SACR 710 (A) 715g-h. 
642 DPP v Thusi (n 382) paras 23-24.
643 S v Dyantyi 2011 (1) SACR 540 (ECG) para 26; S v Nkomo (n 414) para 13; DPP v Thusi (n 382) 
para 19.




The case of Du Toit647 in support of this provided that:
‘the interests of society have several features. They sometimes come to the forefront when 
society is in need of protection from the offender; sometimes when the order and peace in 
society is threatened and lastly when potential offenders have to be deterred from committing 
crimes and consequently a severe sentence is to be considered where society is heavily shocked 
by the offender’s crimes’.648
Further, Rumpff JA in the Zinn case,649 stated that the interests of society demand that an 
offender be put away for a long time, not only to protect society, but also to serve as a
warning to potential offenders and as punishment for crimes that have been committed over 
extended periods.650 This implies that the protection of society and the deterrence of others 
are important elements of the interests of society and accordingly, a less severe sentence fails 
as a deterrent as it does not serve to instil fear of punishment in the minds of others and 
consequently does not serve the interests of society.651 Nicholas JA in the case of Skenjana652
opinionated that public interest is however not necessarily best served by long imprisonment 
terms.653
Harms JA in the Mhlakaza case,654 cautioned against imposing harsh sentences purely for 
reasons of public satisfaction and further noted that though the court is allowed to consider 
public feelings and permanently remove the offender from society, the sentence imposed 
must not be grossly in excess of the otherwise appropriate sentence and it must not only serve 
to deter.655 Though public opinion has some relevance in the sentencing enquiry, it cannot 
substitute the duty of the court to act as an independent arbiter and to impose an appropriate 
sentence,656 especially because the public usually resorts to vengeance.657
647 S v Du Toit (n 612).
648 Ibid 857D-F.
649 S v Zinn (n 12).
650 Ibid 542D.
651 Ibid 453.
652 S v Skenjana 1985 (3) SA 51 (A).
653 Ibid 54I-55A.
654 S v Mhlakaza (n 618).
655 Ibid 518e-g and 519j-520b.
656 S v Makwanyane (n 19) paras 87-89.
657 S v Mafu 1992 (2) SACR 494 (A) 497a.
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The interests of society can operate either to decrease or increase the sentence to be 
imposed658 and they usually refer to nothing more than the seriousness of the crime or rather 
the society’s view of the seriousness of the crime.659 They are often prioritised in violent 
crimes660 and as a result, the fact that the offence committed is prevalent as well as the fact 
that society considers the crime to be “repulsive and scandalous” has an impact on the 
severity of the sentence.661 Such factors however cannot be considered in isolation, they are 
only taken as material aggravating factors in conjunction with other aggravating factors, such 
as the seriousness of the crime and the circumstances under which it is committed.662 Case 
law indicates that this third leg of the triad incorporates the traditional purposes of 
punishment, particularly deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and incapacitation into the 
sentencing considerations.663 Accordingly, the SCA recently went as far as equating the triad 
to the purposes of punishment by implying that sentencing involves the principle of 
proportionality, which is achieved through the consideration of the offence, offender and the 
interests of society “or, with different nuance, prevention, retribution, reformation and 
deterrence”.664
4.3. PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT
There are four traditional objectives of punishment namely; retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation and rehabilitation. 665 These objectives suggest that punishment is justified 
either because it is deserved (retribution theory) or because it is in the interests of society and 
is thus justified because of the advantage it brings to social order (deterrence, incapacitation 
and rehabilitation).666
Retribution is not primarily about reducing re‐offending as the retributive idea is based on the 
notion that punishment should be determined chiefly by the seriousness of the crime itself. It
thus rests on the principle of proportionality as the punishment received by the offender must 
658 Terblanche (n 282) 152.
659 Ibid 153.
660 S v Nkambule 1993 (1) SACR 136 (A).
661 DPP v Thusi (n 382) paras 19 & 23-24; S v Boer (n 264).
662 S v Nkosi (2012) (1) SACR 87 (GNP) para 30.
663 Terblanche (n 74) 174.
664 S v RO 2010 (2) SACR 248 (SCA) para 30.
665 Terblanche (n 282) 138.
666 J.M Burchell (n 17) 68 and 73.
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bear some relationship to the harm done to society.667 This means that according to the theory 
of retribution, the offender must get the punishment they deserve.668 Deterrence on the other 
hand is very different in the sense that severe punishment is imposed solely for the purpose of 
inflicting fear in the minds of offenders and potential offenders so that they do not commit 
crimes, though they may still have a desire to do so.669 It comes in two forms; general and 
individual deterrence. The former focuses on threatening potential offenders with punishment 
so they refrain from committing crimes and the latter focuses on teaching the offender a 
lesson so they will be deterred from re-offending.670 Incapacitation deals with removing the 
offender from society by taking away their physical power to offend through imprisonment,
though they may still have a desire to offend.671 Lastly, rehabilitation is the idea of “curing”
an offender of his or her criminal tendencies; of changing their habits, their outlook and 
possibly even their personality, so as to make them less inclined to commit crimes in the 
future. 672 It seeks to prevent a person from re‐offending by taking away the desire to 
offend.673
4.3.1. PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT AND THE INTERESTS OF SOCIETY
Regarding the role of the objectives of punishment in relation to the interests of society, the 
courts have had differing views with each individual objective. Though case law points to 
deterrence as the main objective to be considered in connection with the interests of society,
Schreiner JA in the case of Karg674 stated that:
‘while the deterrent effect of punishment has remained as important as ever, it is, I think, 
correct to say that the retributive aspect has tended to yield ground to the aspects of prevention 
and correction. That is no doubt a good thing. But the element of retribution, historically 
important, is by no means absent from the modern approach. It is not wrong that the natural 
indignation of interested persons and of the community at large should receive some 
recognition in the sentences that courts impose, and it is not irrelevant to bear in mind that if 








674 R v Karg (n 674).
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and injured persons may incline to take the law into their own hands. Naturally, righteous anger 
should not becloud judgment’.675
These words have been frequently cited as authority for the notion that retribution is 
outmoded and deterrence is the main objective of punishment.676 However, Judge Harms in 
Nkambule677 noted that retribution should not be disregarded as it does not only have a 
subsidiary role to play in the sentencing process.678 Though retribution can easily amount to 
vengeance, it is important to note that retribution in this context means requital for the evil 
done.679
In Nkambule,680 it was acknowledged that though deterrence is an important consideration, 
only effective deterrence is in the interests of society.681 Deterrence however is not always 
the most important consideration in sentencing and if it is, certainty of punishment rather than 
its severity is the main deterrent to crime.682 Harms JA in Mhlakaza683 noted that the focus of 
more severe sentences flows from both retribution and deterrence rather than from 
incapacitation or rehabilitation.684 He further stated that the length of imprisonment will not 
always have a deterrent effect. 685 Courts have been urged to impose sentences that are 
realistic and do not exceed acceptable limits just for the purposes of satisfying public
opinion.686
Though incapacitation and rehabilitation seem to be neglected, they are also accepted as 
legitimate ways in which punishment operates to protect the community.687 With regard to 
incapacitation it is a justifiable consideration only on the evidence that the offender is likely 
to commit further crimes unless they are restrained from doing so.688 Further, a balance 
between the protection of society and the offender’s welfare must be reached.689 However, 
incapacitation is a limited objective of punishment as the offender is restrained and removed 
675 Ibid 236A-C.
676 S v Gardener 2011 (1) SACR 570 (SCA) para 67; S v Dyanti (n 684) para 21.
677 S v Nkambule (n 660).
678 Ibid 147c.
679 S v Mafu (n 657) 497c-e.
680 S v Nkambule (n 660).
681 Ibid 145d.
682 Ibid 146d-e and h.
683 S v Mhlakaza (n 618).
684 Ibid 519d.
685 Ibid 519g.
686 Ibid 524a-b and e-f.




from society for the term of the sentence they are serving.690 The penalty must thus seek to 
reform the offender and possibly deter them from committing further crimes.691
With regards to rehabilitation, the reform of an offender is also possible even where the 
sentence imposed is long.692 Judge Harms however noted that rehabilitation becomes less 
important where the seriousness of the crime demands a lengthy sentence especially for 
purposes of removing the offender from the society.693 Though the court cannot predict the 
likely outcome of lengthy imprisonment, it is doubted that a lengthy sentence may have a 
rehabilitative effect, especially because the purpose of rehabilitation is downgraded where the 
seriousness of the crime demands a lengthy sentence.694 Rehabilitation however remains an 
important consideration where the sentence imposed has the potential of achieving it.695
Nugent JA in the case of Swart696 said that:
‘retribution and deterrence are proper purposes of punishment and they must be accorded due 
weight in any sentence that is imposed. Serious crimes will usually require that retribution and 
deterrence should come to the fore and that the rehabilitation of the offender will consequently
play a relatively smaller role’.697
However, Navsa JA stated that:
‘Traditional objectives of sentencing include retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation. It does 
not necessarily follow that a shorter sentence will always have a greater rehabilitative effect. 
Furthermore, the rehabilitation of the offender is but one of the considerations when sentence is 
being imposed’.698
It thus seems that retribution, deterrence and incapacitation are all likely to be achieved 
through the imposition of imprisonment or lengthy imprisonment thereof. Thus one will look 
690 Ibid 73 and 74.
691 Ibid 74.
692S v Nombewu 1996 2 SACR 396 (E) 407; S v Ngongo 1996 1 SACR 557 (N) 559.
693 S v Mhlakaza (n 618) 519h-i; S v Nkambule (n 660) 147h.
694 Ibid; JD Mujuzi ‘Life imprisonment in South Africa: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow’
(2009) 2 SACJ 1-20; S v Janssen (2010 )1 SACR 237 (ECG) para 17.
695 S v Nkambule (n 660) 147f; Terblanche (n 282) pg 165.
696 S v Swart 2004 (2) SACR 370 (SCA).
697 Ibid para 12.
698 Director of Public Prosecutions, KwaZulu- Natal v Ngcobo (n 233) para 22.
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at the prospects for rehabilitation as a mitigating factor warranting the imposition of a lesser 
sentence.
4.3.2. PROSPECTS FOR REHABILITATION AS A MITIGATING FACTOR
The SCA as evidenced in the previously discussed cases has often considered the prospect of 
rehabilitation as a substantial and compelling circumstance, justifying a departure from the 
prescribed sentences. The courts have often done this without defining what is meant by 
rehabilitation.699 For instance, in S v Sikhipha,700 the appellant, a 31-year-old, was sentenced 
to life imprisonment for raping a 13-year-old girl and the SCA in deciding to reduce the 
sentence to 20 years’ imprisonment, held that one of the factors in mitigation or in favour of 
the appellant was their good prospect of rehabilitation. 701 The court observed that the 
sentence imposed by the legislature, though it is the most serious one, it denies the appellant 
of the possibility of rehabilitation.702 The court then added that “the mitigating factors, 
including rehabilitation are not speculative and flimsy”.703
Rehabilitation is influenced largely by speculation that the offender, after undergoing the 
various training and attending the relevant courses in prison, will lead a crime-free life.704 In 
light of this speculative nature of rehabilitation, Petse ADJP in the case of Dyantyi705 said
that:
‘but it is, however, my view that seeds of rehabilitation can, in a manner of speaking, germinate 
only if the convicted person him/herself has first and foremost, expressed contrition for his/her 
criminal wrongdoing thereby accepting the gravity of the criminal act of which he/she has been 
convicted and commit to return to the path of rectitude. Without expression of contrition any 
hope of rehabilitation becomes illusory and thus an unrealistic expectation and not merely a 
speculative hypothesis’.706
The offender’s good prospect of rehabilitation require that punishment be tailored to the 
offender rather than to the crime, this means that the punishment imposed in a particular case
699 S v Nkomo (n 414); S v Bailey (n 397); DPP v Thusi (n 382).
700 S v Sikhipha 2006 (2) SACR 439 (SCA).
701 Ibid para 18.
702 Ibid para 19.
703 Ibid para 19.
704 JD Mujuzi ‘The prospect of rehabilitation as a ‘substantial and compelling’ circumstance to avoid 
imposing life imprisonment in South Africa: A comment on S v Nkomo’ (2008) 21 SACJ 1-21 at 11.
705 S v Dyantyi (n 643).
706 Ibid para 26.
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is such that it gives the offender the opportunity to be rehabilitated and consequently, the 
severity of the crime appears to be trumped by such a possibility of rehabilitation.707
In the case of Nkomo,708 Lewis JA stated that though it was difficult to imagine a rape more 
severe than that one considered in the case, the prospects of rehabilitation as well as the fact 
that the offender was a first offender was substantial and compelling enough to justify a 
lesser sentence.709 Accordingly, the court concluded by saying that a sentence of 16 years was 
justified, as it served the purposes of punishment; more specifically deterrence and the 
interests of society. 710 Theron JA in her dissenting judgment on the other hand, 
acknowledged the fact that there is hardly any person whom it can be said that they are 
incapable of rehabilitation. 711 Further, she disagreed with the fact that the prospects of 
rehabilitation (of which there was no evidence), coupled with the fact that the accused was a 
first offender amounted to “substantial and compelling circumstances” within the meaning of 
that expression, and were truly convincing reasons to depart from the minimum sentence 
prescribed by the legislature.712
In reaching her conclusion and in relation to rape she said that:
‘Given the prevalence of rape in this country, courts must also be mindful of their duty to send 
out a clear message to potential rapists and to the community that they are determined to protect 
the equality, dignity and freedom of all women. Society’s legitimate expectation is that an 
offender will not escape the sentence of life imprisonment, which has been prescribed for a 
very specific reason simply because substantial and compelling circumstances are, 
unwarrantedly, held to be present. In our constitutional order women are entitled to expect and 
insist upon the full protection of the law’.713
707 N Smith, ‘Rehabilitation’ The Criminal Justice Encyclopaedia (2005). Available from 
http://pubpages.unh.edu/~nicks/pdf/Rehabilitation.pdf : accessed 14 September 2015.
708 S v Nkomo (n 414).
709 Ibid para 22.
710 Ibid para 23.
711 Ibid para 31.
712 Ibid para 32.
713 Ibid para 29.
105
4.3.3. FACTORS THAT HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON THE PROSPECTS FOR
REHABILITATION 
i) RELATIVE YOUTHFULNESS
Courts have often referred to an offender’s relative youthfulness, without defining what 
exactly is meant by the term and what the term meant in respect of the individual. It is 
common practice to regard a teenager as immature and as a result, the youthfulness of an 
offender usually amounts to a mitigating factor, unless their conduct is such that it rules out 
immaturity.714 Though courts will often make the pronouncement that one’s conduct may rule 
out immaturity, this notion proves to be flawed as it is still unclear what conduct will warrant 
maturity or good decision-making. In general however a court will be more lenient on a 
young person than on an adult, although the mitigating effect of one’s age is usually unclear 
as it depends on the facts of each case.715 It is trite that when dealing with a younger offender, 
the evidence adduced on his or her behalf especially evidence pertaining to background, 
education, level of intelligence and mental capacity needs to be clear in order to enable a 
court to determine the level of maturity as well as the moral blameworthiness of the 
offender.716 The main question is thus whether or not the offender’s immaturity, combined 
with other factors such as lack of experience, indiscretion and susceptibility to being 
influenced by others actually reduces the blameworthiness, especially because these are the 
factors that distinguish a young person from an adult.717 Thus a person over the age of 18 
years must adduce evidence of immaturity to such an extent that such immaturity operates as 
a mitigating factor.718
Accordingly, it has been said that the constitutional era has provided a different approach by 
providing a change in sentencing principles relating to young offenders. 719 The said 
principles make imprisonment the last resort and where it is inescapable, a shorter duration is 
warranted.720 In Centre for Child Law,721 it was held that “there is no intrinsic magic in the 
age of 18, except that in many contexts it has been accepted as marking the transition from 





719 S v IO 2010 (1) SACR 3423 (C) para 8.
720 Ibid para 12.
721 Centre for Child Law (n 62).
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childhood to adulthood. The constitution’s drafters could conceivably have set the frontier at 
19 or at 17. They did not. They chose 18.”722 The court in PN 723 held that an offender who is
no longer a child cannot be said to be more “vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences 
and outside pressures” and their character unlike that one of children under the age of 18 
years is therefore not “uniquely capable of rehabilitation”.724
ii) PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AND FIRST OFFENDER STATUS
Our courts have often considered relevant previous convictions as an aggravating factor and 
the fact that the offender is a first offender as a mitigating factor. 725 Apart from the 
seriousness of the offence, the existence or absence of previous convictions has been 
conceived as an important determinant of an appropriate sentence.726 The court in Zonele,727
though decided prior to the constitutional era, held that “generally speaking, previous 
convictions aggravate an offence because they tend to show that the offender has not been 
deterred by the previously imposed punishments and has proceeded to committing the crime 
under consideration in a given case.”728 This meant that an offender who had not been 
deterred by his previous convictions had to be punished severely, though it was said that a 
consideration of the former amounted to double jeopardy.729
Some courts have also held that aside from indicating the fact that the offender did not learn 
the requisite lesson implicit in the previously imposed sentences, previous convictions 
implied that the offender possessed a bad character or criminal propensity and thus lacked
any prospects of rehabilitation.730 In the constitutional era however, it has been said that the 
sentence imposed must fit the crime, and previous convictions cannot serve to justify a 
sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crime. 731 The court in Oktober 732 also 
stressed that the general principles in the form of the Zinn triad (crime, criminal and 
interests of society) must be used to determine an appropriate sentence, also in the presence 
722 Ibid para 39.
723 S v PN 2010 (2) SACR 187 (ECG).
724 Ibid 195 a-c.
725 S v M 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) para 43; S v Scheepers (n 619) para 11.
726 South African Law Commission (n 35) 37.
727 R v Zonele 1959 3 SA 319 (A).
728 Ibid 330D.
729 South African Law Commission (n 35) 37.
730 S v Morebudi 1999 2 SACR 664 (SCA) 668; S v Sethokgoe 1990 2 SACR 544 (T) 545.
731 S v Stenge 2008 2 SACR 27 (C) para 60.
732 S v Oktober 2009 1 SACR 291 (C).
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of previous convictions.733 This further emphasises what was said in the case of Dodo,734
where the court stated that the principle of proportionality is the guiding principle and an
offender ought to receive punishment proportionate to the crime they have committed. This 
case is particularly important as it was decided in the constitutional court and thus reflects 
the position in the constitutional era and accordingly proportionality has to be achieved 
even in the presence of previous convictions.
iii) REMORSE AND A PLEA OF GUILT
The existence of remorse as a mitigating factor has been addressed in a number of cases.735 In 
Martin,736 remorse was said to “denote repentance, an inner sorrow inspired by another’s 
plight or a feeling of guilt”. 737 In Matyityi, 738 it was described as “a gnawing pain of 
conscience for the plight of another”.739 Remorse will only be regarded as being sincere, 
where the offender appreciates the extent of his error, but not when he merely regrets the 
consequences of his deeds.740 It has been said that where the offender shows real remorse, 
there is a great possibility of rehabilitation, of which such possibility becomes remote where 
the perpetrator does not take responsibility for his actions or rather appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct.741 In Dyantyi,742 the court found that an offender will rarely be 
able to show that he has prospects of rehabilitation, without proving to the court that he is 
genuinely remorseful.743 Rumpff JA in Seegers,744 held that remorse, as an indication that the 
offender will not be committing further crimes, is an important consideration, particularly in 
those cases where the deterrent effect of the sentence imposed on the accused is 
considered.745 Accordingly, a truly remorseful offender is unlikely to be a repeat offender.746
733 Ibid 294.
734 S v Dodo (n 75).
735 Ibid; S v Martin 1996 (2) SACR 378 (W); S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (2) 
SACR 539 (CC) para 115.
736 S v Martin (n 735).
737 Ibid 383G-I.
738 S v Matyityi (n 233).
739 Ibid para 13.
740 Ibid.
741 S v PN (n 723) 194a-b and 195d-f.
742 S v Dyantyi (n 643).
743 Ibid para 26.
744 S v Seegers 1970 (2) SA 506 (A).
745 Ibid 512G-H.
746 Terblanche (n 282) 204.
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When dealing with remorse, the courts thus have to determine whether or not the offender is 
not simply regretful or feeling sorry for themselves, 747 particularly because remorse can 
easily be confused with regret.748 Owing to this, it is the duty of the offender to satisfy the 
court of their true remorse.749 This means that the accused must take the witness stand in 
order to enable the court to reach correct conclusions concerning the alleged remorse. 
Further, in such an instance, the court can have a proper understanding of what motivated the 
accused to commit the crime, what has since motivated his change of heart and whether he 
does indeed have a true appreciation of the consequences of his actions.750 According to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, where the offender fails to give such evidence, the genuineness of
the alleged remorse cannot be determined. 751 Notwithstanding this, mere expressions of 
remorse, without sufficient proof of its existence have been accorded some weight by our 
courts.752
A guilty plea as well an apology to the victims may be viewed as an indicator for remorse.753
However, courts generally do not accord much weight to such a plea when the evidence 
against the offender is overwhelming and resultantly, such a plea is merely regarded as a 
neutral factor.754 Further, the guilty plea will be of little mitigating value, where the offender 
fails to satisfy the court of his true remorse.755 Overwhelming evidence reduces the weight 
accorded to a guilty plea as the accused in the circumstances, has no other choice, but to 
plead guilty.756
The court in De Klerk,757 accepted the fact that the appellant was genuinely remorseful. This 
was because after being convicted of indecent assault, he did not only plead guilty, but he
also voluntarily entered into a treatment programme for paedophiles at his own expense and 
also informed the mother of the victim of his conduct. Further, he voluntarily avoided the 
747 S v Martin (n 735) 383g-h.
748 S v Matyityi (n 233) para 13.
749 Ibid; S v Seegers (n 744) 512G-H. (See S v Matyityi (n 233) above for a discussion on remorse).
750 Ibid; S v Kgantsi 2012 JDR 0856 (SCA) para 11; S v Keyser 2012 (2) SACR 437 (SCA) para 29; S 
v Martin (n 735) 383g-h.
751 Ibid.
752 S v Scott-Crossley 2008 (1) 223 (SCA) para 35; S v Chipape 2010 (1) SACR 245 (GNP) para 17.
753 S v Matyityi (n 233) para 13; S v Wilson 1986 (4) SA 477 (A) 481I.
754 Ibid; S v Michele 2010 (1) SACR 131 (SCA) para 7.
755 S v Van der Westhuizen 1995 (1) SACR 601 (SCA) 605D; S v Furlong 2011 JDR 0591 (SCA) para 
16.
756 S v Mashinini 2012 (1) SACR 604 para 24; S v Britz 2010 JOL 25567 (SCA) para 11; S v Michele 
(n 754) para 17.
757 S v De Klerk 2010 (2) SACR 40 (KZP).
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situations that gave rise to the committed offences.758 In Michele,759 the court noted that in a 
case of unlawfully obtained money, remorse will manifest itself in the immediate repayment 
of the money.760 In Matyityi,761 the submission that the offender’s plea of guilt and apology to 
the victims were strong indicators of remorse was rejected as the evidence against the 
offender was overwhelming.762 The incriminating evidence included stolen items found at 
the home of the offender’s girlfriend, DNA evidence linking him to the crime scene, some 
pointing-outs made by him and the fact that one of the victims had positively identified him 
at an identification parade.763
Courts have also dealt with the issue of whether or not a lack of remorse can be viewed as an 
aggravating factor. A lack of remorse in most cases is seen through the offender’s demeanour 
and behaviour.764 However, it has been submitted that a lack of remorse on the part of the 
offender should not be taken as an aggravating factor.765 The court in Ngada766 acknowledged 
the fact that a lack of remorse on the part of the accused may be regarded as relevant when 
imposing a sentence. In this regard, Jones J quoted the SCA in Makhudo,767 where it was said 
that:
‘While the behaviour of an accused during the trial may be indicative of a lack of repentance or 
intended future defiance of the laws by which society lives and therefore be a relevant factor in 
considering sentence, neither the fact that an accused’s defence is conducted in an objectionable 
manner nor the fact that the accused’s demeanour in court is obnoxious, is a proper factor to be 
taken into account unless it is of a kind which satisfactorily establishes that the accused is the 
kind of person who would best be deterred from future criminal activity by being dealt with in a 
firmer manner than would have been appropriate if the accused was not that kind of person’.768
Accordingly, this implies that a lack of remorse may be relevant in imposing a sentence, but 
only to the extent that such a conclusion is not based solely on the accused demeanour and 
behaviour in court. 
758 Ibid paras 6, 9 and 28.
759 S v Michele (n 754). 
760 Ibid para 7.
761 S v Matyityi (n 233).
762 Ibid para 13.
763 Ibid.
764 S v Pakane 2008 (1) SACR 518 (SCA); S v M (n 735); S v Combrink 2012 (1) SACR 93 (SCA); S v 
SMM 2013 (2) SACR 292 (SCA).  
765 S v Ngada 2009 JOL 24359 (ECG).
766 Ibid para 8.
767 S v Makhudo 2003 (1) SACR 500 (SCA).
768 Ibid 504f-h.
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Jones J further said that:
‘the role of absence of remorse in aggravation of sentence must be put in proper perspective. 
The real question is its relevance to the imposition of sentence. This seems to me to be at the 
heart of the passage quoted above from the judgment in Makhudo’s case. Lack of remorse may, 
for example, be relevant to the issue of rehabilitation, the possibility of repeat offences, or the 
need to protect society from the conduct of callous, relentless and remorseless offenders. As 
Makhudo’s case warns us, it is necessary to guard against the danger in, and the potential 
impropriety and injustice of, increasing a sentence because of the way in which a defence is 
conducted, or because of an accused person’s poor demeanour or arrogant behaviour in the 
witness box or in court. These considerations may go hand in glove with a lack of remorse but 
they will usually be irrelevant. An accused person should not, of course, be penalised for 
exercising his right to plead not guilty, to challenge the State evidence, and to require the 
prosecution to prove his guilt. This does not give him licence to conduct his defence in a 
vexatious manner. But even if that is what he does, this is not necessarily relevant to 
sentence’.769
Regardless of this, the conduct of the accused in and outside of court has proven to be 
detrimental in some cases. For instance, in Combrink,770 a lack of remorse was construed 
from the fact that the offender had denied the commission of the crime.771 In Pakane,772 the 
accused was said to lack remorse because of the fact that they had concealed the truth by 
giving false evidence and testimonies, and had interfered with police investigations. 773
Madala J in his minority judgment in Centre for Child Law,774 indicated that the accused 
lacked remorse particularly because she had committed further crimes whilst out on bail; this 
she did with the full knowledge of all consequences that could possibly arise from their 
actions. She also continued to plan the commission of further crimes while under 
imprisonment and accordingly, her re-offending indicated a lack of remorse.775
Scholars have also suggested with regard to remorse that disclosure of the impact of the 
crime by the victims through victim impact statements, has the potential to trigger an 
769 S v Ngada (n 765) para 8.
770 S v Combrink (n 764).
771 Ibid para 23.
772 S v Pakane (n 764).
773 Ibid para 43.
774 S v M (n 735).
775 Ibid para 115.
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emotional response in offenders.776 This then creates a platform for offenders to express their
remorse and apologise to their victims in the sentencing process.777 Implicit in this claim is 
the fact that the occurrence of such victim-focused remorse is a positive feature of restorative 
justice.778
4.4. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS (RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE AND VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS)
4.4.1. THE MEANING OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Restorative justice is a relatively new concept in South Africa and it emphasises the aim of 
restoration between offender and victim. 779 Simply put, restorative justice addresses the 
damage and the needs of both victims and offenders in such a way that both parties, as well 
as the communities which they are part of, are healed.780 When dealing with this concept, the 
involvement of victims of crime in the criminal justice process becomes particularly 
important.781 This is because there is a desire to return to traditional systems of justice, which 
place greater importance on the victim as well as on the issue of redress and the healing of the 
community.782
Restorative justice is thus aimed at repairing the damages caused by crime; the goal is to heal 
the wounds of every person affected by crime. This does not only relate to the victims of 
crime, but the community at large.783 Thus, restorative justice redefines and widens the scope 
of crime by interpreting it to mean more than just breaking the law, or offending against the 
state, but also an injury or wrong done to another person; whether that person is the victim or 
the community at large.784
776 T Booth ‘Victim Impact Statements and the Nature and Incidence of Offender Remorse: Findings 
from an observation study in a superior sentencing court’ Griffith Law Review (2013) (2) 430.
777 Ibid.
778 Ibid.
779 A Van der Merwe (n 289) 11.
780 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 7 ‘Sentencing restorative justice (Compensation 






Restorative justice in the preamble of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 (“the CJA”), is 
defined as:
‘An approach to justice that aims to involve the child offender, the victim, the families 
concerned and community members to collectively identify and address harms, needs and 
obligations through accepting responsibility, making restitution, taking measures to prevent a 
recurrence of the incident and promoting reconciliation’.
It is important to note that the first part of the above-mentioned definition reiterates what has 
been said previously. It places emphasis on the involvement of the victim and further allows
for family and community involvement. The next part of the definition also deals with the 
identification of issues such as harms and needs (of the victim, amongst others) and the 
addressing of those issues through the employment of various methods. These methods refer 
mainly, to the making of restitution, the protection of victims through the prevention of re-
offending and lastly, the promotion of reconciliation.785
The Law Commission in its discussion paper also suggested that restorative justice is based 
on three assumptions,786 namely:
a. Crime does not only cause harm to the victims, but also the offenders themselves and 
communities at large.
b. Not only government, but also victims, offenders and communities should be actively 
involved in the criminal justice process.
c. In promoting justice, while the government is responsible for preserving law and order, 
the community is responsible for establishing peace.
Accordingly, these assumptions give rise to certain elements which are central to restorative 
justice programmes.787 These elements include that:
a. Crime is to be regarded not just as an injury to victims, but also as an injury to 
community peace.
b. The focus is to be placed on correcting the wrong.
785 A Van der Merwe ‘A new role for crime victims? An evaluation of restorative justice procedures in 
the Child Justice Act 2008’ (2013) 4 De Jure at 1023 http://www.dejure.up.ac.za/images/files/vol46-4 
2013/Chapter_10.pdf : accessed 10 September 2015.
786 South African Law Commission (n 781) 9.
787 Ibid.
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c. The victim, community and offender are to be regarded as active role-players in the 
criminal process.
d. Victims are to be compensated for their losses through restitution.
e. Victims are empowered in their search for direct involvement in the criminal justice 
process, perhaps through requiring the submission of victim-impact statements.
f. Victims are assisted to regain a sense of control in the areas of their lives affected by the 
offence.
g. Offenders are held responsible for their conduct.
The discussion on restorative justice above, places great emphasis on victim-involvement in 
the sentencing process, of which such involvement is probably best recognisable by the 
submission of victim impact statements during the sentencing stage. This is because placing 
focus on the rights of victims by involving them in the sentencing stage requires that attention 
be paid to evidence submitted by the victims.788 Victims of crime are not defined, but a 
broader definition of the term “victim” has been accepted. Accordingly, the term victim 
refers to “persons who, individually or collectively have suffered harm, including physical or 
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss, or substantial impairment of their 
fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal law.”789 The 
term also includes, where appropriate, the immediate family or dependants of the direct 
victim.790 Thus the term includes both direct and indirect victims791 and accordingly, persons 
falling under the scope of the definition are usually the ones to submit victim-impact 
statements.
4.4.2. VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS 
A victim impact statement is defined in the CJA as “a sworn statement by the victim or 
someone authorised by the victim to make a statement on behalf of the victim which reflects 
the physical, psychological, social, and financial or any other consequences of the offence for 
788 South African Law Commission (n 35) 83.
789 The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power: United 
Nations Compendium of United Nations standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice. 
United Nations: New York 1992 211 ff. 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Compendium_UN_Standards_and_Norms_CP_and_CJ_E
nglish.pdf. Accessed 6/09/2015.
790 A Van der Merwe (n 835) 1024.
791 South African Law Commission (n 781) 7.
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the victim.”792 The statement which is addressed to the presiding officer for consideration 
may also include the effect that the crime will have in future on the victim as well as the 
victim’s opinion regarding the crime, the offender and the appropriate sentence. 793 The 
statement can either take the form of a written statement which is presented to the court as 
part of the pre-sentencing report or an oral one given by the victim during sentencing.794 If 
the content of the statement is not disputed then it is becomes admissible evidence on its 
production in court.795 However, if it is disputed, the victim may be called to testify as a 
witness before the court.796
Courts generally do not have the necessary experience and expertise required to generalise or 
draw conclusions about the effects and consequences of a crime on the victim.797 Muller and 
Van der Merwe argue that:
‘It is extremely difficult for any individual, even a highly trained person such as a magistrate or 
a judge, to comprehend fully the range of emotions and suffering a particular victim of sexual 
violence may have experienced. Each individual brings with himself or herself a different 
background, a different support system and, therefore, a different manner of coping with the 
trauma flowing from the abuse’.798
Victim impact statements do not only accommodate the victim during the sentencing process, 
but they also allow the court to be better informed before imposing a sentence based on the 
after-effects of the crime.799 The court through such statements has at its disposal information 
concerning both the accused and victim, thus having the potential to achieve a more balanced 
approach to sentencing.800 If there is no evidence produced by the victim regarding the 
impact of the crime, it is safe to say that the court only has half of the information necessary 
for the proper exercise of its sentencing discretion.801 Accordingly, information pertaining to 
the impact of the crime on the victim as well as the objective gravity of the offence should be 
placed before the court.802 The provision of such information will in turn contribute towards 
792 s 70 (1) of the CJA.
793 South African Law Commission (n 35) 83.
794 Ibid.
795 s 70 (3) of the CJA
796 South African Law Commission (n 35) 85.
797 S v Gerber 2001 (1) SACR 621 (W).
798 K Müller & A Van der Merwe (n 358).





the enhancement of proportionality and the achievement of a balance.803 Notwithstanding the 
fact that South Africa has no formal scheme for the production of victim impact statements, 
courts have taken into account evidence of this nature.804
The Law Commission in its discussion paper proposed improved victim participation in the 
sentencing process, as well as the recognition of victim concerns in relation to the sentences 
handed down. 805 The draft Sentencing Framework Bill of the Law Commission further 
stipulates that as a guiding principle, all sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the 
offence; which is usually determined by the degree of harm caused by the offence or harm 
likely to flow from the offence.806 In addition, the sentence must also be proportionate to the 
offender’s culpability.807 Under the Bill, though the sentences imposed must adhere to the 
principle of proportionality, the sentences must also serve to restore the rights of victims, 
protect society against the offender as well as give the offender an opportunity to be 
rehabilitated.808 Prosecutors are then urged to consider the interests of victims in every case, 
and for this reason, victim impact statements relating to the harm caused to the victim as a 
result of the crime may be brought before the court so that it is better informed about the 
harm suffered as a result of the crime.809
In 2003, the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill (“the Bill”)810 was published,
and like the Sentencing Framework Bill, it provided that as a guiding principle, the interests 
of the victim must be considered in any decision regarding the imposition of punishment.811
The Bill further provided that evidence of surrounding circumstances, and of the impact of a 
sexual offence may be adduced at criminal proceedings for purposes of imposing an 
appropriate sentence.812 This allows the court to be well informed with regard to the extent of 
harm suffered by the person in question. The introduction of evidence on the after-effects of 
the sexual offence is only optional, but it provides a platform for impact statements.813 The 
victim’s right to provide information relating to the impact of the crime during the sentencing 
803 Ibid.
804 A Van der Merwe (n 289) 226.
805 South African Law Commission (n 35) 22.
806 s 3 (1) and (2) of the draft Sentencing Framework Bill, 2000.
807 Ibid at s 3 (3).
808 Ibid at s 47.
809 A Van der Merwe (n 289) 16.
810 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill, 2003.
811 Ibid at Schedule 1, s (l) (vi).
812 Ibid at s 17 (1) (b).
813 A Van der Merwe (n 289) 17.
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stage is also highlighted in a clause under the Service Charter for Victims of Crime in South 
Africa.814
The effective implementation of victim impact statements can be complicated by the victim’s 
age and level of intellectual development or maturity.815 Such victims are often unable to 
express themselves and may be withdrawn and suffer from dissociation as a result of the 
offence, which, in turn, would then influence the weight attached to the evidence produced 
about the harm suffered.816 It is submitted that, in the absence of any guidance regarding the 
use of victim impact statements in the sentencing process, such statements may lead to 
arbitrary application and a proper balance may not be achieved. 817 This is because the 
statement produced by the victim may result in the trigger of the presiding officers’ moral 
conviction.818 However, it has also been noted that it is possible to have a situation where the 
production of victim evidence may lead to the imposition of a lesser sentence.819
4.4.3. VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS AS RESTORATIVE MEASURES
The definition of restorative justice is not a straight-forward one, however it is clear from the 
above that it embraces victim involvement in the sentencing stage.820 There are however 
difficulties relating to the influence such victim involvement has on the eventual punishment 
imposed. In Thabethe, 821 the SCA was faced with the problem of how to approach the 
victim’s request not to impose a sentence of imprisonment on the offender; who was her 
stepfather, based on the fact that the offender was the sole provider for the family.
The victim was just two months away from her 16th birthday and while she was away from 
home without the necessary permission, she was fetched by the stepfather. On the way home, 
she pleaded with her stepfather not to tell her mother of her whereabouts, especially because 
814 Clause 2 of the Service Charter for Victims of Crime in South Africa, 2007. 
http://www.justice.gov.za/VC/docs/vc/2007%20Service%20charter% 20ENG.pdf :Last accessed 20 
September 2015.
815 A Van der Merwe (n 289) 230.
816 Ibid.
817 Ibid 381.
818 J Nadler and MR. Rose ‘Victim impact testimony and the psychology of punishment’ (2003) 88 
Cornell LR 442.
819 A Van der Merwe (n 289) 381.
820 A Van der Merwe (n 835); South African Law Commission (n 35) 83.
821 DPP, North Gauteng v Thabethe 2011 2 SACR 567 (SCA).
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she was at her boyfriend’s place. In return for this favour, the stepfather coerced the victim 
into sex. She subsequently reported the matter as rape and the stepfather admitted to the 
commission of it.822 As seen through the discussion of cases above, rape is considered a 
serious crime, especially that one relating to a child below the age of 16 years as it carries a 
minimum sentence of life imprisonment.823 The case went to the High Court and Bertelsmann
J presided over the case. This is when the victim of the crime; who was 17 years at the time
of her testimony, stated that she did not intend having the offender imprisoned. She also 
stated that although she was still hurt by the incident as she trusted the offender, she had 
outgrown it and was no longer afraid of him as she had in fact returned to live in the same 
household with him.824 In addition, the respondent was the breadwinner and both the victim 
and her family were dependent on him for survival.825
Bertelsmann J referred the matter to a probation officer; who had to facilitate a victim-
offender conference between the victim, the mother and the stepfather. The victim-offender
conference obviously yielded positive results and consequently the probation officer 
recommended that offender be sentenced to correctional supervision in terms of s 276 (1) (i) 
of the CPA.826 Owing to the fact that that the victim was under the age of 16 years, the 
sentence of life imprisonment was inevitable unless “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” existed to allow for a departure.827 In his judgment; Bertelsmann J set out a 
list of factors which he found to be substantial and compelling enough to warrant a departure 
from the prescribed sentence of life imprisonment. Accordingly, he handed down as an 
alternative, a sentence of ten years imprisonment, wholly suspended for a period of five years 
and coupled with a number of conditions.828 These conditions included the fact that he should 
not be convicted of a crime involving a sexual or violent offence and in addition, he was to 
remain under the employment of their current employer unless he is laid off through no fault 
on his part and he was also required to spend at least 80% of his salary on the support of the 
victim and her family. Lastly, he was required to attend a sex offenders’ programme and to 
perform 800 hours of community service.829
822 Ibid para 5.
823 S v Vilakazi (n 158); S v Bailey (n 397); S v Abrahams (n 308); S v Gqamana (n 273); S v 
Mahomotsa (n 110); Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions (n 252); S v Kwanape (n 432).
824 DPP, North Gauteng v Thabethe (n 821) paras 6 & 11.
825 Ibid.
826 Ibid para 8.
827 The Act (n 1) at s 51 (1).
828 DPP, North Gauteng v Thabethe (n 821) para 2.
829 Ibid.
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Bertelsmann J further pointed out that in light of the peculiar circumstances of the case, 
restorative justice is to be recognised and applied. He went on to say that in the present case; 
one which was of a grave nature, restorative justice provided a just and appropriate sentence 
which was able to punish the accused, restore the victim, helped to heal the harm caused by 
the commission of the crime and benefited the society by ensuring the rehabilitation of the 
offender and by the rendering of community service.830
The above-mentioned sentence however went on appeal to the SCA.831 The SCA like the 
court a quo, was of the view that there were factors that were sufficiently substantial and 
compelling to permit the court to depart from the prescribed minimum sentence of life 
imprisonment. 832 However, the SCA was also of the view that the court a quo had 
misdirected itself by according undue weight to the offender’s personal circumstances and 
failed to pay due regard to the seriousness of the offence and the broader interests of society. 
Further, the court held that the court a quo allowed its undue sympathy for the offender to 
negatively impact its decision. 833 The court set aside the above-mentioned sentence and 
replaced it with a sentence of ten years imprisonment, of which no portion of it was 
suspended.834 Bosielo J highlighted the fact that victim impact statements should be heard 
during sentencing and he referred to the Matyityi 835 judgment. In the mentioned case, 
emphasis was placed on the rights of victims to participate during the sentencing process, and
the reason for this was that there was an absence of information pertaining to the victims of 
the crimes in that particular case and the involvement of either direct or indirect victims was 
required, so the court can be well informed with the situation before it. Thus, it seems that the 
decision of Matyityi836 should be read as nothing more than a call for increased victim 
involvement in the sentencing process.837
In the case of Thabethe838 on the other hand, there was victim involvement and the SCA had 
to deal with the issue of what weight to attach to the views of victims in the sentencing 
830 Ibid para 10.
831 Ibid para 3.
832 Ibid para 22.
833 Ibid.
834 Ibid para 31.
835 S v Matyityi (n 233).
836 Ibid.
837 DPP, North Gauteng v Thabethe (n 821) para 21.
838 Ibid.
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stage.839 On the issue of restorative justice, the court also observed that restorative justice 
was slowly gaining recognition in the courts and has even received recognition in the 
Constitutional Court.840 Bosielo JA went on to say that the advantages of restorative justice
could not be doubted as a viable alternative sentencing option provided it is applied in proper 
cases. He further found that the application of restorative justice was inappropriate in the 
context of the serious crime of rape. He held that:
‘without attempting to lay down a general rule I feel obliged to caution seriously against the use
of restorative justice as a sentence for serious offences which evoke profound feelings of 
outrage and revulsion amongst law-abiding and right-thinking members of society. An ill-
considered application of restorative justice to an inappropriate case is likely to debase it and 
make it lose its credibility as a sentencing option. Sentencing officers should be careful not to 
allow some over-zealousness to lead them to impose restorative justice even in cases where it is 
patently unsuitable. It is trite that one of the essential ingredients of a balanced sentence is that 
it must reflect the seriousness of the offence and the natural indignation and outrage of the 
public’.841
Despite the court’s reiteration that victim impact statements must be heard, the court did not 
provide any practical guidelines in this regard. Further, though the court found reasons for a 
departure from the minimum sentence, those reasons were based on the merits of the case, 
and not on the basis that a restorative justice process had been held between the victim and 
offender.842
4.5. CONCLUSION
Despite the enactment of the 1997 Act, the sentencing task in cases that fall under the 
purview of s 51 of the 1997 Act, still poses some difficulty for courts because though they are 
consistent in the traditional factors they consider, they are still faced with the problem of how 
much weight should be placed on the Zinn triad, particularly the crime, the criminal and the 
interests of society. On the other hand, the prospects of rehabilitation remain highly 
speculative as there is no guarantee that prison terms falling outside of life imprisonment will 
yield positive results and will have a rehabilitative effect on the offender. The SCA will need 
839 Ibid.
840 Ibid para 20.
841 Ibid.
842 Ibid para 22.
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to set the record straight and explain what it means to have prospects of rehabilitation and 
how this becomes a substantial and compelling circumstance, as this can easily amount to the 
speculative hypotheses mentioned in the case of Malgas.843 The court further has to explain 
what criteria are to be used in the evaluation of whether an offender has the potential to be 
rehabilitated.
The concept of restorative justice and victim impact statements is also proving to pose some 
difficulties for our courts. Though it is slowly finding application and recognition in the 
different courts, some judicial officers have expressed concerns as to when it is it the 
appropriate time to apply it. However, what remains clear is that the recognition of such a 
concept in our sentencing process cannot conflict with the principle of proportionality, which 
remains the guiding principle where courts are faced with the task of imposing a sentence. 
Another issue that arises during the sentencing process is of whether courts should accept 
victim impact statements as admissible evidence and how much weight should they accord to 
them.
.  
843 S v Malgas (n 9).
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CHAPTER 5
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As previously stated, the purpose of the dissertation was to evaluate what factors could 
possibly constitute “substantial and compelling circumstances”, by critically discussing and 
analysing the manner in which our courts have defined the phrase. One explored the 
principles relevant to the subject and further took into account certain mitigating and 
aggravating factors in conjunction with the Zinn triad. In addition, one also looked at the 
prospects of rehabilitation as a possible substantial and compelling circumstance, which once 
coupled with other considerations, can warrant a departure from the prescribed sentences 
under s 51 of the 1997 Act. Finally, one also looked at certain developments in the law that 
have been recognised during the sentencing stage, specifically the concept of restorative 
justice as well as victim-impact statements.
The dissertation looked to answer the following questions:
a. Are the minimum sentencing provisions constitutional?
b. Do the minimum sentencing provisions strip the courts of its sentencing discretion?
c. How have the courts defined “substantial and compelling circumstances”?
d. What factors could possibly constitute “substantial and compelling circumstances”?
e. What factors are indicative of the prospects of rehabilitation and can the prospects of 
rehabilitation be recognised as a mitigating factor?
f. Has the recognition of victim impact statements as well as the concept of restorative 
justice assisted in the sentencing process?
After a thorough analysis of the law relating to the subject of interest, it is important to note 
that when dealing with a case falling within the purview of s 51 of the 1997 Act, the issue is 
of whether or not there are “substantial and compelling circumstances”, warranting a 
departure from the prescribed sentences as opposed to whether or not the prescribed 
sentences ought to be imposed in a particular case. Accordingly, a case falling within the 
purview of the said section will inevitably attract the applicable mandatory minimum 
sentence if certain triggering circumstances exist and only “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” will justify a deviation thereof.
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It is widely accepted that deciding on an appropriate sentence forms the most difficult part of 
the criminal justice process. 844 Perhaps this is because sentencing is considered to be 
dependent on the exercise of a judicial discretion, thus implying that there is no single 
acceptable answer to the question relating to the appropriateness of a sentence. Judicial 
officers are expected to exercise this discretion properly, mainly because it is accepted that 
the wider it is, the greater the chance of imposing sentences that reflect the individual judge’s 
personal convictions.845 One submits that the proper exercise of judicial discretion however
becomes particularly difficult as each case will often present many facts or factors which tend 
to have some bearing on the sentence eventually imposed. With that being said, the court is 
always faced with a difficult task of determining which of the many facts or factors are 
relevant in a particular case, and most importantly what weight to attach to each of those 
factors. As seen from the above-mentioned case law, when courts are faced with a case 
falling under s 51 of the 1997 Act, the difficult task they face is determining whether 
particular factors can be said to be substantial and compelling and the eventual evaluation
depends largely on an individual judge’s perception of what is compelling and what is not in 
that particular case.
In such instances however, it appears that though the discretion of the court is limited to the 
presence of “substantial and compelling circumstances” and is not totally free as it can only 
be exercised within statutorily defined bounds, courts still approach sentencing in the 
traditional manner by looking at mitigating and aggravating factors and accordingly, the 
enactment of the minimum sentences legislation has not fettered with the discretion they 
previously had. This is confirmed in the leading case of Malgas, which specifically provides 
for the consideration of traditional factors in the assessment of whether or not “substantial 
and compelling circumstances” exist. 
Though the purpose of the 1997 Act has been speculated to be one of consistency, the above-
discussed cases indicate that it cannot be the case because an offender ought to receive a
sentence proportional to the seriousness of the offence he or she has committed and other 
practices, such as the characterisation of offences have since resulted in differing sentences 
844 S v Kok 1998 1 SACR 532 (N) 55.
845 Terblanche (n 282) 114-115.
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being imposed for similar crimes, conceivably because the only available mechanism for 
deviation from the prescribed sentences has not been textually defined, thus resulting in 
different interpretations and inconsistent sentences as the discretion to deviate is linked to an 
individual’s recognition of what amounts to a serious crime and more importantly what 
amounts to substantial and compelling factors. For instance, the cases of Bailey and 
Abrahams present a similar situation in that in both cases, a father had been convicted of 
raping their daughter, who was under the age of 16 years and although one would perceive 
these cases as falling within the same spectrum, the sentences imposed were particularly 
different, so much so that in Bailey, the offender received a sentence of life imprisonment, 
while in Abrahams a sentence of 12 years was imposed. 
It would however be erroneous for one to conclude on this one basis that the enactment of the 
Act has not brought about any consistency as in the Malgas case, it was noted that though a 
court may consider past precedent, a mere discrepancy cannot be used as a sole criterion and 
a court that follows past precedent without proper consideration of the unique facts of a 
particular case will be abdicating its discretion to consider an appropriate sentence. Thus,
there can be no doubt that the facts of a particular case remain important in the exercise of the 
court’s discretion when dealing with cases falling under s 51 of the 1997 Act, mainly because 
the sentencing court still has to impose a sentence that is proportional to the seriousness of 
the offence committed and it is safe to say that such can only be achieved by looking at the 
unique facts of a particular case. Dodo reiterates the principle of proportionality, and further
states that the discretion to deviate from the prescribed sentences is the mechanism that 
ensures that courts do not impose grossly disproportionate sentences through the imposition 
of the prescribed sentences and consequently such a discretion makes the minimum sentences 
legislation constitutional.
In the interpretation of what amounts to “substantial and compelling circumstances”, a strict 
approach was developed and adopted in the Mofokeng case and it depicted that circumstances 
warranting a departure from the prescribed minimum sentences have to be exceptional and 
should not simply amount to the old traditional factors ordinarily considered when imposing 
a sentence, this seems appropriate in light of the Malgas case, where it was stated that the 
minimum sentences legislation meant that it was no longer “business as usual” when faced 
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with cases falling under s 51 of the 1997 Act. The approach adopted in Mofokeng proves to 
be particularly problematic however in that, the very discretion that makes the minimum 
sentences provisions constitutional will be limited as the requirement of exceptionality means
that the court has to find circumstances which are seldom encountered or rare and this may 
result in courts seldom deviating from the minimum prescribed sentences and as implied
above, the excessive limitation of the discretion to deviate from the minimum prescribed 
sentences legislation may well result in the provisions of the legislation being rendered 
unconstitutional. Though the phrase “substantial and compelling circumstances” was 
borrowed from the state of Minnesota in the United States of America, no guidance can be 
obtained from their application of the phrase as they apply a strict grid system which cannot 
be welcomed in our South African legislative framework as the rigid application of s 51 of 
the 1997 Act will impede on the discretion of judicial officers. Further, though a departure 
from the strict grid system is possible under the Minnesota Guidelines, such a departure is 
limited to a certain range specified under the grid, which means where a departure is 
warranted, the court will still have to adhere to a defined minimum and cannot deviate 
outside of that minimum.
South African courts have previously encountered a similar problem under the doctrine of 
“extenuating circumstances” as there was no guidance as to what factors were relevant in the 
enquiry relating to whether extenuating circumstances existed and warranted a departure 
from the prescribed maximum sentence of death. Similar to the case of “substantial and 
compelling circumstances”, various interpretations emerged through case law. The 
interpretation of the phrase as set out in Letsolo however was largely accepted as it did not 
impede on the courts discretion by limiting the type of or nature of factors that were to be 
considered in the enquiry. Thus, similar to a case relating to “substantial and compelling 
circumstances”, courts approached sentencing in the traditional manner and considered the 
traditional mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, it appears that the 
discretion of the judicial officers remained unfettered and the eventual sentence still 
depended on an individual’s appreciation of what amounted to an appropriate sentence in the 
particular case. 
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One submits that if courts are to approach sentencing in the traditional manner, particularly 
by taking into account the cumulative effect of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the 
position before the enactment of the 1997 Act remains intact and the introduction of the 1997 
Act thus has no dominating outcome. One further submits that owing to the fact that the 1997 
Act also aims at ensuring a severe, but proportional response from the courts to the 
commission of serious crimes, courts ought to revert back to the basic sentencing principles 
in conjunction with the Zinn triad in order to ensure a proportional balance between the 
different factors and the seriousness of the crime. The personal circumstances of the offender 
will not be underestimated and the effects of the crime will not be overstated, particularly 
because the courts will have to consider the offender, the crime and the interest of society in 
reaching an appropriate decision. Courts, in addition to the consideration of the harm caused 
by the commission of the crime, will look at all the circumstances that are related to or 
connected with the conduct of the offender in the commission of the crime, this includes all 
those factors that will either increase or diminish the offender’s guilt. By doing this, the 
courts may be able to guard against focusing on the heinousness of the offence as a balance 
between all relevant legs of the Zinn triad will have to be achieved.
In determining the circumstances relevant to the commission of the crime, courts ought to 
guard against placing greater weight on speculative factors such as the prospects of 
rehabilitation, which could be inferred from not only the immaturity (age) of the offender, but 
also from the remorse shown by the accused as well as the accused’s plea of guilt and the 
accused’s first offendership, which leads one to conclude that the offender is not a “habitual” 
offender and consequently, can still be rehabilitated. These mentioned factors are largely 
based on assumptions. For instance, a plea of guilt and remorse is largely dependent on the 
principle of genuineness, in which case, the accused has to satisfy the court of their true 
remorse. Considering the fact that the question of whether or not the remorse displayed by the 
accused is genuine is highly factual and it depends on the evidence presented by the accused 
in court, such remorse can easily be fabricated by the accused, for instance where the 
evidence against them is overwhelming. Similarly, one’s first offendership cannot be said to 
warrant the conclusion that they are unlikely to re-offend. One submits therefore that placing 
unwarranted weight on these speculative factors, may well result in in a consideration of what 
the Malgas case termed as “flimsy” factors.
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In addition to aiming at striking a balance between the offence, the offender and the interests 
of society, the courts ought to consider repairing the damages caused by the crime, those that 
do not only relate to the victims, but also to the community at large. In doing so, the courts 
will be empowered to recognise the concept of restorative justice as forming part of the 
sentencing process. Accordingly, it is important to remember that the concept of restorative 
justice places emphasis on the involvement of the victim in the sentencing process, through 
victim impact statements. One submits that such statements may well assist the court in 
achieving proportionality as the seriousness of the offence may be ascertained from the 
expressed impact of the crime on the victim. This means that the court will find “substantial 
and compelling circumstances” in the evidence that the victim has adduced in the process of 
relaying the impact of the crime to it. This will also mean that the legislation will still be 
compatible with a more restorative approach if courts are particularly cautious of basing the 
final decision on the impact of the crime. Further, through the recognition of restorative 
justice in the sentencing process, an appropriate sentence which is able to punish the accused, 
restore the victim and repair the damages caused by the commission of the crime may be 
achievable as seen in the Thabethe case.
Thus, though the need for greater consistency in sentencing remains important, after an 
analysis of the purposes, consequences and effects of mandatory minimum sentences
throughout this paper, the conclusion is that the introduction of such sentences in the South 
African sentencing regime has proven to result in more complications as more guidance as to 
what amounts to “substantial and compelling circumstances” and this is regardless of the 
manner in which they are specified or they operate within the law. Mandatory minimum 
sentences should be approached with a degree of caution, because though there is a discretion 
to deviate from the prescribed sentences under s 51 (3) (a) of the 1997 Act, courts may easily 
do so for “flimsy” reasons and where there is a need to deviate from the prescribed sentences, 
such need may not be recognised by the court. Further, South Africa should opt for the 
implementation of a more restorative approach, which will result in the restoration of the 
victim by repairing the damages suffered as a result of the crime. Finally, though a strong 
deterrent against crime is necessary, consistency will be achieved where courts adhere to the 
sentencing principles, most importantly the principle of proportionality and where courts 
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